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The thesis analyses the discursive construction of national identities in the media,
using Scotland as the case study. It focuses on the dialectic of the national Self and its
Others and looks at national identity construction in two main Scottish broadsheets,
the (Glasgow) Herald and the Scotsman. The two key discourse moments chosen for
analysis are the 1979 and 1997 devolution referenda in Scotland.
The thesis has three main strands of analysis. Firstly, the thesis looks at the Self/Other
dialectic in the media, more specifically in leader articles. It challenges the view that
the Other is always negative and stresses the role of positive Others in national
identity formation. The aim of the analysis is to identify various significant Others in
the discursive construction of Scottishness. While analysing the Self/Other dialectic in
the media, two other research themes emerged and were incorporated into my
research. Thus secondly, the thesis looks at the complex and often ambiguous use of
various national deixes in the Scottish media, focusing on personal pronoun 'we', and
other important deixes like 'people', 'nation', 'country', 'land', 'history' etc. Thirdly,
as it emerged that comment is contained just as much in political cartoons than in
leader articles, the thesis uses elements of visual sociology (including content and
semiotic analysis) to look at the representations of Scottishness in political cartoons in
a number of Scottish and British daily newspapers.
The thesis combines elements of discourse analysis, content analysis, visual
sociology, nationalism theory and media theories in order to achieve these goals and
hopes to achieve a better understanding of the Self/Other dialectic and the role of
national deixes in national identity building and preserving.
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1. Introduction
I grew up in Estonia. This small Baltic state had been part of the Soviet Union since
1941, as a result of the 1939 Molotov-Rippentrop Pact, the subsequent Soviet
invasion and mock elections. Despite heavy Russification attempts throughout the
Soviet era, Estonians remained very sure of their distinct Estonian identity. Although
it was an 'occupied nation, having its economy, legal rights and mass public culture in
the hands of the invader' (Guibernau 2004:130), Estonians could still be called a
nation. As an Estonian, I grew up speaking Estonian, playing with Estonian kids,
reading Estonian books and following Estonian media. Although it now seems racist,
as a child we were told not to run like a Russian, not to shout like a Russian, etc. I did
not have a single Russian friend, although almost half of the capital Tallinn's
residents were Russian-speaking (and roughly one third of the total population of
Estonia). We went to Estonian schools, they went to Russian schools. In summer
camps, the kids were supposed to mix. We never did. They were Russians, we were
Estonians, and we were very much aware of that crucial distinction. They were
speaking a different language that we were taught at school as a foreign language, and
which we learnt only reluctantly. They were noisier, livelier, more extrovert. They
were the Other.
Estonia regained independence in 1991, after a failed coup d'etat in Moscow. In
1992-1993, I spent a year in Denmark as an exchange student. I lived with a Danish
family and attended a Danish school. As Estonia had just re-entered the world arena
of nation-states a year earlier, the knowledge about the country was poor, even in
geographically close Denmark. Although look-wise I blended into Denmark
smoothly, I remained an exotic feature. Apart from facing questions like 'do you have
colour television in Estonia' and 'have you seen a microwave before' (the answer to
both was yes), I was also asked 'what is the favourite food in Russia' or whether it is
difficult to read Cyrillic. Shocked that I could be confused with Russians, I offered
long explanations, that we do not speak Russian, but Estonian. And that we are not
Orthodox, but Lutheran Protestant. I was making a clear distinction between 'us'
Estonians and 'them' Russians. But that was not all. I always added that the Estonian
language is not even related to Russian, but to Finnish. I also tried to insist that
Estonians are rather similar to Danes, who ruled the country some centuries ago. After
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all, just like in Denmark, the Estonian staple diet includes boiled potatoes, pork and
rye bread, and even liver pate.
That year in Denmark made me very much aware of the Self/Other dialectic. As I was
forced to be reflexive about my Estonianness, I realised that national identity is not
just 'there', but that it is very much construed in relation to what one is not. It also
made me realise that these Others that I kept comparing myself to as a representative
of my tiny Estonian nation, are not just negative, but also positive.
I spent just one year in Denmark, and at the end of the year my Danish was much
better than my Russian, which I was taught for 11 years at school. The difference, I
imagine, was that I did not try to resist learning an 'other language' Danish as I had,
collectively with my fellow Estonians, tried to resist learning Russian, the language of
our negative external (and internal) Other. The way the Other is perceived certainly
does matter.
As I note in the next chapter, the concept of the Other is increasingly popular in the
nationalism literature. A number of theories stress the role of the Other in national
identity formation and maintenance. But somehow these theories did not satisfy me. If
one is to believe the available literature, there is usually just one Other for any
national Self. And, according to this literature, that Other is usually threatening and
negative. I want to take issue with those approaches to identity and the Other and
suggest that there can be many Others for any nation at the same time, and these
Others do not need to be negative - they can also be positive.
What about Scotland? Just like nowadays many people ask me, without prompting,
whether all Estonians hate Russians (not true), there seems to be a belief that all Scots
hate the English, that England is an significant negative Other for Scotland. Is it true?
Does Scotland have any other Others, i.e. is Scottishness defined only - or mainly -
against Englishness? This thesis looks at media discourse in Scotland, and how the
media engage in the discursive construction of national identities, especially in the
context of constitutional change in the UK in the late twentieth century. There are
many reasons for that choice of topic, not least my interest to compare the Self/Other
dialectic in Scotland and Estonia. To begin with, I was curious whether
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Scotland/England/Britain dialectic is comparable to Estonia/Russia/USSR dialectic
(itself another research project).
The main emphasis of this thesis is on the forging of Scottishness in the media.
Scotland, as all other national communities, is an 'imagined community' (Anderson
1991). These are 'constructed and conveyed in discourse, predominantly in narratives
of national culture. National identity is thus the product of discourse' (Wodak et al.
1999:22). Nationhood 'involves a distinctive imagining of a particular sort of
community rooted in a particular sort of place' (Billig 1995:74). What kind of
community and what kind of place is Scotland imagined to be? This thesis will
analyse how the mass media in Scotland develop and mobilise national identities, and
how the media use and contest Scottishness in 'the various struggles around the
formation of a Scottish parliament' (Reicher and Hopkins 2001 :x). Of special interest
is the Self/Other dialectic in the construction of national identities. Reicher & Hopkins
suggest the 'context of division' that devolution has caused 'is bound to lead to a
focus on difference and hence a need to identify exactly what it is that renders any one
nation different from others' (2001:viii). Is that the case and if yes, then who are the
various Others relevant for the Scottish identity? Does England function as a
significant Other for Scotland, and if yes, then how is the relationship between them
imagined? I will also look at the role of 'Britishness' in the construction of
Scottishness. Could 'the propensity of people living in Scotland to claim a stronger
sense of Scottishness over Britishness' (Brown et al. 1998:211) be explained by the
way Britishness is constructed in the media? I will also look at the dialectic of the
Scottish national identity and the European identity. The rhetoric of 'Independence in
Europe' that the Scottish National Party 'has been brandishing ... for many years'
(Nairn 2000:151) is an interesting focus of analysis here. How does the Scottish
identity relate to 'Europeanness'? Is there such a thing as a European supranational
identity and how is it depicted in Scottish media?
Scotland's position within a larger UK framework arguably enhances 'the role for the
press in the nation's sense of itself' (Higgins 2004), rendering Scotland a particularly
interesting case study. Connell suggests:
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because references to the nation have been consistently ambiguous throughout
the 20th century - as to whether it is a reference to Scotland or Britain - the
relation between the media and the nation in Scotland has remained peculiarly
contested. An analysis of this contest may potentially offer a revealing
perspective on the relation between the media and the nation more generally.
(Connell 2003:188-189)
In addition to looking at the Self/Other dialectic, the thesis is concerned with the
deictic nature of media language as well as political cartoons. Chapter 8 deals
exclusively with deixis, which emerged as a theme when looking at the role of the
Other. The role of deixis and the issues at stake are explained in the beginning of
Chapter 8. Chapters Five and Six discuss the role of political cartoons and ways of
analysing visual data, respectively, and Chapter Nine looks at the depiction of
Scottishness in political cartoons.
The chosen methodology is analysis of discourse. The concept is understood here as
'a social construction of reality, a form of knowledge' (Fairclough 1995:18). More
specifically, I adopt Stuart Hall's definition of discourse for the purpose of my
research. Based on his discussion of 'the West' and 'the Rest', by discourse
we mean a particular way of representing [the Self], [the Other] and the
relations between them. A discourse is a group of statements which provide a
language for talking about - i.e. a way of representing - a particular kind of
knowledge about a topic when statements about a topic are made within a
particular discourse; the discourse makes it possible to construct the topic in a
certain way. (Hall 1992:291)
By constructing a topic in a certain way through a particular discourse, the discourse
'also limits the other ways in which the topic can be constructed' (ibid.). Hall, a
cultural theorist, compares his definition of discourse to the sociologists' definition of
'ideology' as 'a set of statements or beliefs which produce knowledge that serves the
interests of a particular group or class' (Hall 1992:292). The Self/Other dialectic, the
strategic use of deixes in creating various social categories and relations between
these categories, as well as various identity representations in political cartoons are all
viewed and understood in this thesis as elements of the ideology of (banal)
nationalism in modern Scotland.
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2. National identity
2.1. Identity as a social construct
The approach in the thesis is social constructionist, i.e. based on an understanding that
national identity is not something that just 'is', but it is a sociocognitive construct
(Cerulo 1997:390). In doing so, it differs considerably from essentialist
understandings of (national) identity that abound especially in earlier nationalism and
identity literature. These pay 'insufficient attention to how identity "works" or "is
worked", to process and reflexivity, to the social construction of identity in interaction
and institutionally' (Jenkins 1996:4). Most contemporary writers on nationalism have
accepted the constructed nature of nations and national identities. Hobsbawm
(1992:10) emphasises 'the element of artefact, invention and social engineering which
enters into the making of nations'. Bhabha (1990:293) writes about the 'cultural
construction of nationness1 as a form of social and textual affiliation'. Concepts like
'imagined community', 'forging a nation' etc., coined by Anderson (1991) and Colley
(1995) respectively, have found their way into discourse about nationalism and
identities, as has Billig's concept of 'banal nationalism' (1995), discussed later.
Neither nations nor national identities should be viewed as something 'immortal' and
everlasting, nor fixed and unchangeable, an idea so dear to nationalists: 'historically
speaking, most nations have always been culturally and ethnically diverse,
problematic protean and artificial constructs that take shape very quickly and come
apart just as fast' (Colley 1996:5). As social constructs, national identities are
constantly transforming. They are continually being renewed, transformed,
reinterpreted and renegotiated according to changing circumstances and interests. As
the social, political and economic conditions of a nation change, the nation is 're¬
defined in ways that make it relevant under a new set of circumstances and which
respond better to the material, symbolic or affective needs of its members'
(Triandafyllidou 1998:609). In order to trace such transformations in identity, the
current thesis analyses the discursive construction of Scottishness in the media
longitudinally, comparing media discourse in 1979 and 1997.
1 I have used Anderson's neologism 'nationness' throughout the thesis (see 1983:3), and also
'Scottishness' in parallel to 'Scottish identity', 'Britishness' in parallel to 'British identity' etc.
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2.2. Identity and otherness
Consulting the Oxford English Dictionary yields a Latin root (identitas, from
idem, 'the same') and two basic meanings. The first is a concept of absolute
sameness: this is identical to that. The second is a concept of distinctiveness
which presumes consistency or continuity over time. Approaching the idea of
sameness from two different angles, the notion of identity simultaneously
establishes two possible relations of comparison between persons or things:
similarity, on the one hand, and difference, on the other. (Jenkins 1996:4)
This definition of identity indicates that identity is 'operative only dialectically, i.e. in
connection with its opposite, otherness' (Therborn 1995:229). As similarity and
difference are implicit in one another, then one only knows who one is by knowing
who one is not (Sampson 1993:155; Cohen 1994:198; Jenkins 1996:3-5; 2000a:7;
Neumann 1996:48). Therborn even suggests that because of this important self/other
dialectic 'there is a primacy of otherness over sameness in making of identity', that
'Alter is primary to Ego'' (1995:229). Identities can only be 'achieved in relation to
real or imagined essential others' (Zukier 1996:1114). Taylor elaborates:
People do not acquire the languages needed for self-definition on their own.
Rather they are introduced to them through interaction with others who matter
to us - what George Herbert Mead2 called 'significant others'. The genesis of
the human mind is in this sense not monological, not something each person
accomplishes on his or her own, but dialogical. (1994:32)
From a sociological perspective all identities are constructed. National identity is no
different: 'If nationalism is an ideology of the first person plural, which tells 'us' who
'we' are, then it is also an ideology of the third person. There can be no 'us' without
'them" (Billig 1995:78):
Many psychologists and psychoanalysts argue that an infant first learns to
think of itself as a separate and unique 'self' by recognising its separation - its
difference - from others (principally, of course, its mother). By analogy,
national cultures acquire their strong sense of identity by contrasting
themselves with other cultures. (Hall 1992:279)
Contrasting, or othering, as I prefer to call it, is an important dimension of national
identity, and 'national discourses depend crucially on contrasting which is more
widespread than commonly assumed' (Eriksen 2004:57).
2
George Herbert Mead (1934) Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviourist.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press
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2.3. National identity and the Other
A.D. Smith notes in his critical overview of nationalism theories, that there are a
number of 'recent theories that emphasise the role of significant Others in the
formation of national identities and the oppositional framework of inclusion and
exclusion in nationalism' (Smith 1998:13; see also Fiirsich 2002:57). The question of
the Self and Other has been deemed constitutive of national identity formation (Cohen
1994:198). But what is exactly the role of significant Others in national identity
formation? How does the oppositional framework of inclusion and exclusion, of
sameness and difference, of the Self and the Other, function? Although these
questions have intrigued scholars of nationalism, the relationship between the nation
and its Other(s) has not yet been investigated in depth (Triandafyllidou 1998:594).
Craib attributes this non-investigation to the differences between older and newer
approaches to sociology and identity. He argues that 'it would perhaps be true to say
that whereas conventional sociology has concentrated on sameness, more recent and
particularly post-modern sociology has concentrated on difference' (Craib 1998:4).
The current thesis reflects the 'general tendency in social theory to emphasise change
and movement, the relativity of boundaries, the multiplicity of identities and internal
diversity, sacrificing cohesion, stability, homogeneity and stmcture as key concepts'
(Eriksen 2004:50).
National identities and nationalism require the existence of the Other. 'The encounter
with the Other is certainly crucial', remarks Smith (1998:203). It is a precondition of
nationalism and national identity. Kamusella has even jokingly noted that without the
Other, 'nation- and nation-state-building would be as much possible as clapping of
one hand' (1999). Guibernau describes how in the Middle Ages
through the creation of markets, the intensification of trade, the fighting of
wars and the slow but progressive amplification of the state's scope, there
emerged a consciousness of forming a community which differed from those
of other groups outside. It was precisely at this stage that we can talk about the
emergence of nations. (1996:51)
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Without the sense of the Other, no sense of national 'us' emerges. And before this
consciousness of Otherness, there can be no nationalism. Before nationalism - and
awareness of the Other - there is only culturalism. The latter
referred to a natural conviction of cultural superiority that sought no
legitimisation or defence outside of the culture itself. Only when ... cultural
values sought legitimisation in the face of the challenge posed by the Other in
the late nineteenth century, do we begin to see 'decaying culturalism' and its
rapid transformation to nationalism. (Duara 1996:154)
The dialectic of the national Self and Other has not been under extensive scrutiny, and
hence there are not many authors who have criticised this position. Bhiku Parekh has
contributed to this debate, though, arguing that although 'identity and difference are
logically interrelated concepts in the sense that to know something is also to know
what it is not', sameness/identity is 'logically and ontologically prior to difference,
and the latter cannot be its basis or criterion' (Parekh 1995:256). Although difference
is important, it is 'ontologically secondary and derivative' (Parekh 1994:502). It is a
chicken-and-egg question: 'identities can only function to exclude and leave out
because of their capacity to include and enclose. We lose something important by
concentrating on one or the other side of this particular coin' (Craib 1998:8). The
current thesis therefore looks both at the discursive construction of sameness and
difference, of Scottishness and otherness in the media.
I noted earlier that national identities are social constructs, and are constantly
transforming and changing. Consequently, 'each age and society recreates its Others'
(Said 1995:332), and we should therefore look at the relationship between the nation
and its Others dynamically, over time. Just as identity is not engraved in stone, the
role of the Other(s) is not constant either. The intensity of the Other's influence on
'us' varies. Identity, and the Self/Other dialectic, is especially salient as 'a reflection
of the uncertainty produced by rapid change and cultural contact' (Jenkins 1996:9).
Thus the Other plays an important part during the early stages of identity formation,
but also at the times of crisis. According to Therborn,
Differentiation is a very uneven process over time. It involves certain ruptural
moments and stable, durable sentiments of self-other perceptions in-between.
In the field of collective identities, the most dramatic and important moments
of identification are wars and the breakdown of a given state order. (1995:230)
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Indeed, 'making of basic distinctions between "us" and "them" is meat and drink for
any propaganda war' (Schlesinger 199la:62). Extreme crisis, like warfare, but also
more peaceful, but nevertheless significant political, social and economic changes,
can be a homogenising force for the nation, and at the same time actively cause
'othering'. Eriksen states that 'warfare can serve as a nationally integrating force. Any
segmentary oppositions ... within the polity may be postponed and "forgotten" when
an external enemy encourages the realisation of the highest level of the system of
oppositions' (1992:67). In these instances of social, political and economic crisis there
is a pressure to reformulate and redefine the particular identity of the nation. Often the
'old' identity is no longer suitable, and it is then that the significant Other becomes
more salient and powerful. The significant Other 'serves in overcoming the crisis
because it unites the people in front of a common enemy, it reminds them "who we
are" and emphasises that "we are different and unique'" (Triandafyllidou 1998:603).
The character of the Self/Other dialectic and the content of the discourse about the
Other have important implications for the otherness of the Other; 'the metaphoric
assertions men make about themselves and about others influence their behaviour'
(Fernandez 1986:6). Depending on how the national Self draws its boundaries and
addresses its Other, 'the consequences for the "Other" will be significantly different in
each case' (Duara 1996:163). The rhetoric counts: 'what matters is not the
representation of the Other as such but the actual nature of the difference that is
constructed' (Delanty 1995:5). The choice is between diversity (the recognition of
otherness) or division (the negation of otherness). If the Other is represented as a
threatening negative Other to the national Self, the enemy rhetoric may lead to
xenophobia and racism against the Other (Delanty 1995:5; Keane 1995:193;
Guibernau 1996:4). It would be difficult to sustain neutral or positive Self/Other
dialectic in a situation where the difference is always construed in negative and
threatening terms.
Whatever the balance of importance between the two aspects of identity, the
discussion of the dialectic with the Other is important. Neumann suggests that
'analyses of self/other nexuses hold out the promise of a better understanding of who
"the actors" are, how they were constituted, how they maintain themselves, and under
which preconditions they may thrive' (1996:168).
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2.4. Various Others
The Other and the imagining of otherness is an important and integral part of national
identity formation. But
foreignness is not an undifferentiated sense of 'Otherness'. Obsessively fine
distinctions can be made between different groups of foreigners. Indeed,
debates and controversies arise about how similar or how different various
groups of foreigners are to 'us'. (Billig 1995:80)
In this section, these possible various groups of Others and their role in identity
formation are outlined. In order to understand better the role of various Others, some
kind of analytical categorisation of different possible Others would be helpful. There
are few typologies of Others put forth in nationalism literature. For instance, Sampson
(1993) has differentiated between real others, imagined others, historical others and
generalised others. Triandafyllidou (1998) distinguishes between two main types,
external and internal significant Others, and further subtypes within these two. Duara
(1996) writes about internal historical Others, potential Others and hidden Others',
Hobsbawm (1992) about present aliens, past aliens, and purely notional aliens. I wish
to recommend a different, somewhat simpler typology of Others.
Triandafyllidou (1998:600) writes that 'the history of each nation is marked by the
presence of significant others that have influenced the development of its identity by
means of their "threatening" presence'. Even though she is correct in noting that the
number of Others in the case of each nation is multiple - i.e. the Self in its discourses
of identity is continuously negotiating several identities simultaneously - these do not
always have to be threatening. Indeed, in her recent book, Triandafyllidou has
included a category of 'inspiring' others (2002a), a marked departure from her earlier
writings. Identities are always constructed in dialectic with the Other, but this
relational opposition does not have necessarily to be antagonistic. Therborn
(1995:230) writes that 'identity should not be conceived as just a blank negation of
the Other. Identity is also, normally, something positive, an identification with
somebody or something, after an awareness of separateness, that is'. Thus identities
do not have to be perceived as negative and mutually hostile, but they do need to be
perceived as separate. As Billig writes again, the images of Others 'tend not to be
uniformly scornful. Some foreigners are presumed to be more meritorious that others'
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(1995:80). Following these insights, I suggest that significant Others can be either
positive or negative.
Apart from the possible positiveness of the Other, the Other does not necessarily have
to be on the outside, but may also be an 'internal Other'. Indeed, the ethnically and
culturally peripheral minorities often serve as the Other (Neumann and Welsh
1991:30). Or to put it more clearly, 'Significant others may be distinguished as
internal, namely, those who belong to the same political entity with the in-group, and
as external, namely those that form part of another state' (Triandafyllidou 1998:609).
In reality the construction of boundaries between the internal and external Others is
more complex. From this I derive another analytical dyad - that the Other can be
either internal or external.
It is important to clarify here that in social science literature the 'internal Other' can
also refer 'to the subconscious, a phase of the self, or the experience of self-
estrangement (e.g. Bakhtin 1981)' (Riggins 1997:4). In this thesis, the internal or
external nature of the Other is defined more or less geographically. Also, the Other
can be non-national, e.g. an historical event, political institution, a specific collective
non-national entity etc. The Other has included 'women, non-western peoples,
peoples of colour, people of subordinate social classes, people with different sexual
desires' (Sampson 1993:4). Especially the role of women as a potential Other in
forging nations and their identities has been recognised recently, resulting in a number
of feminist writings on nationalism. For instance, Anthias & Yuval-Davis show in
Woman-Nation-State (1989) how women are involved in ethnic and national
processes as 'signifiers of ethnic/national differences - as a focus and symbol in
ideological discourses used in the construction, reproduction and transformation of
ethnic/national categories'. Women are also used 'as symbols of national identity in
the case of Greek-Cypriot nationalism', for instance (Walby 1996:237). The former
British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, is known for singling out the striking
miners in 1984/85 as the 'enemy within' the British state (see for instance Fairclough
and Wodak 1997), also a non-national Other. This thesis looks mostly at national
Others.
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To understand better the role of various Others in identity formation, I suggest a
simple typology of Others to be used in the following discussion, based on these two
dyads: External versus Internal and Negative versus Positive, resulting in four ideal
types of Others (Petersoo 2000). All four types of Others can be relevant for the
identity formation at any one time, but they do not have to. Possible Others in identity
formation are the following:
THE OTHER POSITIVE NEGATIVE
INTERNAL Positive Internal Other Negative Internal Other
EXTERNAL Positive External Other Negative External Other
A positive Other is used as a positive reference point for 'sameness' and identity, a
'role model' for the national Self in the construction of its nationhood. The difference
of 'them' from 'us' is constructed positively or shown to be minimal. Or, at least, a
positive Other is an accepted and legitimate part of the wider 'us', the national Self. A
negative Other is, on the contrary, related to the 'difference' aspect of the identity. It
is an Other against whom nationhood is constructed, either in an outright negative
way, or by rejection, by claiming that this particular Other has no role or legitimate
part in the identity of the national Self. This is where the Freudian 'narcissism of
minor differences' sometimes comes to a full play. For example, looking for
differences between Scotland and England seems to become more intense and 'grow
in importance the more the two societies grow similar' (McCrone 2001a: 103).
The definition of somebody or something as positive or negative Other, as internal or
external Other, is a process that can have important consequences for the particular
Other (see e.g. Delanty 1995:5). And this can be an ambivalent and ambiguous
process. For instance, strictly speaking, an internal negative Other is at the same time
also external, in a sense that it is marked out as unwelcome, as something that does
not belong to the national Self (i.e. the Other is territorially internal but socially
external). And vice versa - the external Other is socially also internal, as it is
perceived as relevant, whether positively or negatively. One can draw parallels here
with the ambiguous use of the personal deixis 'we' - often used in political speeches.
The 'we' can include the addressee, but does not always do so, e.g. it can designate
only the speaker, or the speaker and all the listeners, or the speaker, all listeners and
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all other people of the 'imagined community'. I do acknowledge the inherent
ambiguity of the external/internal and positive/negative typology, but will
nevertheless proceed with it, as it is a useful theoretical tool.
How many of these possible Others are 'in use' or functional at any given moment,
and in what way, varies. According to Triandafyllidou, in the course of history 'more
than one nation or ethnic group becomes a salient outgroup' influencing the identity
formation of the ingroup. But she claims that, at any given time, there is only one
significant other for each nation which affects the formation and transformation of its
identity (Triandafyllidou 1998:600). It seems more reasonable to believe, though, that
there is room for more than one Other at any given time. National identity formation
should not be seen as a strictly 'monogamous' dialectical affair between one nation
and one significant Other, but as a complex interplay between the nation and various
Others. Any identity argument against one Other can at the same time be an argument
for another Other (cf. Reicher and Hopkins 2001:84) - thus indicating a possible
multiplicity of Others.
As the identity of a nation may be defined and based on a cluster of several different
key variables, as language, religion, culture, history etc., each of these aspects may
require a different Other. Thus the basis of otherness can vary in different situations.
Indeed, 'the Other may be defined in any terms of non-identity, family, tribe,
ethnicity, class, religion, and so on' (Therborn 1995:233). Although most write about
ethnic and national groups as Others, the concept is broader: 'Others may also be
women for men, the rich for the poor, Californians and New Yorkers for Midwestern
Americans, the young for the old, conservatives for Marxists, tourists for natives, and
so on' (Riggins 1997:4). In studies of nationalism it is thus 'certainly not enough to
see the Other in terms of his or her ethnicity'.
The dialectic with one Other differs from that with another. 'We adjust our own
emerging actions in anticipation of the responses of these various others' (Sampson
1993:106). This different, adjusted dialectic with different Others is also echoed in
Triandafyllidou's opinion. She writes that there are 'different conflict dynamics that
are developed between the nation and [each] significant other, and the ways in which
these condition the development of national identity' (1998:602) - note again the
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prevalent assumption, that the Self/Other dialectic is only conflict-driven, that the
relationship is always negative.
In order to better understand the role of various Others in the process of nation
building and maintaining, I will look at various positive and negative, and external
and internal Others, and illustrate the various Others in more detail.
2.4.1. Internal others
2.4.1.1. Negative internal Others
Examples of negative internal Others are numerous. Commonly immigrant groups are
the Other against whom the identity of a nation is constructed, and who, as a result,
'usually live and work in a climate of discrimination, marginalisation and racism'
(Smith 1995:95). Hjerm writes that 'it is even difficult to see how "others" or
immigrants ... could ever be viewed in a non-derogatory way' (1998:5.2), as
"Othering' the immigrant is functional to the development of national identity and to
achieving or enhancing national cohesion' (Triandafyllidou and Spohn 2003:10).
The function of the identification of internal negative Others has been to homogenise
and unify the 'majority' nation. The 'identification and prosecution of internal
enemies has been a familiar technique of integration for centuries' (Eriksen 1992:64).
As Hobsbawm (1992:91) writes: 'there is no more effective way of bonding together
the disparate sections of restless peoples than to unite them against outsiders'. As I
suggested previously, these 'outsiders' do not have to be spatially outside. An internal
Other is usually negative, because it 'disrupts the cultural and political order of the
nation, and thus challenges its sense of unity and authenticity,' threatening to
'contaminate' it (Triandafyllidou 1998:603; Triandafyllidou and Spohn 2003:10), to
'undermine the fabric of the nation' (Smith 1995:95).
Especially in Europe, Jews have been an important negative reference point, together
with the Roma: 'in common with anti-Semitism, anti-Roma racism is deeply
embedded within European culture' (Evans 1996:43). While Jews have been othered
because of their religion, then Gypsies' 'nomadic culture has marked them as
outsiders' (ibid.). Indeed, the negative otherness of these two groups is so apparent,
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that it has led Therborn to say 'the non-European immigrants and refugees have
become the Jews and Gypsies' of the right-wing extremists in contemporary Europe
(1995:323). Jews, having an 'outstanding history' of negative otherness in Europe,
and therefore being 'frequently excluded and ostracised' in the past (Hall 1992:280),
can, according to Hobsbawm, even become 'purely notional aliens'. This has
happened in Poland, 'where anti-Semitism continues to explain Polish ills in the total
absence of Jews' (Hobsbawm 1992:174). In a way, this is the same and the opposite
of the idealisation of Baltic Germans in Estonia in their absence. Eriksen writes that
indigenous or other ethnically distinctive populations ... may serve as negative
symbols of the nation. [...] This was clearly the case in Nazi Germany, where
Germanness was defined in contrast to the un-Germanness of Jews, Gypsies and
Slavs (and still is to some extent). (Eriksen 1992:64; see also the chapter on
Germany in Greenfeld 1992)
The negative internal Other can also be another large nationality living within the
same political territory. For example, 'in Belgium, Flemish nationalism was
constructed against Francophone Walloon cultural as well as economic hegemony'
(Woolf 1996:35).
Another example of an internal negative Other are African-Americans in the United
States. Hobsbawm writes that '"visible" ethnicity tends to be negative, inasmuch as it
is more usually applied to define "the Other" than one's own group' (Hobsbawm
1992:66), and the otherness of African-Americans has until recently been negative.
American writer Toni Morrison has argued that 'the very heart and soul of what it
means to be American is founded on constructing an accommodating black presence',
that American identity 'is constructed on the basis of implicit and necessary
comparisons with the African-American' (Sampson 1993:11, 87).
2.4.1.2. Positive internal Others
A positive internal Other is usually a minority, living within the same territory with
the majority nation, who is not considered to be a threat to the identity and integrity of
the constituent nation.
Not many examples of positive internal Others have been described in nationalism
literature. Eriksen writes that sometimes, if not exceptionally, the 'ethnic minority
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populations can also be used symbolically ... as metaphors of the nation' (Eriksen
1992:64). Although the previous section established that the othering of immigrants is
common and functional to the development of national cohesion, then not all
immigrants are perceived as threatening, negative Others:
With regard to European Union, for instance, citizens of fellow member states are
endowed with the same rights and duties as the host country nationals, because
they are citizens of the Union. Moreover, these people do not generally suffer
from discrimination in the social sphere. Similarly, North Americans and citizens
from other industrialised countries may be foreigners in Europe but do not come
within the negative stereotype usually associated with immigration. In other
words, the process of Othering the immigrant is activated towards specific groups.
(Triandafyllidou and Spohn 2003:11)
Minorities can be considered to be a positive Other in case of the same territorial-
ancestral descent. For instance, in Greece 'the differentiation between Greeks and
"Others" is salient also with regard to immigrants, among whom a distinction is made
between those of Greek descent and the "others", the "aliens'" (Triandafyllidou et al.
1997). The 'Greek immigrants' 'returning' from Anatolia to Greece, form a positive
reference group, part of the wider national imagined Greek 'us'3. Such 'resident
territorially compact minorities, often of long standing' are present in most, if not all,
European countries. In general, such communities are 'generally viewed as
"legitimate", if less favoured, co-residents of the national state, who had in earlier
periods experienced neglect and discrimination on the part of elites of the dominant
ethnie' (Smith 1995:95). In the sphere of nationalism, where 'the universality of
ethnic opposition' (Smith 1998:181) is prevalent, being considered 'legitimate, if less
favoured', can be considered a positive statement.
I have discussed the positive internal Others in Estonia in much more detail elsewhere
(Petersoo 2000). There have always been autochthonous ethnic minorities living on
the territory of today's Estonia. Most important have been the Baltic German
(baltisakslased) community, but also the Swedish communities of the west-coast
(rannarootslased). Both date back to the thirteenth century (Piirimae 1997:50). In
particular, the German nobility and merchants remained 'despite periodic change in
3 In reality, the issue was more complex. The 2002 Greek box-office hit 'Touch of Spice' follows a
story of one Greek family deported from Istanbul in 1905 for being of Greek ethnicity. However, they
were constantly reminded in Greece that they are 'Turks'.
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formal suzerainty the key elites in Estonia from the thirteenth to the twentieth century'
(Raun 1997:406). This German upper class was deeply resented by the Estonian
population. The Estonian columnist Andrei Hvostov has suggested that hatred of the
Baltic German is, rhetorically speaking, deeply rooted in Estonian blood (1998:104),
that 'lingering Estonian resentment against the Baltic Germans' (Raun 1997:409)
cannot be denied. However, some sort of 'Renaissance' of Baltic Germanness, has
taken place since Estonia regained its independence in 1991 (Hvostov 1998:109).
Writings 'about Germans have become much more positive, recognising for example
the contribution of the nobility to the improvement of Baltic agriculture far beyond
that of Russia' (Lieven 1993:138). A 1991 study revealed that more than a quarter of
Estonian respondents believe that Germany and Baltic Germans have positively
influenced Estonian development (Vihalemm and Lauristin 1997:285). This is wholly
understandable as 'the massive swing towards Western models naturally brings with it
a reappraisal of the role of Baltic Germans who were, after all, for centuries the chief
representatives of Western culture in the region' (Lieven 1993:138). Curiously then,
an internal Other, previously bitterly resented and no longer even present (Hitler
called all Baltic Germans back to Germany during the 1939 Umsiedlung), today is
valorised and strongly used as a positive Other - making them a purely 'notional'
Other.
2.4.2. External Others
2.4.2.1. Positive external Others
A positive external Other is usually a neighbouring nation and/or state not perceived
as a threat by the nation in question, but rather as a positive reference point. This
Other is used as a role model, a standard that the nation wants to achieve, become
like. Again, there are not many examples discussed in nationalism literature, as most
authors treat Others as something negative. However, positive external Others play a
very important role in Estonia. I have identified three important positive Others in
Estonia - Finland, Scandinavian countries and the supranational Other 'Europe'
(Petersoo 2000). I will briefly describe them below.
Finland has been a significant positive Other for Estonia. From the beginning of
national awakening in the nineteenth century, the Estonian national movement 'was
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primarily oriented towards Finland' (Piirimae 1997:63). The architects of Estonian
nationalism felt great admiration for Finland, which was seen as culturally much more
emancipated (Jansen 1994:2251). Reasons for this are manifold. Geographical
proximity is one factor, but more important has been linguistic proximity. Estonian
and Finnish are two of the few non-Indo-European languages spoken in Europe4.
Together with Hungarian, they are the only three of the Finno-Ugric languages to
have their own nation-states. This linguistic and geographical closeness has
contributed to the development of Estonian identity. 'Finland was Estonia's alter ego'
and during the Soviet occupation 'the existence of Finland sustained the idea of a
Republic of Estonia, keeping alive the Estonians' vision of what the country may have
been had they stood up to the Russians' (Ruutsoo 1995b: 177). 'The indigenous
features of a Finno-Ugric language and folklore, shared with Finns, helped Estonians
maintain an inner distance from the Soviet-Russian, i.e., Byzantine forms of everyday
practices during the five decades of occupation' (Lauristin 1997:35), and it was
largely due to these cultural Finno-Ugric markers that Estonia 'has remained a
distinctive culture-space differentiated from Russia' (Mettam and Williams
1998:369). Another factor related to the Finnish positive external Other was Finnish
television. Available in the northern half of Estonia since 1958, and being easily
comprehensible to Estonians, it became an 'electronic window on the West' (Kionka
and Vetik 1996:136). Access to Finnish TV channels on the other side of the Iron
Curtain was a factor 'more important than can be imagined by Europe' (Ruutsoo
1995a: 15), as it 'afforded Estonians more information on current affairs and more
access to Western culture and thought than any other group in the Soviet Union'
(Kionka and Vetik 1996:137).
Scandinavian countries have been another positive external Other instmmental in
developing Estonian identity. Estonia has been both under Danish and Swedish rule
during its history. Elements of Danish and Swedish cultural heritage are today 'more
positively accepted as part of an Estonian identity'; direct contacts with Sweden,
Denmark and Finland 'have been a major source of cultural influence ... shaping new
patterns of everyday life and new post-modern values' (Lauristin 1997:36). According
to a study conducted in 1993, ninety percent of Estonians perceived themselves to
4 The others are Basque language and Finno-Ugric Hungarian language.
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have the highest number of similar cultural features in common with Nordic countries
(Kirch and Kirch 1995:52-53).
Finally, Europe has been an important positive external Other in Estonia. Estonia sees
itself firmly positioned in Europe. The self-image of the 'membership in the Western
cultural tradition of West-European Christianity' is supported by the 'legal and
educational systems, developed through the centuries according to Swedish and
German traditions' (Lauristin 1997:35)5. At the dawn of nineteenth century, the
'Young Estonia' movement popularised the slogan 'Let us be Estonians, yet become
Europeans', 'a conscious effort to define Estonian culture alongside German culture
as a part of the general European cultural stock' (Estonian Institute 1997). Indeed, the
so-called 'return to Europe' was 'the keynote of Baltic national feeling since its
rebirth in the 1980s' (Lieven 1993:374). 'Return to Europe' and Estonia's will to be
'accepted again by the West and to be recognised as an integral part of the Western
cultural realms is a more substantial driving force in [Estonia's] development than
mere economic or political motivation could ever be' (Lauristin 1997:29). The
accession of Estonia to the European Union in May 2004 has, in many ways,
accomplished these goals.
2.4.2.2. Negative external Others
A negative external Other is usually a neighbouring state. For example,
Triandafyllidou describes 'rival nations (or nation-states), neighbours of the ingroup,
which contest some part of the ingroup's homeland or which are in possession of
lands that the ingroup claims to be part of its own territory, namely the nation's
irredentia'. The national Self is afraid that the external Other is going to 'challenge the
territorial and/or cultural integrity of the nation from "without"' (Triandafyllidou
1998:603). This also suggests that the dialectic between 'us' and 'them', should be
viewed in the context of international relations (Neumann and Welsh 1991;
Triandafyllidou 1998).
5 Note how the distinctiveness of legal and educational systems is emphasised in the context of
expressing the distinctiveness of Estonian national identity. This is very similar to the way the distinct
legal, religious and educational systems are referred to in Scotland when distinguishing latter's
distinctiveness from England.
Lauristin is also appealing to Sweden and Germany as positive Others, both serving as a link between
Estonianness and Europeanness.
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There are several examples of negative external Others in the history of European
nationalisms. The 'fear of enemies (barbarians or non-Greeks) and hatred of them'
had their origins in pre-modern Greece (Harle 1990:5). Elsewhere in Europe, France
seems to be one of the most 'popular' negative Others. Greenfield suggests that
France was 'ultimately responsible for the emergence of German nationalism':
France gave Germans the Enemy, against whom all the strata of the disunited
German society could unite, on whom everyone could blame their misfortunes and
vent their frustrations. Hatred of France inspired the uncertain patriotism within
the German breast; it provided this new as yet flickering passion with a reason for
existence and with a focus. (1992:372)
France also served as a negative Other for Britain in general, and for England in
particular - and vice versa. It was 'the resentment toward England that shaped the
ideological foundations of the French national consciousness' (Greenfeld 1992:180),
and in the eighteenth century 'Britain developed many of its modern symbols of
nationhood in conscious contradiction to French styles of nation-making' (Billig
1995:81). For Britain, France was the negative external Other, the Enemy that
'brought Britons, whether they hailed from Wales or Scotland or England, into
confrontation with an obviously hostile Other and encouraged them to define
themselves collectively against it' (Colley 1996:5). A British identity was
'superimposed over an array of internal differences in response to contact with the
Other, and above all in response to conflict with the [French] Other' (Colley 1996:6).
Colley describes the relationship between France and Britain: Tike another famously
unhappy couple, the British and the French had their teeth so sunk into each other in
these years (and long after) that they could neither live together peacefully, nor ignore
each other and live neutrally apart' (Colley 1996:1,3).
Chapter 7 discusses the idea of Scottishness as partially based on a negation of
Englishness. Meanwhile, another more recent example is the revival of Greek
nationalism, triggered by an external Other - Macedonia. Triandafyllidou analyses
'how and why the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia [FYROM] has
represented an external significant other for Greece in the period 1991-1993 and the
effect that this has had on Greek national identity'. Apparently the transformation of
Macedonia 'into a nation-state has been perceived by Greece as a challenge to its
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cultural distinctiveness and territorial integrity' (Triandafyllidou 1998:604) and forced
the Greeks to redefine their Greekness. Greece itself has figured as a negative external
Other in Turkey, alongside the Armenians in eastern Anatolia (Gol 2005).
2.5. Some critical remarks about the concept of the Other
It is important to bear in mind that although sameness and otherness are two sides of
the same identity 'coin', the dialectic with the Other is just one aspect of (national)
identity formation. 'Modern nations and nationalism involve many more elements
than a heightened concern for monitored boundaries and the exclusion of
"foreigners'" (Smith 1998:83). Therborn, though suggesting that Alter is primary to
Ego, admits that 'the experience of the Otherness of the Other is intimately related,
but irreducible to the discovery and the making of the self (1995:230).
If the essence of identity becomes its difference from the Other, if identity-forging is
focused on opposition to the Other, this cannot be viewed positively. Delanty calls
this 'a pathological form' of identity (1995:5), which
fetishes difference and discourages inter-communal borrowing. It encourages the
community to pay far more attention to how and how much it differs from the
others than to whether or not it is true to itself. It also tends to stress only those
aspects of it in which it differs from others and to distort and falsify its way of life.
(Parekh 1994:503)
This kind of quest for identity 'leads to paradoxes and proves self-defeating' (Parekh
1995:256). Using enemy images/negative Others in order to increase the cohesiveness
of the Self can be dangerous:
certain analyses - Huntington's (1993) essay on the clash of civilisations comes to
mind - seem to offer 'othering' as a piece of practical advise for how to glue a
particular human collective together. Integration and exclusion are two sides of the
same coin, so the issue here is not that exclusion takes place, but how it takes
place. If it is proposed to achieve integration at the price of active othering, that
price seems to be too high to pay. Analyses of collective identity formation should
contribute, however timidly, to our living in difference, and not to some of us
dying from otherness. (Neumann 1996:168)
There have not been many thorough analyses of the character of the Other and the
dialectic of nations and their Others. I wish to argue against the prevailing and
widespread assumption that the Other is a negative contrast only, and explore further
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the existence and role of positive Others. As identity consists of two aspects -
sameness and difference - the Other should not only be seen functional in difference,
but also in similarity. No claims are made that the Self/Other dialectic is the one and
only aspect of identity formation process worth studying: 'Collective identities
emerge as multifaceted, and must be studied as such' (Neumann 1996:167).
2.6. Concluding remarks
There are two main aspects of national identity that are important for the current
research. Firstly, that national identity is constructed socially through discourse.
Secondly, that national identity is constructed in Self-Other dialectic. Based on those
two main premises, I suggest a following operational definition of national identity for
this research, based on a definition given by Luther (2000):
National identity is a specific form of social identity embodying shared core
values and norms associated with the specific nation, enclosing its sense of
perceived differences and similarities vis-a-vis other nations, and having been
discursively constructed over an extended historical time period.
Thirdly, I suggest that national identity is partially constructed and maintained in the
media and by the media. The media are one important arena where the nation is daily
reproduced. But what is exactly the relationship between the media and the discursive
construction of national identities and the Others? How do we bridge the media,
national identities and the Other? What is the role of mass media in the inter-ethnic
relations and in sustaining the Self/Other dialectic? There are a number of studies that
have attempted to throw light on that relationship. Schneider (2001) analyses othering
strategies in German discourse; Hargreaves (1996) describes the deviant construction
of immigrant suburbs as so-called Banlieues in the French media; Triandafyllidou
(1999) discusses the discourse of nation and immigration in the Italian press. These
studies support the hypothesis that mass media provide the decisive and possibly the
best site to examine the creation of the Other in society, as the mass media construct
the national identity by means of exclusion (Said 1995; van Dijk 1997; Chung
2000:99; Fiirsich 2002:65). Ruxandra Trandafoiu's research confirms that
the media create collective identity, but they do it by distinguishing the 'in-group'
from the 'out-group' in order to reinforce group boundaries. The media contribute
to nation building, but by reproducing positive stereotypes of 'us' and negative
stereotypes of 'them.' (2004:68)
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While this confirms the tendency to operate by means of exclusion, again only the
negative othering is noted. In the Scottish media, explicit negative 'othering' is less
common, but negative stereotyping of the Other takes the form of attributional bias (a
concept introduced by Luther 2000). However, positive othering is not uncommon
either, as can be seen in my analysis of Scottish media in Chapter 7.
Edward Said's influence cannot be underestimated here. His seminal study
Orientalism has inspired many researchers to use media texts, in addition to literature
and anthropology, in order to analyse the way the knowledge about the Other is
constructed through discourse (Fursich 2002:65). The next chapter will look at the
role of the media in society in general, and in nation building and preserving in
particular, in more detail.
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3. Media and identity
3.1. The role of media in society
Reicher & Hopkins state that 'nations, nationalism and national identity are all around
us', making nationhood 'a central aspect of our social world' (2001 :vii). Similar
claims can be made about the media; just like nations and national identity, the media
are all around us. In his sociological introduction to media power, McCullagh states
that 'we live in media-saturated societies' (2002:1). The mass media have become
'the cultural epicentre' of our world (Castells 1996:336). From the free Metro on
public transport, to a choice of newspapers and magazines in pubs, cafes, airplanes
and in doctors' waiting rooms, print media are everywhere, not to mention TV. But
what functions do the media serve in society? What is the relationship of the media to
'the broader social context in which they operate' (Steenveld 2002:63)?
This study concentrates on media output rather than media effects. It will focus on the
discursive construction of national identities in the media, and only briefly on how
media discourse actually affects the way its consumers formulate their understanding
of nationness. This approach has been prevalent in sociological studies of the media,
where analysis has focussed on media texts, 'with the common assumption that
media's meanings are to be found in media's messages' (Spitulnik 1993:295). An
alternative view is suggested by McLuhan, who famously insists that 'the medium is
the message' (1964). Ideally, of course, mass media analysis should encompass all
main dimensions: production, content, and reception. Although text-based studies
'may reveal "hidden" aspects of media messages,' they usually 'do not help us
understand why such texts are appealing or popular, or how they are consumed by
actual audiences' (Gauntlett 2002:17). Hence, for thorough understanding of the role
of the media, other aspects of media in addition to media texts/content need to be
studied, as 'this picture is incomplete without an analysis of the culture of media
production, the political economy and social history of media institutions, and the
various practices of media consumption that exist in any given society' (Spitulnik
1993:295). Indeed, some scholars even suggest that study of media content should be
relegated to secondary position and recommend instead 'the analysis of social
practices involved in production, distribution, and reception as the best means of
understanding the social role of texts' (Newcomb 1991:69). However, although I
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cover the aspects of media production and distribution, and discuss the reception of
the media, the main research focus remains the content of the media.
3.1.1. Mass media production
News production, i.e. 'the processes of news-gathering, sifting, and editing, and the
administration of news and entertainment organisations,' is of interest, as 'it helps us
to understand what pressures shape the commodity presented to the public' (Curran
and Seaton 1997:276). On the production side, there are several social forces that
influence how the news media operate and affect the particular character of mass
media content. Some of these social forces are outlined below.
3.1.1.1. The power and influence of media sources
Media sources are individuals and organisations that, either directly or indirectly,
influence the news by providing information to the media, and appear or are quoted in
news stories. The significance of sources lies with the important way in which they
can influence stories through 'the selective and well-timed leak, through the off-
record briefing, and through a range of other methods of information control that do
not necessarily require them to be openly identified' (McCullagh 2002:66). There are
debates about whether some sources actually control the content of the print and
broadcast media. McCullagh suggests that 'powerful groups are central sources of
news and, while they do not automatically control the ways in which issues are
defined in society, they have considerable influence on the process', leading to 'a
significant degree of convergence' and 'limitations on the range of interpretations of
the stories' (2002:71-72).
3.1.1.2. The politics of media personnel/organisation
The ideological orientation of the media organisation influences heavily the content of
its newspapers. In most countries, national newspapers are identified with particular
political and ideological positions. In the case of leader articles, which are the focus of
this research, the assumption is that 'the ideologies of journalists somehow influence
their opinions, which in turn influence the discourse structures of the opinion articles'
(van Dijk 1998:21). The study of media discourse in Britain and Scotland confirms
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that ideological orientation of the media organisation influences the content. For
example, the Guardian, the 'left-leaning national prestige daily' (Billig 1995:48), was
supportive of Scottish devolution in both 1979 and 1997, whereas the right-of-centre
Telegraph traditionally supports the Conservatives and was accordingly against
devolution on both occasions. The main Scottish broadsheets were pro-devolution on
both occasions, although in 1979 the Scotsman was more strongly 'pro' than the
Glasgow Herald (Brown 1979:68). Brown writes that 'most of the papers took up
positions on the question of a Scottish Assembly as proposed by the Scotland Act
1978 and regarded the campaign leading up to the referendum on 1 March 1979 as a
major news story' (1979: 64). He also found that political orientation of the media
organisation (i.e. whether the newspaper was pro- or anti-devolution) influenced the
content of the newspapers, especially the amount of coverage dedicated to the
devolution referendum. When analysing the Scottish morning papers by allocation of
space (measured as a percentage of the total editorial space available in each paper),
and the papers' support for devolution, Brown found a correlation between the
ideological stance of the newspaper, and the content of the media, as suggested above.
3.1.1.3. The relationship between media ownership and control
Although it is often assumed that those who own the media also control the content of
the media, recent research has shown that this is not always the case. McCullagh
(2002:78) argues that
it is not possible, for the most part, to read particular examples of media
production as direct reflections of the interests of owners. Although 'corporations
dominate cultural landscape' (Golding and Murdock 1996:16), the manner in
which this translates into cultural control is not as direct and undeviating,
as some authors assume. Indeed, for most proprietors, media organisations are simply
another part of their industrial or commercial empire and 'the ideological substance
and stance of the organisation is a matter of indifference to its owners (as long, that is,
as it produces the required level of profit)' (McCullagh 2002:78-79). In reality, the
situation is often more varied and complex. For example, the Australian media
magnate Rupert Murdoch is widely known to influence his papers' opinions, even 'if
the nature of that influence is not in the academic sense researchable'6 (Seymour-Ure
5
Rupert Murdoch's News International owns, among others, the Sun, the Times, the Sunday Times, and
the News of the World.
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1998b:45). But while the Scottish edition of Murdoch's The Sun announced on 23
January 1989 on its front page across a giant Saltire that it now supports the SNP and
Scottish independence (Smith 1994:108-109), the London-based edition remained
pro-Thatcher (and thus anti-devolution and anti-independence). Although the then
editor of the Scottish Sun, Bob Bird, denies it was a commercially-driven decision,
'many observers remain sure that this "conversion" could not have been approved by
News International without the evidence that sales could indeed be boosted' (Smith
1994:109)7. The real task of most newspapers is 'to return annual profits' dividends to
head office' (Smith 1994:5-6).
In some other papers, the role of the proprietors is openly dissociated from the editing
of the paper. For example, the Guardian is owned by the Scott Trust, named after the
long-time owners of the formerly Manchester-based newspaper. The Scott Trust has
'no other purpose really but to own the company and perpetuate the Guardian, you're
given no instructions by the owners. You're only told 'to continue in the spirit as
heretofore' (Interview 15). Whereas it is important to take ownership into
consideration, it is not all-explanatory. Not considering the role of proprietors 'would
obviously [be] inadequate but an explanation based solely on it would be just as
inadequate' (Bourdieu 1998:39).
3.1.1.4. The influence of the audience
Media need to attract an audience in the increasingly competitive market, and must
thus cater to the needs of that audience. On one hand, the pressures of the mass
market often mean that the media tilt 'towards representing the interests of the more
powerful economic classes,' as such readers attract most revenues from advertisers,
and increase the profits, the raison d'etre of media as business (Steenveld 2002:68-
69). On the other hand, successful media communication requires some idea, a mental
map, of their audience, and often the media organisations adapt their style of
communication to suit that audience. Also, the media have moved from the situation
where 'audiences were seen as a group to inform and educate about political and
social affairs, to one in which increasingly the audience is seen as a commodity to
7 The Sun, under the same ownership, changed its political allegiances once again in 1997, when the
proprietor Rupert Murdoch decided to support the Labour Party instead of the Conservatives.
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create and as a group to entertain' (McCullagh 2002:85). This entertainment is
achieved by dumbing down the news content, by 'downgrading of hard news and
upgrading of sex, scandal and infotainment' (Kalb 1997; cited in Esser 1999:292).
3.1.1.5. The effect of organisational routines on media output
Finally, 'news organisations develop particular strategies to deal with the environment
in which they operate, and these working arrangements have implications for the
nature of what they produce' (McCullagh 2002:86). The latter are supposed to cater
for the following three requirements of the news-gathering process: 1) to produce
reliable and accurate news; 2) to generate information that will attract and retain the
attention of a (presumably national) audience; and 3) to select stories that can be
processed economically, efficiently and routinely. The routines involved in media
production involve the usual 24-hour news cycle or 7-day news cycle in case of
Sunday papers.
There is double 'bidding for space' going on in newspaper offices - both bidding
between different stories to catch attention, and bidding between journalists. There are
more stories at any given time, as well as more journalists and correspondents at any
given paper. Consequently, the editors have to pick and mix - not all journalists and
their articles will always make it. One of my interviewees explained:
The Guardian has 375 journalists. A lot of them are feature writers ... there are
also an awful lot of reporters and they all want into the next day's paper. The
balance will depend on the personalities of who's in charge of the paper on a
given day. You also need the balance between the international and domestic,
between serious stories and light stories, between stories that will tell you about
famine or war and you have to balance that with stories that are offbeat or about
fashion or film. (Interview 10)
A number of news values will increase the chances of any given story making it into
the paper: 'Timeliness, exceptional quality, future impacts, prominence of persons,
conflict, consequence, etc' constitute 'the mantra of news values' (Steenveld 2002).
Responding to the following news values help a potential story to 'make it' to the
paper:
• Drama, i.e. if the potential story is either dramatic or can be presented in a
dramatic way.
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• Unambiguity, i.e. if the meaning of an event is clear and easily understood by the
widest possible readership. The widest possible readership (which, as Brookes
(1999:256) claimed, is nevertheless limited to 'the nation') is achieved by writing
an easily and widely understood story. A Scottish feature editor told that
the first thing I'm looking for, ... that it's a good read and by a good read I
mean it's something that is easy to follow, the points are very succinctly made.
(Interview 18)
• 'Bad news', as negative events are usually more compatible with news values
(drama, unambiguity, etc.) than positive events.
• Celebrity involvement, i.e. in contemporary celebrity-centred and -saturated
culture, 'the actions of elites and of elite nations are believed by news workers to
be of more consequence and so are more likely to be covered as news'
(McCullagh 2002:89).
• Cultural and geographic proximity also increase the chances of the story
appearing. 'Those events which happen in places near to us in a geographic sense,
or which happen in places or to people with whom we have some form of cultural
identification, are more likely to become news' (McCullagh 2002:89). For
example, British papers report proportionally a lot more on the Commonwealth
and the US, and considerably less from places that are not seen as culturally,
politically or geographically relevant. This is relevant also within the devolved
United Kingdom, as one of my interviewees stated:
Because obviously there's limited, well readers in England aren't gonna be
terribly interested in what's going on in Scottish parliament cos it's not
relevant to them. So the Scottish edition is quite distinct from the English
edition. (Interview 14)
Readers in England will not be 'terribly interested' in the Scottish news, as Scotland is
perceived geographically and politically distant from England. Devolution has further
increased that perceived distance. It has made Scotland almost a foreign country for
the readers in England:
In a sense it's what Scotland wanted. It wanted to be a separate country. That
makes it a little bit more like a foreign country, if you understand what I'm
saying, and foreign countries tend not to be as heavily covered for domestic
readerships as parts of your own country, therefore it's diminished. (Interview
15)
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Note how the interviewee, a senior editor of a purportedly British national newspaper
unconsciously (?) omits Scotland from that 'national' frame. This suggests that
although the London newspapers claim to speak for the whole of British nation, in
day-to-day level they imagine their readership in considerably more restricted and
sub-British terms. Although Scotland is part of the 'British nation', the 'British
nation' as imagined by London-based 'national' newspapers is more limited in scope.
• Personalised, i.e. news stories about people that readers can relate to, are more
likely to be published.
• 'In order to communicate quickly and efficiently about events and issues, news
workers must place them in a context that makes them comprehensible and
meaningful to the audience' (McCullagh 2002:89). This media practice can be
linked again to the 'dumbing down' and 'tabloidisation' and the scares that 'the
media offering as a whole converges to the lowest common denominator'
(Schoenbach 2001:364).
The tendency to make a story relevant to its readers by localising it in a particular
place is common here. In Scottish papers, this often means 'putting the kilt on', i.e.
emphasising the Scottishness of a given story. This is often seen as parochial by
journalists working in the London media though:
well, not ... on London papers you don't [localise], no, because you take the
view that you're beyond that journalistic learning stage where you don't have
to bother with that anymore but there is a sense, occasionally, of perhaps for
my paper, I'll be asked to write a story in such a way for the Scottish edition
and in that sense Scottish journalism is ... suffers from the same thing.
Actually the adjective 'Scottish' gets thrown in to make it seem more relevant.
Quite whether readers need that or not, I'm not so sure. (Interview 17)
It is interesting to note here, that sometimes this 'tartanising' happens in British
papers as opposed to Scottish papers, i.e. there is also 'parochialism of the centre'. For
example, when Michael Martin MP was elected as the Speaker of the House of
Commons in October 2000, the Daily Mail (bought in England) wrote:
The election of Scot Michael 'Mick' Martin as Speaker worries MPs. His ex-
sheet metal worker's accent is thicker than a bowl of Glasgow porridge.
'We're going to suggest the use of subtitles above the Speaker's chair,' says a
Westminster source, 'because its so hard to follow what he actually says.'
(Ephraim Hardcastle, Daily Mail, 24.10.2000)
The Scottish edition of the same paper omitted all 'tartanisation', but instead localises
the story through othering the MPs 'south of the Border', using a deictic 'they':
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The election of Michael 'Mick' Martin as Speaker worries MPs south of the
Border. They think the ex-sheet metal worker's accent is thicker than a bowl
of porridge. 'We're going to suggest the use of subtitles above the Speaker's
Chair,' says a Westminster source, 'because it's so hard to follow what he
says.' (Ephraim Hardcastle, Scottish Daily Mail, 24.10.2000)
This contradicts the notion that localising is something that London papers do not do,
and only happens in 'regional' papers.8
• Visuality, i.e. an event that generates good visual images has a better chance of
being reported in the media than one that does not. Moving TV images,
photographs, cartoons, illustrations, maps, and other visual images can be hugely
important. Research has shown that articles presented together with visuals lead
to a greater opinion change (Brinkman 1968), and therefore it is in the interest of
the newspaper to publish stories that lead to effective visualisations in addition to
the written text.
3.1.2. Mass media content
The main question here is what media do with the 'reality'. What happens to the 'out
there' by the time it is printed in the newspaper? This is a difficult question to answer,
and there is no consensus on the matter among media scholars. Four main
formulations of 'the media's role in talking to us about our world' (Macdonald
2003:12) have been suggested. They comprise: the reflection model, the
representation model, the framing model and the simulation model.
3.1.2.1. Reflection model
The so-called 'liberal view' sees 'the media as independent 'mirrors' of society,
simply 'reflecting' all that takes place' (Steenveld 2002:63). This undistorted
'window to the world' understanding of the media is usually put forward by
journalists and media generally. Media professionals would like us to believe that the
journalistic window they provide is clear and does not 'distort or refract what we are
looking at; it must allow us to see the world as the world really is' (McCullagh
2002:15). This claim has been refuted by media sociologists. It is technically
impossible for the media to provide such an objective window to the world. The
8 For further analysis of the given extract see Rosie et al. (2004:451).
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media have a limited news carrying capacity and therefore some element of selectivity
is inevitable. By no means are the media purely passive reflectors of the world
(Schlesinger 1991a: 108; Riggins 1997; Macdonald 2003:12).
3.1.2.2. Representation model
Whereas journalists wish to be seen as reflecting reality, media sociologists argue that
media can only represent a partial selection of reality. The 'representing reality'
notion of the media is to be understood in terms of media's need to be selective about
the world 'out there'. Scholars use a number of metaphors here - media as 'selective
filters' (Macdonald 2003:12) or 'fractured glass' (McCullagh 2002:15), for example.
Instead of providing the audience with a transparent window on the world, the media
'tell us about some events and issues, but not about others, and the ones they bring to
our attention may not necessarily be the most socially or politically significant'.
Therefore, the media are able to control and shape the knowledge and understanding
that their readership develop about the world.
This notion of the media as selectively representing reality is also criticised, among
other reasons, for 'suggesting that the world of external reality and the world of
textual representation were separate or at least separable entities, and that the real
world always existed in material form prior to its representation' (Macdonald
2003:13). It is also quite a challenge for journalists thoroughly to 'rid themselves of
their own subjectivity, and give a fair and balanced representation of different sides of
the story while using the right facts to put issues in context' (Hazel 2001:94). Thus the
media are not value-free, but act discursively by providing frames.
3.1.2.3. Framing model
Discourses are the 'artefacts of language through which the very reality they purport
to reflect is constructed' (Riggins 1997:2). The media have almost an exclusive role in
producing those public discourses to the public, and play an important role in
'creating reality' (van Dijk 1993:243; Schlesinger 1991a:108). Discursive
construction of reality is advanced by those who believe the media do not just
represent the world, but 'help to construct our ideas about the real world' (Macdonald
2003:14). The imperative word here is 'construct'. In nationalism studies, the notion
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of imagining does not imply that 'nationalism masquerades under false pretences that
[Gellner] assimilates 'invention' to 'fabrication' and 'falsify', rather than 'imagining'
and 'creation" (Anderson 1991:6). Similarly, the
notion of construction implies neither an intention to deceive, nor an ability on
the part of the media to determine our thinking. Instead, it suggests a vital
interaction between the media's role in forming the 'frames for understanding'
we construct in our heads about the material world, and the actuality of our
behaviour and attitudes. (Macdonald 2003:14)
The concept of framing is important in understanding the nature of media power and
has been widely used in recent literature. Basically,
The media do not simply provide us with information on certain issues and
events: they also provide us with perspectives on them. These place the events
and issues within particular contexts and encourage audiences to understand
them in particular ways. In effect, the media do not simply select events to
cover; they also offer interpretative frameworks through which these are to be
understood. (McCullagh 2002:25).
It is in this sense that media acts discursively and differs from the representation
model. This also implies elements of agenda-setting - what the specific article does
not say about the reality is just as important, if not more so, than what is said
(Schlesinger 1991a:93). 'In many respects, media texts are ideological icebergs, of
which only the tip is visible to the reader' (van Dijk 1993:256).
While the representation model stated that 'the media have the power to select the
events and issues that are given coverage', the discursive framing model suggests the
media 'have the power to be selective about what is covered and also the power to
interpret events and issues for us' in a particular way. For example, each frame
positions devolution and Scottish identity in a different way and so has different
implications for how we understand the nature of, and the solutions to, these key
issues of devolution and identity. Although those who adopt this central notion of
framing 'share the assumption that media power is the power to frame events and
issues in particular ways', they identify the use of frames by the media and in the
media differently. As the frames are banal - they 'do not announce or highlight
themselves but appear as natural and obvious ways of telling stories and of relating
events to us' (McCullagh 2002:26-27), researching them can be difficult. Researchers
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analysing media frames have two distinct strategies at their disposal (McCullagh
2002:27-34):
• Inductive strategy (from text to frame) involves setting fairly loose criteria for the
identification of frames. The frames are then 'applied to particular media texts to
draw out the underlying frames that are structuring the text, or are latent in it'.
• Deductive strategy (from frame to text) is more commonplace among researchers
and involves identifying a list of frames/discursive formations/narratives/story
types 'that are available to make sense of events or issues in a society. Media texts
are then analysed to see which of these frames are actually or predominantly used
in the media account'.
I am using both approaches in my thesis. For example, the section on the role of the
Other in identity construction is mainly deductive. I have developed a typology of
possible Others in identity construction elsewhere (Petersoo 2000). This research
looks at the suitability and relevance of such a model in the context of the discursive
construction of Scottishness. In contrast, the analysis of linguistic means of realisation
in national identity construction has been largely informed by inductive strategy.
Based on the data identified in and extracted from the texts, I have developed certain
frames for analysing my data in Chapter 8.
However, although the concept of framing is central to understanding the role and
power of the media in society, there are 'a number of unresolved problems with it'
(McCullagh 2002:34-36):
• The question of media bias and accuracy of news: 'If framing is an inevitable
feature of news, then how can we distinguish between good and bad journalism or
between accurate and inaccurate news reporting?' If everything is indeed relative,
then how do we judge the media?
• The assumption 'that researcher can identify frames independently of the
perceptions and responses of readers' is questionable, as researchers cannot claim
that their versions of media stories are 'real' versions. The 'validity of analysis of
framing therefore depend not on the inherent meaning of media texts - they have
none - but on the resourceful readings of the these texts by researchers'.
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Consequently, different researchers usually reach different conclusions about the
meaning of particular media texts.
• The final question is related to the possible number of frames that can be
identified in a given media text. Some researchers claim that 'media coverage is
structured around one particular frame' in any given article. At the same time,
Gamson (1989) suggests that 'there might be more than one frame present in news
stories,' i.e. 'a range of interpretations can be found in the one story'. McCullagh
suggests that 'a text organised around a single frame could be assumed to be a
more powerful one than one that contains a number of perspectives on the same
event' (2002:36), as the coherence of the text influences the perception and
understanding of it.
3.1.2.4. Simulation model
Finally, following semiotics, and especially Jean Baudrillard's concept of the
simulacrum or simulation, post-modern scholars deny 'the point of positing any link
whatsoever between media or cultural texts and reality' (Macdonald 2003:14), as the
media is unable 'to provide a coherent view of the world' (McCullagh 2002:47).
'Instead of reality, people are treated to simulations involving the constant
recombination of various signs, of elements of the code' (Ritzer 1998:12), and this
process of simulation 'assumes force of reality'' in mass communication. 'Reality
itself is abolished, obliterated, in favour of this neo-reality of the model, which is
given material force by the medium itself (Baudrillard 1998:126). Echoing the
McLuhanesque 'medium is the message' claim, postmodernists deny the usefulness of
searching for 'meaningfulness beyond the sign', as 'signs refer us to other signs, until
the relation of these to the world beyond diminishes to vanishing point' (Macdonald
2003:15), rendering looking for the truth or reality behind the media representations
'pointless' (McCullagh 2002:48). This would make all media research as an attempt
to understand the society in general useless, as analysing the media would only tell us
something about the media and nothing beyond that.
Critics of postmodernists, however, deny 'this kind of autonomy to sign systems' and
locate sign systems as 'essential constituents in our social and political operation'
instead (Macdonald 2003:16). And although postmodernists 'give considerable status
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to the role of the media' in their theories, they 'offer few detailed empirical analyses
in support of their claims'. McCullagh concludes:
the arguments of post-modernists sensitise us to issues of media presentation
and to the effects that these may have on how events are represented and how
they are understood. But in the process it may give too much attention to the
formats and technologies of the media and, as a result, neglect the issue of
media content. (2002:62-63)
3.1.3. Reception ofmass media
If traditionally, the media's meaning is to be found in the media content, then a
number of scholars insist that 'text-as-meaning is produced at the moment of reading,
not at the moment of writing' (Fiske 1987:305). This approach focuses on the
reception of the media. What are the effects of the media for the audiences?
McCullagh claims that 'a key aspect of media power is the potential to shape the
nature of social consciousness and the nature of public opinion,' and consequently
media can also shape social and political action (2002:151). Therefore the media is an
illuminating field of analysis for the better understanding of national identity
formation and also for the study of Self/Other dialectic. However, this thesis is not
looking at the reception of media messages per se. The main reason is that there is still
disagreement about the exact nature and extent of media effects and 'the case for
media effects is far from proved' (Hazel 2001:94).
The analysis of mass media reception usually boils down to the questions: 'what do
media do with the audience?' and 'how do print media influence the readers?'. Social
scientists have accounted for the audiences in several ways. They have credited the
media with the power to 'influence' or 'persuade' their audience, to 'change
attitudes', or even to 'affect behaviour' (Curran and Seaton 1997:270). Broadly
speaking, there seem to be two types of myths on media and their audiences: those
that 'believe in the audience, and myths that distrust the audience' (Schoenbach
2001:368). Some writers claim the media are all-powerful (and audience is the
receptive couch potato), others insist that the power rests with the audience (the
armchair intellectuals), with a number of positions between those two extremes. There
are several different 'phases' described by different authors, and the following is an
attempt to describe them.
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3.1.3.1. The hypodermic model
This stimulus-response model was widely popular in early twentieth century. The
word 'hypodermic' suggests that media messages go directly into the minds of the
audience, like hypodermic needles. The hypodermic model has 'heavily behaviourist
overtones, media content serving as a trigger' (Hall 1980b: 117), and it sees the
audience as an undifferentiated and passive mass vulnerable to the media, which 'had
put people and society directly at the mercy of those who controlled them' (Elliott
1974). This couch potato view claims that 'the media are capable of injecting ideas
and attitudes into vulnerable audiences and in the process making them its prisoners'
(McCullagh 2002:152). The hypodermic view with its simplistic cause-and-effect
relationship is also sometimes supported by politicians. Hazel (2001) writes about
political journalists in Quebec, constantly accused of perceived bias by politicians
dissatisfied with their election results, suggesting that election result were determined
by media coverage alone.
Newer research refutes the hypodermic model, as media influence is not so
straightforward. McCullagh reiterates Klapper (1960):
... 'mass communication ordinarily does not serve as a necessary or sufficient
cause of audience effects'. This was because the media do not operate on
susceptible audiences. Audiences have prior social connections, prior social
attitudes and prior opinions, and it is through these that the material from the
media was filtered and against which the validity and relevance of its content
was assessed. (2002:153)
The audience is not homogenous, and society is not 'a simple, centrally controlled
hierarchy' where media influence is uniform. Instead of simply influencing the 'couch
potato' audience, the media have the power of reinforcement, and confirm people in
the opinions which they already hold, whose political views 'may become more
strongly held because they are reinforced by the media' (Curran and Seaton 1997:271,
274).
Recently the hypodermic model has enjoyed a revival, being used by screen theorists9.
Their main claim is that 'media texts have the power to create the manner in which
they will be understood'. Consequently,
9
The name 'screen theorists' derives from the British film journal, Screen, which published many of
the leading contributions of the French social and psychoanalytic school of thought.
45
... in studying media messages we need to focus on the communication and
not on the audiences. If the meaning of the message is in the text, then the
responses of audience members do not require independent study: they can be
deduced from the structure and characteristics of the film or television
programme. [...] If this argument is accepted, then the audience ceases to be
of interest or concern to students of the media. The analysis of the media
becomes confined to the study of programmes and to the examination of their
inherent meaning. Studying the audience, in effect, becomes redundant.
(McCullagh 2002:156-157)
Although I would not go as far as reinforcing the simplistic hypodermic model or its
recent offspring screen theory, I agree that the intended content of the media is of
more interest, that the text is dominant in the study of the media.
3.1.3.2. Uses and gratifications model
Glasgow Media Group's well-known active audience model falls into this category.
Uses and gratifications theories were advanced in 1940s, and they focus on 'what
people do with (and think about) mass media' (Spitulnik 1993:299). These theorists
turn the question 'what media do to the audience' around and suggest that it is more
productive to ask what do audiences do with the media instead. The studies have
showed that the reasons why the audience use the media and the consequent
gratification 'is varied and not homogeneous' (Curran and Seaton 1997:273). The
same media message can be interpreted and used in different ways, to satisfy the
particular social and emotional needs that different individuals in the wider media
audience have. Four main needs have been identified (McQuail et al. 1972):
• Diversion helps audience to escape from daily routine.
• 'Para-social interaction' - some television programmes provide substitute
companionship to the audience.
• Identity confirmation - people use the media to reflect on/confirm certain aspects
of their life and/or sense of identity.
• Surveillance and information acquisition - people turn to the media to find out
what is going on in the world.
McCullagh notes that 'the implication here is that the relationship between the overt
content of a programme and the response that it elicits from the audience is a complex
one'. Indeed, the audience response 'to particular programmes is not one that is in the
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control of programme makers, but it is a function of the needs of audience members'
(2002:155). This is the same in the print media - both 'makers and users, writers and
readers, senders and receivers can do things with communication that are unintended,
unplanned for, indeed, unwished for' (Newcomb 1991:74). We cannot really know
how the readers will understand and interpret newspaper content. This is another
reason why this research does not concentrate on the effects and reception of the
media at this point.
The uses and gratifications model is also criticised for a number of reasons. Firstly,
the audience's use of television and other media 'seems to depend on availability and
viewing habit rather than on need' (McCullagh 2002:155). Secondly, the uses and
gratifications model is too mentalistic, individualistic, empiricist, static-abstract, it has
low explanatory power, and is 'a peculiarly individualistic variant of functionalism',
equating goals and needs (Elliott 1974:286-287).
3.1.3.3. The agenda setting model
Agenda setting stands for the 'effect of the media in determining priorities: how far
press, radio, and television coverage could change a sense of which events were more
important' (Curran and Seaton 1997:275). The agenda setting power of the media is
often illustrated by the case of Enoch Powell's 1968 speech on immigration. The
speech was delivered to only a small audience in a church hall in Birmingham. Media
quickly picked up the controversial speech, and excessive media coverage guaranteed
that within two days 'The Rivers of Blood Speech' was known to 86 per cent of the
British population. This brought the question of race and immigration into the centre
of public concern:
Before the speech only 6 per cent of a Gallup Poll sample thought immigration
an issue of national importance; afterwards 27 per cent thought it was
important, and nearly 70 per cent of the public believed that the government
would have to take a 'harder line'. (Curran and Seaton 1997:275)
Thus the media have the power to bring issues to the public attention. And keep them
there. Whereas the ability of the media to persuade their readership directly is limited,
the media affect what their readers know. Or as McCombs and Shaw (1972:66) have
put it: while the media 'may not be successful in telling us what to think', they 'are
stunningly successful in telling us what to think about.'
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Just for clarification, it is worth mentioning here that although McCombs and Shaw
are routinely identified as the founding fathers of agenda-setting research, they are
simply building upon several earlier studies in the field. Schoenbach writes somewhat
ironically:
Traditionally, we are told that, once upon a time, there was a 'seminal' study
by McCombs and Shaw, published in 1972. They were, the myth says, the first
to empirically demonstrate that media make us aware of important issues in
society. (2001:372)
However, Schoenbach then points out 'a well-known definition that Bernard Cohen
came up with in 1963: the press 'may not be successful much of the time in telling
people what to think, but is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think
abouf (Cohen 1963:13). And, eventually, the agenda-setting research dates back even
more: 'The evidence available suggests very strongly that people think about what
they are told ... but at no level do they merely think what they are told' (Trenaman
and McQuail 1961:178).
3.1.4. Concluding remarks
I have outlined the main theories about the role of media in society, and briefly
discussed the importance of mass media production, content and reception. Mass
media are the 'meaning-brokers' in modem society, the central arena for producing,
reproducing, establishing, maintaining and transforming meanings and representations
in contemporary society (Castells 1996; Phillips 1999; Chung 2000; Matheson 2000;
Fiirsich 2002; McCullagh 2002; Steenveld 2002). The media are an important element
that form part of the so-called public sphere (Habermas 2001). They are therefore an
illuminating field of study for the better understanding of national identity
construction. I acknowledge that media influence is varied, and while they can
influence certain readers, the influence is difficult to measure; that the media set the
agenda although this is not the only function. For the purposes of my research on the
discursive construction of national identities in the media, two aspects of media power
are important:
(1) the capacity of the media to pick and mix the stories, i.e. the selectivity/agenda-
setting function of the media.
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(2) the ability of the media to present those articles in a particular way, to frame the
articles and act discursively.
Echoing van Dijk and his discourse-processing theory of social communication, I
acknowledge that media influence 'goes beyond that of immediate effects and agenda-
setting functions of specific media messages on specific readers' (van Dijk 1993:242).
In order to comprehend the way the media frames the issue of identity and devolution,
I am analysing media discourse qualitatively. The methodology used in this thesis is
explained in more detail in Chapter 5.
3.2. Media and national identity
In his Nationalism and Social Communication, Deutsch writes about the
incompatibility of concepts in social sciences, and the lack of cross- and inter¬
disciplinary studies, that inhibits the research in general:
Good work was done on national languages as a problem in linguistics; on
national settlement patterns as a problem in geography; on national
governments and international relations as a subject of political science; and
on 'monetary nationalism' as a problem in monetary theory. Yet the pieces of
the puzzle remained unassembled, and, indeed, very often did not fit together.
(Deutsch 1966:16)
Exactly the same puzzle remains unassembled in sociology and media studies. The
literature contains a number of complaints about the lack of studies about the
relationship between media and national identity (Schlesinger 1991a; Maclnnes 1992;
Brookes 1999; Law 2001). Schlesinger, for example, claims that writing on
nationalism 'is marked by a blindness reciprocal to that of current communication
studies: there the nation-state is under-conceptualised, whereas in the nationalism
literature the mass media are usually quite untheorised' (1991a: 156). Brookes
mentions the 'relative paucity of recent research within critical communications and
media studies on the extent of the mass media's role in the formation of national
identities' (1999:247). But assumptions about existing relationship between the two
abound: 'there are certain relations ... between the images of identity offered by
political elites or the media and "everyday discourses" about nations and national
identity' (de Cillia et al. 1999:154); the media are 'intentionally used to promote a
national collective' (Luther 2001:29). Schneider insists that 'identity studies should
not leave aside public representations of belonging', including the media, as otherwise
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such studies 'run the risk of overlooking some of the basic structuring principles of
any specific identity formation' (2001:361-362). Yet this is exactly what is done in
research. Despite all these studies suggesting a link between the media and national
identity construction, we still do not know how discursive identity construction
actually works in the media. Theorists often assume a priori linkages between media
and national identities, and such '"gratuitous assumptions" continue to hold sway'
(Law 2001:299). It is necessary to study further the media/identity relationship and
attempt to overcome those assumptions.
Despite the fact that many authors emphasise the importance of the media in the
construction of national identities, there are no clear-cut and convincing arguments
explaining why and how the media is important. Much of the relevant literature
remains vague and ambiguous, although making ambitious assumptions and claims
unsupported by consistent theory or empirical demonstrations of these processes. The
key questions: Are media just reflective or are media constructive? How exactly are
national identities forged, imagined and constructed in the media discourse? - remain
to be answered. Despite the many attempts to explain the identity formation process in
the media, the mentioned gap still remains under-explored and unfilled.
In order to discuss the relationship between the media and national identities, I
propose to look at this relationship from two different angles. Firstly, I will look at the
historical role of mass media in forging national communities (McLuhan 1964;
Anderson 1991). Secondly, I will look at the role of the media in sustaining and
developing national identities and the feeling of nationness, or the relationship
between 'established nation-states and mature media institutions' (Brookes 1999:247).
A number of authors have discussed the latter (Billig 1995; Wodak et al. 1999; Yumul
and Ozkirimli 2000; Law 2001), and my research hopes, first and foremost, to
contribute to that field of knowledge. To paraphrase Deutsch (1966:4), I will look at
the role of mass media in nation building and nation preserving, respectively.
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3.2.1. Role of mass media in nation building
McLuhan explains how peasants were turned into Frenchmen:
it was the printed word that, achieving cultural saturation in the eighteenth
century, had homogenised the French nation. Frenchmen were the same kind
of people from north to south. The typographic principles of uniformity,
continuity, and lineality had overlaid the complexities of ancient feudal and
oral society. (1964:15)
Consequently, 'Francien, the dialect of De de France and to some extent of the
Champagne region, came to set the national standards for both literary and colloquial
French' (Deutsch 1966:43)10. The development of print media was instrumental for
the spread of nationalism and forging of national communities as we know them
today. The print media became the 'Architect of Nationalism' (McLuhan 1964:185).
There are two major ways in which print media have contributed to the development
of national communities through 'the vernacular mobilisation of communities' (Smith
1999:11). The media have aided nation building through contributing to the
codification of languages and through simultaneous newspaper consumption.
In terms of codification of languages, resulting in a nation-cum-language equation in
many parts of the world today (to the degree that many nation-states 'came to share
their names with the languages that were so vital for their political legitimacy' (Holt
and Gubbins 2002:1)), the role of print media cannot be underestimated. 'Nationalism
was unknown to the Western world until the Renaissance, when Gutenberg made it
possible to see the mother tongue in uniform dress,' writes McLuhan (1964:233). And
the new 'architects of nationalism' of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries used the
new technology to their full advantage by promoting new national languages. Often
these architects of nationalism had to deal with populations that
10 Recent historiographical developments suggest that France was linguistically unified only after
Napoleon Ill's compulsory military service, followed a few decades later by mass public education.
Thus the media were not the l turning the peasants into Frenchmen. (Armstrong
2004:11-12)
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often had neither a single vernacular (but, rather, a socially, regionally, and
experientially differentiated continuum of vernaculars), nor a vernacular that
could readily be put to the modern ideologizing and organizing purposes that
new protoelites had in mind. (Fishman 1996:155)
Although there were some linguistic considerations involved, the 'establishment of a
common idiom distinguished from varieties of dialect was much more the fruit of a
political will than truly linguistic considerations' (Battail 2000). It was the will of
these very architects of nationalism, who saw the potential of print media, and
campaigned for the development and codification of national languages. As McLuhan
writes, the 'uniformity and repeatability of the printed page' put considerable pressure
'toward "correct" spelling, syntax, and pronunciation' (1964:190), and the architects
of nationalism 'stressed the need to recognize, utilize, standardize, and modernize the
vernaculars' (Fishman 1996:157). The print media were central to this codification of
national languages and played therefore an important role in modern nationalism.
For example, the current version of Estonian was 'chosen' by the nationalising elite,
and their print media out of two major written languages at the time - northern
Estonian and southern Estonian dialect. Although both versions were spoken widely
among the inhabitants, by the middle of nineteenth century 95 per cent of all regularly
printed media was in the northern Estonian dialect. This helped to spread that
particular version of the written language to the masses, making it eventually the
standard language of Estonia - and, consequently, undermined the other version. Thus
the various dialect-speaking peasants were turned into Estonian-speaking nationals in
great part by the print media (Lauk 2002). The nationalising elites needed 'to
communicate with, organize, and activate recently urbanized but still predominantly
illiterate populations' (Fishman 1996:155). 'The new middle-class intelligentsia of
nationalism had to invite the masses into history; and the invitation-card had to be
written in a language they understood' (Nairn 1981:340). Standardisation and spread
of national language was therefore 'an important factor in the creation of nations'
(Dhoest 2004:397).
But language, of course, is not a necessary condition for the development of national
communities, for it is 'the presence of sufficient communication facilities with enough
complementarity' that matters (Deutsch 1966:97). In the Americas - both north and
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south - a distinct vernacular language was never even an issue in respective national
struggles (Anderson 1991:47). In Scotland, the Scots speak the same language as the
English south of the Border. However, language is not unimportant in Scotland. There
is a growing tendency to publish in vernacular Scots by Scottish novelists. Reflecting
and 'speaking to the Scottish experience,' these novels form a part of the Scottish
nationalist discourse (Hearn 2000:78-79). This is not dissimilar to the way press uses
vernacular languages to mobilise masses, although the scope and scale differ, as
newspapers reach a wider audience.
The other major contribution of the print media to nationalism involves an act of
banal nationalism, namely, simultaneous consumption of newspapers. Anderson sees
this 'ritual of daily newspaper reading as an example of print-capitalism's role in the
historical constitution of nations as imagined communities' (Brookes 1999:248). Even
the members of 'the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members,
meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their
communion' (Anderson 1991:6). It is through the simultaneous consumption of mass
media that these people come to see themselves as part of the same imagined national
community:
We know that particular morning and evening editions will overwhelmingly
be consumed between this hour and that, only on this day, not that. ... The
significance of this mass ceremony ... is paradoxical. It is performed in silent
privacy, in the lair of the skull. Yet each communicant is well aware that the
ceremony he performs is being replicated simultaneously by thousands (or
millions) of others of whose existence he is confident, yet of whose identity he
has not the slightest notion. Furthermore, this ceremony is incessantly repeated
at daily or half-daily intervals throughout the calendar. What more vivid figure
for the secular, historically clocked, imagined community can be envisioned?
At the same time, the newspaper reader, observing exact replicas of his own
paper being consumed by his subway, barbershop, or residential neighbours, is
continually reassured that the imagined world is visibly rooted in everyday
life11. (Anderson 1991:35-36)
This 'specific assemblage of fellow-readers' (Anderson 1991:62) forms the basis of
Anderson's imagined community, and for this the existence and development of print
media is crucial. Print media, and especially newspapers, 'play a key role in the way
11 Note the local focus here. Although Anderson writes about national imagined communities, his
examples are often local: subway, barbershop, neighbourhoods etc. For somewhat similar criticism of
Anderson (when writing about the importance of print media, Anderson often illustrates his claims with
examples of oral culture), see Wogan (2001). Anderson himself has later modified some of his ideas
introduced in the Imagined Communities, admitting that they might have been 'one-sided' (1993:120).
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in which the nation is understood in terms of time and space: newspaper reading
constitutes the simultaneous consumption of the same newspapers by a group of
individuals defined within finite boundaries,n (Brookes 1999:249). Again, as
McLuhan noted, print media created nationalism.
But while Anderson's study is valuable in understanding the role of 'simultaneous
ritual consumption' of newspapers for the formation of national identities, it says little
about the content of newspapers:
However newspaper content and the ritual of process of reading should not be
seen as discrete but rather as inextricably interrelated ... [as] the content of a
newspaper does not just reflect the ritual conditions under which it is read, but
reinforces and reproduces it. (Brookes 1999:249)
The following section will concentrate exactly on that issue and focus on the way how
the content of newspapers contributes to the sustaining of national identities through
banal nationalism and by 'flagging the homeland daily' (Billig 1995:93).
3.2.2. Role of mass media in nation preserving
There is a prevalence of a priori assumptions that media and identity are linked. The
mass media is the 'meaning-broker in modern society' (Matheson 2000:571), the
'central field for producing, reproducing and transforming meanings in contemporary
society' (Phillips 1999:221). The media have become the main site for various
discursive practices, including the discursive construction of national identities, and
'daily newspapers perform a crucial semiotic role in cementing the national form'
(Law 2001:300). For example, Connell insists that 'Scotland's distinctive media
patterns form an important constituent of Scottish institutional autonomy that has
helped to preserve Scottish difference within Unionist structures of government since
1707' (2003:187-188). But how? Schlesinger has taken a stand with the widely
assumed role of mass communication in the construction of cultural identities. He
criticises the assumption that there seems to be 'an easy and obvious answer: media
must be important because they are so prevalent. Must they be so? And how might
12 The issue of finite boundaries of the imagined community is an interesting one. In the globalised
world the technology has stepped a big step forward from the times of when print media forged nations
and Cerulo (1997:397) insists that new communication technologies (NCTs) 'have changed the
backdrop against which identity is constructed'.
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they be so in different ways in different circumstances?' (1991a:138). Luther has
suggested that 'the reflection and promotion of national identities may be not only
intrinsic to media forms ... but it may also be intentional.' That is to say that the
media are intentionally being used, particularly by elites, as vehicles of national
identity affirmation and promotion, in order to 'create social integration' and
'maintain stability within the nation' (Luther 2001:28-29). How does this process
work?
Although the exact nature of the relationship between media discourse on identities
and the way identities are perceived/experienced by media audiences remains fuzzy,
'there are certain relations ... between the images of identity offered by political elites
or the media and "everyday discourses" about nations and national identity' (de Cillia
et al. 1999:154). Brookes (1999:261) believes the importance of media is in
reinforcement: 'In the case of media operating within an established nation-state the
press can be effective in reinforcing national identity in a context in which its
naturalness might otherwise be challenged'. One way newspapers achieve this is by
imagining their readers in national terms, as newspaper 'is capable of generating a
feeling of collective belonging through the style of its address' (Connell 2003:188).
Consequently, 'all the papers, whether tabloid or quality, and whether left- or right-
wing, address their readers as members of the nation' (Billig 1995:11). Even when the
newspapers do not explicitly refer to the nation, they
are read within specific contexts. First, if these articles do not themselves
make explicit reference to national identity, they appear in the context of
newspapers which have a shared cultural agenda which is assumed to be
national. [...] National newspapers by definition are nationally distributed, and
although there may be differences of age, gender, region, social class and
ethnicity even within the readership of individual titles, the limit is that of
nation. (Brookes 1999:256)
I take issue with the claim that 'national newspapers by definition are nationally
distributed' in the following chapter, but here it suffices to note Brookes' reference to
Anderson and his definition of the nation as an 'imagined community'. It remains also
unclear who assumes the shared cultural agenda to be national and why. And is the
relationship between media and identities more complex than the one suggested
above, i.e. that the media provide the national frame for imagining? How exactly do
the media play 'the most remarkable part in the daily reproduction of nationhood'
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(Yumul and Ozkirimli 2000:801)? What is the relationship between national political
space (the nation) and national communicative space (the media) (Schlesinger
1998:55)? Chapter 8 will discuss how the Scottish media reproduce nationness by
'using a deixis of homeland and nation-making, by flagging banal signs of
nationhood, by quoting the nationalist utterances of politicians and others' (Yumul
and Ozkirimli 2000:801).
3.3. Concluding remarks
As the media are the main transmitters of all sorts of public discourse, they provide a
major arena for the study of identity and discourse. Discursive construction of
nationalism discourse in general, and national identities in particular, benefit hugely
from the analysis of media. Mass media provide the arena to put forward, discuss and
debate, promote and dismiss, various definitions of identities and various nationalist
claims. While 'different people emphasise different views,' then 'no one agenda
should be mistaken for the whole' (Hearn 2000:4). While very important, the media
provide just one insight into the discursive construction of national identities in
Scotland. The next chapter will introduce the case for the analysis, looking at the
national identity and media in Scotland.
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4. Identifying Scotland
This chapter gives necessary background information about national identity and the
media in Scotland13. The first half of the chapter will discuss briefly prevalent
historical and contemporary definitions of Scottishness. The chapter will continue by
looking at the media in Scotland. It will discuss the complex issue of national media
in Britain and will suggest some ways of defining the Scottishness of the Scottish
media. I will also discuss the history and relevance of the two Scottish broadsheets
that form the basis of my data corpus, the Herald and the Scotsman.
4.1. National identity in Scotland
How has Scottishness been defined throughout the history? Scotland
is not simply what we want it to mean. It is a complex theatre of memory in
which different ways of 'being Scottish' are interpreted and handed down,
constructed and mobilised by social and political forces which seek to
naturalise them. (McCrone 200la:3)
National identities are social constructs and the imagined Scottishness is 'being
renewed, interpreted and renegotiated according to changing circumstances and
interests' (Smith 1998:155). McCrone continues:
Knowing who you are has long seemed something which has distinguished the
Scots, certainly from their neighbours south of the border. A sense of identity,
of distinctiveness, seems at times to have been held against all the odds, and,
critics might say, much of the evidence. After all, the distinctive markers of
national identity, such as language and religion, have been largely absent,
certainly in comparison to other inhabitants of these islands, notably the Irish
and the Welsh. The Scots have long spoken a variant of English, and from the
middle of the sixteenth century marked themselves out as Protestant, to such
an extent that they took to being British without much trouble, and, indeed,
considerable success, in the eighteenth century. Assertions of difference might
appear to amplify minor differences in a world growing increasingly
homogeneous. (2001a: 149)
The above quotation shows the complex self-other dialectic that goes into defining
national identity. Scots are distinguished from the English, from the Irish and the
Welsh, and situated in a British context. Various (non-)markers of identity are
invoked (language, religion, the Border). The quotation also highlights the
13 Some information about key historical dates in Scotland is relevant for the understanding of this
thesis. I have included a comprehensive outline of key events in Scottish history, especially the events
leading up to, and related to, the devolution referenda, in Appendix 11.4.
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occasionally elusive nature of Scottish identity. When I first arrived in Scotland from
Estonia, I was puzzled by the fact that language does not form the basis, or even a
significant part, of the way nationness is constructed in Scotland. The same can be
said about Wales, for that matter, although Welsh language plays a more important
role on a symbolic level there (although it has felt to a 'language-nationalist' like me
that the Welsh language revival policies are a bit like the acts of 'surgeons who
restore to its natural function a limb which had been almost paralyzed but not severed
from the national body' (Kahn 1950:157; cited in Fishman 1996:158)). In Estonia, the
definition of national identity is easy - the one who speaks Estonian is Estonian
(consequently, the Estonians who fled to Canada and elsewhere during the Second
World War are 'more Estonian' than the Russians who moved to Estonia during the
Soviet occupation and speak Russian as their first language). Finland is another
similar Herderian example - Wuorinen claimed in 1931 that 'without Finnish we are
not Finns'14 (Fishman 1996:160). But as mentioned earlier, a distinctive language is a
helpful, but by no means necessary and/or sufficient for defining national identity
(Deutsch 1966:97; Anderson 1991:47). In Scotland, language did not become a
crucial 'cultural identifier,' demonstrating that it 'is not necessary for nations to be
linguistically distinct' (McCrone 2001a:50). The 'practical disappearance of Gaelic
was primarily to the imposition of English' (Guibernau 2004:136) and just one per
cent of Scots still spoke Gaelic according to the 2001 census. But this lack of distinct
vernacular has not stopped Scottish nationalism and identity flourishing.
Religion, at the same time, has played symbolically a bigger role in the discursive
construction of Scottishness. Although many Scots were Protestants like their English
southern neighbours, most were Presbyterian rather than Anglican, at times a crucial
distinction15. Through references to its separate religion, educational and legal system
from England, the distinctiveness of Scotland has been constantly re-enacted and
emphasised in public discourse, including the media. Language and religion are by no
means the only markers of difference though. Other aspects of difference have been
asserted and emphasised in Scotland. Depending on the 'goals and demands of the
moment,' different elements of Scottish identity are emphasised. At any given time,
14 John Henry Wuorinen (1931) Nationalism in Modern Finland. New York: Columbia University
Press.
15 See Armstrong (2004) on the nationalism-religion connection.
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'competing issues of 'national' identity ... are on offer' (McCrone 2001a: 151). How
have these changed? Jonathan Hearn suggests that
Scottish national identity hangs in a constellation of overlapping and
interpenetrating identities - British, Celtic, European, Western, working class,
to name just a few - which can be variously combined and emphasised
according to the goals and demands of the moment. (2000:11)
Hence, depending on their utility, different Others are evoked, as Chapter 2 suggests.
Chapter 7 will discuss various Others relevant to the discursive construction of
Scottishness as they appear in the Scottish media.
4.2. Media in Scotland16
As noted in Chapter 3, there is a distinct lack of studies investigating the relationship
between the media and identity. Studies of Scotland are guilty of the same charge, as
Schlesinger et al. write:
Scotland's media are a crucial element of the country's civil society. They
have long been part of the range of institutions constituting the substratum of
Scottish distinctiveness within the UK, but seemingly this is so obvious a fact
that it has warranted hardly any serious investigation.
In the mainstream sociology and political science of Scotland, the analysis of
media has been a marginal to say the least. For instance, David McCrone's
definitive sociology of Scotland contains one passing mention of the topic
(McCrone 1992:167), and it is not addressed at all in other important works
such as Lindsay Paterson's (1994) study of Scottish autonomy. Even where
the question of civil society has been directly considered, as in Jonathan
Hearn's (2000:88-9) analysis of the contemporary nationalist movement, mass
media are of tangential interest. (2001:10-11)
They continue:
In its extraordinary disregard for the key role that we would argue the media
play in constituting a public sphere, the political sociology of Scotland is of a
piece with mainstream theorising on nationalism in general (see Schlesinger
2000). It is as if Scottish media are either so omnipresent as to be invisible, or
that their role and impact are simply taken for granted or, again, that they are
only worth examining when an exceptional political movement comes along.
(Schlesinger et al. 2001:11)
Schlesinger et al. are not alone in their concern. The paucity of studies in the Scottish
context has been noted by other authors (Maclnnes 1992; Connell 2003), and in recent
years several attempts have been made to try to overcome that shortcoming. Connell
16 This thesis focuses on the print media in Scotland. For the analysis of other forms of media in
Scotland, see Hearn (2000:79-83). More specifically, Maclnnes (1994) has written on the broadcast
media in Scotland, as has Schlesinger (1998; 2000; Schlesinger et al. 2001), to name just a few.
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illustrates how Scottish newspapers 'negotiated the shifting dynamics of competition
and nationalism' during the interwar period (Connell 2003:189), and Stovall analyses
the newspaper attention to nationalism in Scotland in 1966-1976 (Stovall 1978). If
McCrone's first definitive sociology of Scotland only had one passing reference to
media, his new edition of the sociology of Scotland suggests that
along with law, the Church, education and banking, the media can be ranked
as a key civil institution in Scotland which reinforces national identity. After
all, the press is often referred to as the 'fourth estate', reflecting its role in
social politics in modern societies. (McCrone 2001a:44-45)
Other researchers have expanded the number of studies about the relationship between
media and (national) identity in Scotland. Law (2001) surveys 'the national dialogics
of the press sold daily in Scotland through a critical encounter with Michael Billig's
(1995) notion of 'banal nationalism". Bicket (2001) looks at the media discourse on
the new Scottish parliament. There are a number of recent articles dealing with the
Scottish press written by the Leverhulme-funded media research group at the
University of Edinburgh (Rosie et al. 2004; Maclnnes et al. 2005). The mass media in
Scotland are 'quite central to the constitution of contemporary public sphere' and 'the
media more generally should be recognised as a key force within civil society'
(Schlesinger et al. 2001:11). However, McCrone (2001a:181) warns us that although
'it is tempting to conclude that the media has been the prime instrument in
manufacturing this new Scottish communicative space,' we must take into
consideration that 'while the existence and development of a distinctive media has
been important in generating this space, it is not a sufficient condition in and of itself.
So there is a relationship between the media and nationalism and identity in Scotland,
but the nature of that relationship remains contested.
Other authors stress the importance of the media in Scotland with regard to the
development and preservation of civil society and national identity in Scotland.
Maurice Smith insists that Scotland has 'a proud and independently-minded press. Its
major newspapers play a key role in shaping public opinion, as well as reflecting it'
(Smith 1994:1). Indeed, the Scottish media are often elevated to the same level of
importance as the 'holy trinity' institutions of Scots law, distinct education system and
the Church of Scotland (Brown et al. 1998:3; McCrone 2001a:44-45), highlighting
their role in the preservation of Scottish distinctiveness. Scottish media 'are a set of
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influential and distinctly Scottish social institutions' (Maclnnes 1992:137), and 'one
of the best-established ways in which 'Scots' can participate in being Scottish'
(Higgins 2004:634). These 'distinctive media patterns form an important constituent
of Scottish institutional autonomy that has helped to preserve Scottish difference
within Unionist structures of government since 1707' (Connell 2003:187-188). But
what constitutes Scottish media? Before this question can be answered, I will discuss
the concept of national media.
4.2.1. National media?
In general, 'the predominantly London-based editions, which are widely taken to
constitute the British national press, usually purport to speak for the whole of Britain,
subsuming the national identities of the "stateless nations'" (Brookes 1999:250).
Indeed, the London-based British media is routinely referred to as the 'national
media' in literature. For example, Britain has 20 'national' daily and Sunday
newspapers, all published in London (Esser 1999:311); the fact that 'national
newspapers [are] published in one city,' i.e. London, makes the British press unique in
Europe (Tunstall 1996:2). Billig bases his whole Banal Nationalism on the study of
'British national newspapers', overlooking titles published outside of London. A
major EC Fifth Framework Programme, EURONAT, follows the trend by stating
'because of the report's national focus, regional papers including Scottish and Welsh
papers, are not included in this analysis' (Ichijo 2002:5, my emphasis). Billig is at
least aware that his analysis of British 'national newspapers' is controversial and
acknowledges that
the British press, in common with so many other things described as 'British',
is English-based. By calling the Day Survey a national survey, while
concentrating on the English editions, some of the conventional, hegemonic
semantics of 'British' nationalism have already been adopted. (Billig
1995:111).
Thus in the UK context, the term 'national media' is usually attributed to the media
based in London. Historically speaking, Seymour-Ure writes (1996:18-19), a national
paper in the United Kingdom would fulfil the following three criteria: they are
IV
London-based, have nationwide circulation and reflect the whole country . But as he
17 Note the use of national deixis 'country' by Seymour-Ure to mean, presumably, the UK.
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admits himself, none of these criteria are fixed, leaving the concept of national media
suitably vague. Lets look at the three criteria in more detail.
National media are based in London, i.e. in the capital of the United Kingdom.
This is broadly the case. However, the successful 'national' paper, the Guardian, was
until 1959 based in Manchester. According to this definition, Scottish, Welsh and
Northern Irish-based titles are excluded from the 'national media' category.
National media have nationwide circulation.
Brookes was quoted in last chapter claiming that 'national newspapers by definition
are nationally distributed' (1999:256). But nationwide circulation is 'also something
of a fiction' (Seymour-Ure 1996:18-19), as the papers often have different editions
with different content in different areas of 'the nation'. Even 'national' papers know
their circulation is less than 'national' (Maclnnes et al. 2005). As one interviewee
stated,
if you look at the circulation profiles, [newspapers] like the Times and the
Independent are really vestigial in the north of England. They don't exist
there very strongly at all. The Independent more or less stops at Watford ...
The Guardian's very well dug in now in London. It does have a substantial
balance of readership across the country... (Interview 15)
Thus 'technically, the British press is not national in the sense that the same editions
cover the whole of the United Kingdom. Some papers publish separate, editorially
independent editions for Scotland' (Billig 1995:111) - so-called 'tartan' editions, as
well as other regional editions.
In addition to regional editions of 'national' titles, there are regional and local
newspapers. The Newspaper Society defines regional/local newspapers as following:
Any publication in written form on newsprint or similar medium, published in
the British Isles (excluding the Irish Republic) at regular intervals not
exceeding seven days, and available regionally rather than nationally (i.e. not
available throughout all or most of the British Isles). (www.newspapersoc.org.uk)
If this curious Newspaper Society definition (the nation(al) means British Isles
excluding the Irish Republic, but including Isle of Man and Channel Isles, neither of
which are part of the UK) is taken as definitive, then Scottish media would indeed be
classified as regional media, because it is available 'regionally' rather than
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'nationally'. Although it is possible to buy the Scotsman in London, the Scotsman
sells less than three per cent of its copies outside Scotland. However, the Scotsman's
circulation data is included in the National Newspapers/Quality of the Audit Bureau
of Circulation, making it technically a 'British national' newspaper. The Herald was
listed as a regional, not a national paper in the Audit Bureau of Circulation (ABC)
books until July 2004, but has now been 'upgraded' into a 'national paper' as well.
National media reflect the whole country.
According to one interviewee, broadsheets see themselves as British national papers
in the sense that they cover from Land's End to John O' Groats (Interview 2). But
theory and practice do not always coincide. A Telegraph journalist admitted that
We tend to think ... you're writing for a British newspaper so you are writing,
broadly, for a British audience although, at the same time, the vast majority of
our readers would be English, a particularly high proportion from the Home
Counties. (Interview 17)
A study by Rosie et al. (2004:448) also found that 'most of the stories covering events
taking place in the UK in fact concerned events in England'. Another interviewee
claimed that the London-based Daily Telegraph has, since devolution, made quite a
successful attempt to make sure that the Scottish Parliament gets covered and a
Scottish political commentator has been appointed (Interview 14). Yet, a senior editor
of a British national Sunday described openly his paper as 'an English paper [...] in
the very fine English tradition of liberal intelligentsia' (Interview 7). A senior
journalist in the Guardian - allegedly a 'national' broadsheet - admitted that, since
devolution, Scotland is seen as almost a foreign country and thus tends not to be 'as
heavily covered for domestic readerships as parts of your own country' (Interview 15,
my emphasis) - basically saying that 'national' means 'English', not 'British'. Hence,
in reality, the 'nationals' tend 'to reflect the life and interests of three or four regions
rather than those of the whole country' (The Royal Commission on the Press, 1947,
cited in Seymour-Ure 1996:19), and many 'national' journalists admit that their
papers are 'English,' and not really 'British'.
The 'nationals' rarely reflect the whole of the United Kingdom, nor are they evenly
distributed across it. Hence the category 'British national press' is of limited
analytical or theoretical use (Maclnnes et al. 2005). It follows that 'national media' in
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the United Kingdom in general, and in Scotland in particular, are more complicated
than commonplace sociological studies of media suggest. This complexity, again, is
related to the issue of nationness in the United Kingdom. As 'references to the nation
have been consistently ambiguous throughout the 20th century - as to whether it is a
reference to Scotland or Britain - the relation between the media and the nation in
Scotland has remained peculiarly contested' (Connell 2003:188-189). This makes a
study of Scottish media more worthwhile and interesting. An analysis of this
media/nation contest in Scotland may potentially offer 'a revealing perspective on the
relation between the media and the nation more generally' (ibid.). As so-called
'national' titles themselves do not readily fit the existing definitions of 'national
newspaper', and as Scotland itself is more and more seen as a nation, as opposed to a
region, even by outsiders, the Scottish media should be thought of first and foremost
as national, and not simply as a regional appendix to the London-based British media.
Indeed, for most Scots, the 'national media' are located not in London, but 'in
Scotland, within a UK framework of ownership control, finance and regulation'; and
the Scottish media is defined as national, because it expresses 'a sense of nationhood,
as opposed to a mere regionality' (Meech and Kilborn 1992:247). Throughout this
research, therefore, I will use the concepts of British national media and Scottish
national media, or, for short, British media and Scottish media. By distinguishing
between the Scottish and the British press in such a way, this research does not
'forgetfully assume British press homogeneity' (Law 2001). I believe that
distinguishing between 'Scottish' and 'British' press is less inaccurate and insensitive
than distinguishing between 'national' and 'regional' media.
4.2.2. Defining Scottish media
Arriving at a definition for the Scottish media has proved elusive and difficult for
commentators throughout the twentieth century (Connell 2003:190). In this section I
will attempt the unattainable - to get to such a definition.
In the stateless nation of Scotland, the media have become 'an alternative means of
expressing that sense of [Scottish] distinctiveness. Just as Scotland feels it deserved a
"national" identity, it wishes to see its press as "national" in the same terms,' writes
Maurice Smith (1994:1-2). Consequently, some Scottish papers describe themselves
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as national and flag their 'national' status in their mastheads. There is a thistle logo on
the masthead of the 1979 Scotsman, thistle, of course, being the 'national flower' of
Scotland:
The Scotsman adopted a new look in early 1990s, and the masthead was changed as
well. Albert Morris writes that
The three thistles, symbols of a proud and independent nation and newspaper,
were still there - in colour, but just as prickly. The new, elegant, and visually-
impactive typeface was generally approved by readers, although one claimed
that the masthead showed the English thistle.
The Scotsman treated the matter with humorous indulgence and refused to be
nettled. (Morris 2002)
THE SCOTSMAN
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The Scotsman announces that it is 'Scotland's National Newspaper'. This self-
description as 'national' dates back to the second half of the nineteenth century
(Macdonald 1978:12), but it is flagged on the front page only since 1990s.
During the 1979 devolution referendum, the Glasgow Herald stated that it is
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The Herald adopted a more 'national' approach by dropping 'Glasgow' from its title
in 1992. During the 1997 devolution referendum, the Herald had already introduced




There are still no explicit non-verbal Scottish icons or symbols on its current
masthead, but the newspaper now claims to be Scotland's 'national newspaper' as
well:
stfftuws borr-skukie owurr natmvu »n»>?apn
ThelHerald
But what makes a newspaper Scottish? Which of the three dimensions of the mass
media outlined in Chapter 3 defines the Scottishness of the newspaper? Is it
production, content, and reception, i.e. does a newspaper need to be produced and
printed in Scotland, have Scottish content, or be targeted at the Scots and distributed
in Scotland? The following section will look at some aspects of the media that could
be used to define the Scottishness of Scottish media, using the familiar format of
production-content-reception from earlier.
4.2.2.1. Scottish production?
There are several aspects in the production side that can be taken into consideration.
Hutchison writes about 'home-produced' newspapers (1978c), using a national deixis
'home' to designate 'Scotland'. He suggests that for a newspaper to be thought of as
Scottish, it has to be produced and printed in Scotland. Consider the following
extract from The Daily Record's 1979 devolution campaign:
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More than half of Scotland's voters read the Daily Record. [...] The Scottish edition
of the Daily Express (printed in Manchester) has the impertinence to claim that it is
'The voice of Scotland' in its hysterical campaign against devolution.
The Daily Record with twice as many readers makes no such claim. Even a
political moron should know that there is a division of opinion in Scotland about
the merits of an Assembly.
It is a piece of political humbug for the English Express group to say that 'No to
Devolution' is the Voice of Scotland. (DREC080279, original emphasis)
By emphasising that the Scottish edition of Daily Express is actually printed in
Manchester and that it is owned by the 'English Express group', the Glasgow-based
Daily Record is stressing the non-Scottishness of its rival tabloid. This double-
othering, based on non-Scottish ownership and location, while emphasising the
Scottishness of the Daily Record, diminishes the 'right' of the Daily Express to act as
the Voice of Scotland. However, Hutchison categorises the Beaverbook titles,
including the Daily Express, as Scottish titles in his own research, 'since there is a
substantial editorial presence in Glasgow although the papers are printed in
Manchester' (Hutchison 1978a:78). His work supports the idea that the actual place of
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More recently, the Independent flirted briefly with the Scots by putting a large blue
'Printed in Scotland' sign under the masthead of its new tabloid-size paper in
February 2004, but has since dropped the practice.
Ferguson (1946) suggested decades ago that a true Scottish newspaper has to be
owned by Scots. He distinguished between three different types of media available in
Scotland:
• Those 'owned and staffed by Scots'
• Those 'native journals which have been bought by Kemsley Newspapers'
• London dailies
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According to Ferguson, only the first type qualifies as Scottish, as the newspapers in
the second type have lost their editorial independence, which has 'rendered them
Scottish only in outward appearance' (cited in Connell 2003:191). Ferguson's
assertion from that post-war era needs to be qualified in the current age of
multinational corporations. Today, a higher proportion of Scotland's newspapers are
owned 'from outside her territory by English, or internationally based organisations'
(Macdonald 1978:11). This trend is widespread in Scotland in general and the issue
has been part of Scottish political discourse since 1970s:
In Scotland's case, since World War II there has been a trend toward
economic dependence on inward investment and external ownership, making
for a kind of branch-plant economy. Well over half of Scottish industry is
owned outside of Scotland, controlled either by British conglomerates from
London, or firms in other countries, especially the US. (Hearn 2000:6)
The media are no different. While in the first half of the twentieth century both
broadsheets were Scots-owned, today they are both owned by non-Scottish
companies:
Before 1979 1997 Today
The Scotsman Thomson Regional Newspapers (1953) Scotsman Publications Ltd (1995)
The Herald Scottish and Lonrho gains 1992 buy-out Bought by
Universal control of George from Lonrho, The Newsquest
Investments Ltd Outram& Scottish Scottish Media Media Group in
(Sir Hugh Fraser) &Universal Group (smg since 2002 (belongs to
Newspapers 2000) Gannett)
Indeed, if the geographical location of ownership were the defining criteria for the
Scottishness of a given newspaper, then both the Herald and the Scotsman would
have difficulties describing themselves as Scottish, as the ownership of both
broadsheets has 'emigrated'. Since 1995 the Scotsman has been owned by The
Scotsman Publications Ltd, which belongs to The Barclay Brothers, now also the
owners of the Telegraph group. The 'reclusive' twins Sir David and Sir Frederick
Barclay have lived on the tax-haven island of Brecqhou in the Channel Islands, and
their only claim to Scottishness (apart from the location of their business ventures) is
having Scottish parents, although the brothers themselves were born in London.
Similarily, in 2002 smg (known as Scottish Media Group until 2000) sold the Herald
to London-based Newsquest Media Group, part of a US newspaper giant Gannett.
Indeed, despite their 'foreign' owners, neither the Herald nor the Scotsman would
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describe themselves as anything else but Scottish newspapers. Similarly, the Times,
the Sunday Times, the News of the World and the Sun are still very much Fleet
Street/British papers, though owned by the US-based Australian media magnate
Rupert Murdoch.
But does the 'nationality' of the ownership matter? Macdonald suggests that
The advantage of the Glasgow Herald's, ownership (until the recent
intervention of Lonrho) by Sir Hugh Fraser's Scottish and Universal
Investments Ltd. over the Scotsman's ownership by the London-based
Thomson British Holdings Ltd. would appear doubtful. (1978:11)
She insists that 'the nature of commercial control, rather than its geographical base,
would seem to be the most crucial determinant of what a newspaper can or cannot do'
(ibid.). Macdonald does express her concerns with ownership control though:
The current control of the paper by the Thomson organisation does not inhibit
the Scotsman's journalists from incisive comment but it does inhibit the
freedom to choose which areas of public concern to be incisive about. The
Thomson organisation's interest in North Sea oil is not going to encourage the
Scotsman or the Aberdeen Press and Journal (another of Thomson's Scottish
papers) to be very critical of the activities of the big oil companies. (1978:10)
But this is related to the issue of proprietors' interest more generally, and does not
depend on the geographical location of the owners. According to Maurice Smith,
Scottish ownership does not automatically translate into being 'more Scottish'
anyway:
The one major Scottish-based publisher, D.C. Thomson, is conservative,
secretive to the point of eccentricity, and plays no part in the banging of the
Scottish drum. During the 1980s, our major newspapers' owners included
Robert Maxwell and Roland 'Tiny' Rowland, neither of them men with any
special interest in Scottish affairs, or even in the fortunes of their Scottish
titles, whose only real task was to return annual profits' dividends to head
office. (1994:5-6).
Thus simple ownership does not necessarily show anything. As mentioned in Chapter
3, not considering the role of proprietors would be inadequate, but so would be an
explanation that is based solely on the role of the owners (Bourdieu 1998:39). While
media could historically be described as an architect of nationalism, then today the
media are to a large degree multinational - and increasingly nationless, at least in
terms of ownership.
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Another criteria one can consider is the national identity of journalists themselves.
Journalists belong among the professionals who play a significant role in the
promotion and maintenance of national identity:
All comparative studies of nationality have underlined the crucial place of
such professional strata in generating the identity shifts behind nationalism: it
is teachers, clerics, lawyers, journalists and loose screws who cause the
trouble, far more than landlords, bankers, manufacturers or trade unionists.
(Nairn 1997:188)
McLuhan (1964) famously claimed the print media to be the architect of nationalism.
But how do journalists 'build' national identity and promote nationalism? As
suggested in Chapter 3, the media have an important role in nation-building process.
Quebecois political journalists, for example, have long acted as intellectual leaders in
Quebec, where the media played an important part in 'promulgating new ideas, and
providing a platform for the 'new intellectuals" who later became the leaders in
Quebec society (Hazel 2001:96). Similarly, the media in Scotland 'contribute to the
Scottish sense of difference within the UK, in short to Scottish national identity'
(Schlesinger et al. 2001:11). But what is the role of individual journalists in this wider
process of nation-building and nation-preserving? Does the Scottishness of Scottish
journalists contribute to the Scottishness of the Scottish media?
One might wish to describe a paper produced by staff who imagined themselves to
possess a particular national identity, or who subscribed to particular 'nationalist'
view of the world as national - and this may shape what these journalist define as
news and how the news is presented. And as Ferguson (1946) mentioned, Scottish
papers are those which are 'owned and staffed by Scots'. While some interviewees
hint that national identity of the journalists may affect the post-football or rugby
match mood in the office, most of them doubt the importance of national identity in
terms of the structure of the newspaper. It may help initially:
I think it helps on the doorstep if you are Scottish to get people to talk ...
especially if you are in a tower block in Govan or something. If you turn up an
go 'oohh heeello' (laughter) 'I'm from the Home Counties, could you possibly
tell me what's happened' you might have a bit of trouble and you would have
a much better chance if you have a Scottish accent. But, I would hasten to say
that I think as soon as you are pleasant and nice to people hopefully they don't
care where you come from. Initial first interaction, it might help if you have a
Scottish accent. (Interview 4)
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However, other interviewees are dismissive about the role of the national identity, and
stressed the value of 'good journalism', i.e. 'you're judged by what you do'
(Interview 7). Here are few more quotations on the 'good journalism' theme:
I don't think there's any advantage in being kind of intrinsically Scottish. Or
in being somebody who was born here. [...] I tend to go with the argument
that, you know, good journalism counts [...] whether you've got a Scottish
accent or not, but, obviously, good journalism involves a thorough background
knowledge of the issues, and of the place you're in. So, that's important, and
good journalism is helped in Scotland if you know the situation, and obviously
that comes from (...) being here for any length of time. (Interview 3)
I don't think their nationality is important at all. ... I mean if it's coming here
to work on a Scottish newspaper or the Scottish edition of a national, a
London-based newspaper, I think it's important that they come here and they
know about the area that they're working on and I think that it's important that
they get to grips with whatever sort of specific area, if they're covering
politics, they know a bit ... or even if they're not covering politics, if they're
living and working in a Scottish newspaper and working on Scottish content in
Scotland, I think it's great if they have a grasp of the sort of political culture of
the country but where they're from or what their nationality is is of no
importance. (Interview 8)
But not all interviewees agreed. For example, one England-born journalist in Scotland
insists: 'I think it's important ... for those who are not Scottish. I think there is an
element of hostility' (Interview 9). But interestingly enough, the hostility is not
nationalist as such, and parochialism comes to play again, as the interviewee
continued:
I don't think it's principally based on the fact that one's English. I think it's
principally based on the fact that one is taught to work in a rather more
ambitious journalistic culture. [...] Now some people would say it was
because I was English - I don't think it had anything to do with my national
identity. I think it had to do with the fact that I had worked on a bigger stage
and most of them hadn't and they found that rather threatening in a sense. ...
They resented that and that is a problem throughout Scottish broadsheet
journalism and broadcasting industry. [...] Because it shakes up their quiet and
relaxed lifestyle up here (laughter). (Interview 9)
In some countries, defining the 'nationality' of the media is easier. For instance, early
Flemish public service broadcasters announced that 'Flemish television means: direct
visual contact with the whole world, through a medium that is operated by Flemish
people and that is governed by Flemish values' (Dhoest 2004), a definition that gives
71
high prominence to the national identity of the staff and Flemish language. In
Scotland, the language is not the defining criteria, and in terms of the national
identification of journalists working in Scottish national broadsheets, the situation is
much more complex. Overall, national identity of the journalists is not be the basis for
defining the 'nationness' of a newspaper in Scotland.
4.2.2.2. Scottish reception?
Scottish newspapers have traditionally been city-based. There is no equivalent of
Fleet Street in Scotland,
no centralised area of power on which competition concentrates. The added
dimension of local identity is therefore imposed, in Scotland, on the structural
dimension between popular and quality papers. Although three of the daily
papers published in Scotland (the Glasgow Herald, the Scotsman and the
Daily Record), and the two Sundays (the Sunday Mail and the Sunday Post)
aim for distribution throughout the country, the circulation of all but the
Sunday Post is very heavily geographically weighted. (Macdonald 1978:12)
The Herald is, historically, Glasgow-centred, and the Scotsman Edinburgh-centred.
The main offices of both titles are still based in respective cities, but more or less
recently they have both redefined themselves as Scottish national broadsheets. And
although the 'petty bickering' between the two Scottish broadsheets in defence of
'their respective home cities has diminished', the expression of 'locational differences
is not yet extinct' (Macdonald 1978:12). Even today, the readership of the papers is
still very much city-based. For example, in 2002 a remarkable 81 % of all copies of the
Herald circulated in Scotland were sold in Strathclyde, as opposed to just 8% for the
Scotsman. The readership of Sunday papers is geographically more varied. Scotland
on Sunday fares slightly better in Strathclyde, managing to sell 32% of its Scottish
circulation in the traditional Herald hinterland, and Sunday Herald sells 26% of its
copies outside the Strathclyde region (Competition Commission 2003: Appendix 5.1).
Thus, despite the 'national' claims of the Herald and the Scotsman, the papers are still
very much centred in their respective home cities.
This regional focus is not characteristic of broadsheets alone, of course. Macdonald
claims that 'theoretically national popular papers,' the Daily Record and the Sunday
Mail also
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angle their content in the direction of what they assume to be the interests and
concerns of the working people of the West of Scotland, as befits their
geographical location in Glasgow. Distribution concentrates, accordingly, not
on extensive penetration of all parts of the country, but on the industrial belt of
the South of Scotland, where attitudes and outlook are taken to be compatible
with those of the industrialised West. Although there have been deliberate
attempts on the part of most of these papers to prevent regional identity
directing content, the question of whether they can be regarded as fully-
fledged national papers remains. (Macdonald 1978:12-13)
Scottish papers sell outside Scotland as well. The 'extensive sales in part of England'
of the Sunday Post, for example, 'challenge the view that its appeal is intrinsically
Scottish'. Although some of its readership can be explained in terms of exile Scottish
readership, its appeal must lie in something other than its Scottishness (Macdonald
1978:18). Similarly, the Scotsman sold, in February 2004, 2.51 per cent of its copies
in England, Wales, Northern Ireland and other countries, and also 1 copy in Republic
of Ireland18.
But in general, if the location of the readership were to be the only defining criteria
for 'national newspaper,' then 'the nature of newspaper readership patterns in
Scotland provides little encouragement for those who would like to think of charges
of parochialism against the Scots as obsolete' (Macdonald 1978:13).
4.2.2.3. Scottish content?
Existence of Scottish news content is another defining criteria for the Scottish
newspapers, as 'the genuine difference in news-content indicates a perspective that
deliberately encompasses a Scottish oriented world-view' (Connell 2003:192). The
development of Scottish content did not take place smoothly, as Macdonald writes:
It might be expected that the distinguishing characteristic of Scottish
newspapers would be their communication of Scottish news. Historically, such
an assumption would be decisively ill-founded, but even in the contemporary
situation it is, arguably, open to critical scrutiny. The Scottishness of the
Scottish press was very slow to emerge. Although the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries witnessed the florescence of Scottish newspapers, these
saw their role as purveyors of British and foreign intelligence primarily, and as
reporters of their own environs only gradually. This is understandable, given
that newspapers of the time originated most often as supporters of a political
18 Audit Bureau of Circulation (5 April 2004)
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party, and the centre of political life was accepted unequivocally, at that
period, to be London. Technological limitations made plagiarism from the
London press inevitable and therefore unashamed. (1978:13)
Note how Macdonald suggests that Scottishness of the Scottish papers is somehow
incompatible with covering British and world news, as if being Scottish equals being
interested in only Scottish issues, and an international perspective makes these papers
somehow 'non-national'. This is in marked contrast with the ideas expressed by
several presenters at the 'Scotland & The Media: A Question of Trust' conference
organised by the Royal Society of Edinburgh in March 2004. For example, Paul
McKinney, head of News and Current Affairs of Scottish TV claimed that the Scottish
media today are too parochial, too focused on Scottish news. In order to be a truly
'national' media, Scottish media should edit their own international and British news
in addition to Scottish news, and give a Scottish perspective to the former two.
Placing too much emphasis on Scottish stories can backlash and lead to claims of
parochialism. The latter is an accusation
that can be laid at the door of many newspaper offices in Scotland. Concern
with things Scottish, even in the limited and often trivialised way in which it
appears, becomes a means of avoiding consideration of broader political,
economic or social issues which must nevertheless affect the lives of people
living in Scotland. Foreign news coverage in most Scottish newspapers is
shamefully lacking. (Macdonald 1978:18)
In 2000, Tim Luckhurst, briefly editor at the Scotsman, accused the Scottish papers of
being principally composed of 'local rather than national events (either Scottish or
British), and what news coverage they provide is dominated by human interest or
breaking news' (quoted in Connell 2003:187), i.e. 'the categories which we now more
readily think of as the staple ingredients of popular journalism' like crime, accidents,
fires, climate, etc. (Macdonald 1978:15). Another Glasgow-based journalist
remembered returning from London, and 'reading a Scottish Sunday paper, thinking,
God, this is really insular, very small minded, very parochial' (Interview 13).
The papers seem to believe that in order to assert their Scottishness, they have to
choose Scottish stories over non-Scottish stories, whether the stories merit it or not.
This is also a regularly occurring theme in interviews:
The Scotsman and the Herald are almost schizophrenic. They feel an
obligation to report the UK news but they also report local news and they have
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to decide what to put on the front page. Should it be local? Should it be
national news, national meaning Scottish? Should it be UK or should it be
international? Whereas the Guardian only has to worry about should it put an
international story on the front or should it be a UK story, the Scotsman and
the Herald are always torn between putting a Scottish story or a UK story.
Post-devolution has become easier for them, there's more a tendency now to
splash on a Scottish story than they would have before the Scottish Parliament
came into being. (Interview 10)
Interestingly, the same interviewee admits that this concentration on Scottish issues is
not necessarily a criticism: 'Maybe that's no bad thing that Scotland has its own
agenda that's different from the UK agenda' (Interview 10), but he does describe the
media in Scotland as parochial. Being parochial equates to being regional, and this is
not flattering: 'by and large ... most of the stories up here are irrelevant, seen as
parochial and regional. Effectively, I think, we are regarded as something of a region'
and not a nation by London-based newspapers (Interview 13).
There was a drive in the 1970s to become more 'national' in the 'British national
papers' sense. The Scotsman tried to cover foreign news with as much detail as
Scottish news, appointing a full-time European correspondent in Brussels - being the
first non-Fleet Street paper in Britain to do so (Macdonald 1978:18). Arnold Kemp
took over the editorship of the Herald in 1981, determined to 'develop the Herald as a
"pluralist" national newspaper for Scotland, with a strong international outlook'
(Smith 1994:241). This international outlook has diminished somewhat during the last
decade or so again. A critical Scot-in-London interviewee said:
Before The Scotsman used to argue it was national in a British sense and ...
one of the few differences between the Scotsman and the London based papers
was it was based in Edinburgh rather than London. But it regarded its
coverage of international and UK news as being as good as the London based
papers and the Herald too, thought of itself as national in that sense, in the UK
sense. Since, I think, partly as a reaction to Thatcher, change took place in the
mid-80s. I'm not sure exactly when you can say it started. Maybe when Jim
Sillars won in Govan and I think it was in '87 or '88, and there was a sort of
resurgence in Scottish nationalism and then there was the devolution
campaign. ... when people talked about the papers having a 'national identity',
instead of meaning 'British', they started to mean 'Scottish' and now it's
overwhelmingly national in the Scottish sense rather than British and they
don't attempt now to regard themselves as sort of competing with the London
based papers. They see themselves as writing primarily for a Scottish audience
and the quota of Scottish stories is much higher now than it would have been
20 years ago. (Interview 10)
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Whether this is a sign of parochialism or assertion of newspapers' Scottishness is a
matter of interpretation. However, while it may be good marketing sense 'to give
space to Scottish politics as it has been for a long time to provide concentrated
coverage of Scottish sports' (Macdonald 1978:17), there seems to be an increasing
awareness that Scottish media should look beyond Scotland as well, if they want to be
truly 'national' and not just 'regional' Scottish newspapers. Scottish newspapers have
flirted with the upsurge of Scottish nationalism and establishment of Scottish
Parliament for long enough, and need now to move on - or return to - giving the
Scottish perspective on Scottish, British, European and global news.
4.2.3. Scottish national broadsheets
The current research is based on the analysis of the two major Scottish broadsheets,
the Herald and the Scotsman. Although there are two more broadsheets in Scotland
that have similar circulation patterns like the Herald and the Scotsman, namely the
Courier in Dundee and Press and Journal in Aberdeen, the last two 'are not regarded
as "national" papers in the same way' (Schlesinger et al. 2001:22), nor do they
purport to be national papers as Herald and Scotsman do. According to Schlesinger
'jointly, these newspapers dominate the opinion-leading market in, respectively, West
and East-Central Scotland, the belt where most of the population is concentrated'
(1998:62). Both papers have been supportive of devolution, though to slightly
different degrees:
1 Title 1970s 1979 1997 Today ]
The Scotsman Pro Strongly pro Pro Critical
The Herald Critical Pro Strongly pro Pro
The Herald traces its history back to 1783, when the Glasgow Advertiser was
launched, two years before the London Times began in London. Consequently the
Herald often claims to be 'one of the world's oldest-established dailies' (Smith
1994:234). In 1804 the newspaper was renamed the Glasgow Herald, and changed
again in 1992, when 'Glasgow' was dropped from the title to reflect a wider Scottish
readership. Traditionally, the Herald was a Unionist newspaper, and spent most of the
twentieth century as 'the strident, unforgivingly Tory voice of the West of Scotland's
business class' (Smith 1994:234). The paper remained 'the staunch loyal voice of
Conservatism' in the area until the mid-1970s. According to the former editor Arnold
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Kemp, the Herald 'leader writers used to consult Tory central office to make sure they
had the right line' before his arrival in the paper in 1981 (Smith 1994:68). However,
the Herald started to 'drift away' from 'toeing the Conservative party line during the
devolution years of the late 1970s' (ibid.), and by the time of the first devolution
referendum in 1979, the Herald was in favour of devolution. Arnold Kemp arrived as
the editor in 1981, and this finally 'broke the traditional line of mutual support
between newspaper and party, defying Conservatism and scorning Thatcherism, in
particular, as it espoused Scottish constitutional change with an unmatched
confidence' (Smith 1994:235).
The first issue of the Scotsman was printed in 1817, 'as a liberal antidote to the
conservatism of Edinburgh press' at the time (Macdonald 1978:9). Originally it was
published weekly, but soon came out also on Wednesdays. By 1873, the daily
circulation was forty thousand, and the Scotsman became, 'in spirit and authority,
Scotland's national newspaper' (Morris 2002). The paper campaigned heavily for
devolution in 1979. However, the devolution campaign took its toll on the paper, and
'the excitement of the 1970s was to evaporate before the onset of the new decade,'
writes Maurice Smith. 'The disillusionment of the 1979 referendum, and the apparent
indifference within Thomson Regional Newspapers to the paper's claim to be a
"national" title - with the material benefits to its journalists that that claim would
imply - led to a haemorrhage of talent' (Smith 1994:233). Though supportive of
devolution during the 1997 referendum, today The Scotsman has become rather
critical of the new Scottish parliament.
4.3. Concluding remarks
What defines the Scottishness of the Scottish media? If it is not the circulation,
location, ownership etc., then what defines the nationness of a particular newspaper?
What makes the Herald and the Scotsman Scottish? Connell suggests that 'national
status is less about the comprehensive nature of a paper's coverage and more about
the manner in which its content is presented' (Connell 2003:203, my emphasis).
Hence, one should look at 'the extent to which Scottish newspapers are capable of
engendering a sense of Scottishness due to a tendency to address their readership as
Scottish' (Connell 2003:188), as it is through the style of its address that 'the press are
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capable of generating a feeling of collective belonging' (Fowler 1991:46-65;
Dahlgren 1992:17; cited in Connell 2003:188).
This brings us to the question of framing, as discussed in Chapter 3. Connell
speculates whether 'the preference for locally produced newspapers in Scotland is
indicative of Scottish sociological distinctiveness, because Scottish newspaper-readers
consume alternative titles they receive a distinctly Scottish perspective on events'
(2003:188). Indeed, the back cover of The Best of The Scotsman, a compilation of
paper's 1994 articles, states that the Scotsman newspaper gives 'a distinctive Scottish
slant to the daily news' (Wishart 1994, my emphasis). It seems that the only criteria
for the Scottishness of the Scottish newspaper is the framing of its articles, a specific
Scottish perspective. As 'Scots mainly consume Scottish newspapers, they are daily
addressed as Scots by Scottish agenda and recognise this to be so,' and this
'contributes to a self-awareness of Scottish difference within the UK' (Schlesinger et
al. 2001:12). The media are tied up in the Self/Other dialectic as well. Maurice Smith
rhetorically asked: 'What is the point of proclaiming Scotland's "difference" if her
newspapers cannot produce a different view of the world, tailored more directly to
Scottish perspective?' (1994:8).
National identity can be based on language, religion, history, geography, common
culture, and many other criteria. National claims vary in their nature between national
communities. In Estonia, Catalonia, France, Quebec, and elsewhere, the language
plays an important role in the discursive construction of national identity. In Scotland
it does not, but this does not make Scotland any less of a nation. The roots and routes
of any given national identity differ and 'nationalism is not the expression of
"objective" differences, but the mobilisation of those which the actors believe to be
salient' (McCrone 2001a:50). It is the same with national media. The media can claim
their nationness based on ownership, location, staff, content, circulation, consumption
patterns or some other suitable criteria. The individual criteria can matter, but do not
have to. The Herald and the Scotsman are Scottish national newspapers, because they
routinely claim and identify themselves to be such. This thesis will look at the subtle
ways the media are doing this.
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5. Methodology
Here is a quote from the Scotsman, published three weeks after the 1997 devolution
referendum:
Mr Blair's rhetoric is a curious thing, given that it is his chief political
weapon. It relies heavily on the sound-bite and the slogan but it also seems to
dare us to find him mawkish, cloying or manipulative. 'Compassion with a
hard edge', he said. It sounds very fine, but what does it mean? Thatcherism
with a human face? Socialism with a bit of economic efficiency? Or is it just a
way of saying - in prime ministerial parlance - hey, look, you sometimes have
to be cruel to be kind?
[...]
This is the real problem. Mr Blair does not advocate sin. He demands virtue,
hard work, decency, partnership, fairness, compassion, efficiency, self-belief -
nothing, in other words, that anyone could possibly object to. When you ask
what any of this means in practice, however, all that emerges is the sort of
language more suited to a management training seminar crossed with a prayer
meeting.
(SCOTO11097)
As the extract implies, linguistic choices matter. Lakoff has written that 'Language
drives politics and determines the success of political machinations. Language is the
initiator and interpreter of power relations. Politics is language' (Lakoff 1990:13). But
rhetoric is a powerful weapon not just for politicians, it also benefits the media. How
to analyse the media and their language? Chapter 3 suggests that there are three
dimensions to the analysis of the mass media - production, content, and reception.
This thesis focuses on the content of media texts and analyses the discursive
construction of national identity in the Scottish media, and the change in media
discourse. Any research project should match research methods to the questions being
asked, and as I am more interested in the nature of changes in media language, and
not the extent, I approach the media qualitatively, using analysis of discourse. I 'got
microscopic', as Billig (1995) suggests. 'It is as if the main research tool in much
contemporary research on identification consists of bifocal magnifying glass
precluding generalisations and overviews, and favouring minutely detailed accounts
of variations and nuances' (Eriksen 2004:50). In addition to detailed analysis of media
texts, I also interviewed a number of journalists to get a better understanding of the
production and writing processes involved and to contextualise my findings further.
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Broadly speaking, analysis of 'the mass mediation of national identity' (Spitulnik
1993:294) can be either quantitative or qualitative, or combine both of these
approaches. 'The distinction between quantitative and qualitative approaches to
research is of course more complicated than simply a choice between the use of
numerical and statistical procedures on the one hand, and the search for patterned
relationships on the other' (Barker 2003:316). I adopted a qualitative approach, but
this chapter will briefly also look at the quantitative approach, before outlining the
methodology used in the research.
5.1. Quantitative text analysis
Content analysis has the distinct advantage of 'being understood and accepted by
most people, including journalists' themselves (van Leeuwen and Jewitt 2001a: 1).
That may be the reason why content analysis has been the chosen kind of evidence of
press data and media analysis for decades (Bell 2001:13; ter Wal 2002:444). The term
'content analysis' is some 70 years old, although its intellectual roots go much further
back in history, 'to the beginning of man's conscious use of symbols and language'
(Krippendorff 1980:9). Of course, 'however ancient these roots might be, their
existence, if not persistence, should not distract from the fact that modern pursuits are
significantly different in aim and in method' (ibid.). Content analysis as a
methodology was more thoroughly developed during the interwar period. This was
triggered by two different aims - firstly, researchers wanted to measure the 'accuracy'
of the mass media, and secondly, content analysis methods were elaborated and
employed during the Second World War in order to detect possible implicit messages
from German domestic radio broadcasts (Krippendorff 1980, Rose 2001:54). It has
been a popular methodology since.
Content analysis claims to be an 'explicit methodology, through which ... analysis
would not be woolly but vigorous, reliable and objective' (Rose 2001:54-55). One of
the best-known definitions of content analysis is by Berelson (1952), who defines it as
'a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the
manifest content of communication' (cited in Holsti 1969:3). Krippendorff defines
content analysis as 'a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences
from data to their context' (1980:21), where 'replicable' stands for Berelson's
'objective and systematic'. But definitions of content analysis have tended to change
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over time 'with developments of the technique and with application of the tool itself
to new problems and types of materials' (Holsti 1969:2). These earlier definitions
have been recently attacked on several occasions. Some of the criticisms are:
• Content analysis is restricted to purely quantitative analysis and 'its definition of
"reliable" equates reliability with quantitative methods of analysis' (Gunter
2000:55-56).
• It is concerned with manifest content only. Consequently, content analysis 'can
only grasp some of the building blocks of social representations ... In content
analysis, the evaluation of a word, and the different meaning assigned to it in
different contexts, cannot be assessed, unless the contexts are checked for every
occurrence' (ter Wal 2002:446, my emphasis).
• It is purely descriptive instead of yielding data from which one might infer
influences of media content on audience perceptions of social reality (Gunter
2000:56). This shortcoming is less problematic in the case of current research, as
it is focusing on media content, and not other sites as production and audience
reception.
Although traditionally seen as a quantitative technique, some scholars have recently
promoted a more qualitative approach to content analysis. According to Berg the issue
of whether content analysis is or should be qualitative or quantitative has become 'one
of the leading debates among users of content analysis' and Berg himself 'strives for a
blend of qualitative and quantitative emphasis' (1995:175). Bell agrees that content
analysis is best used when supplemented with 'researcher's own qualitative insight'
(1991:214). Thus 'content analysis and qualitative methods are not mutually
exclusive' (Rose 2001:55). Holsti himself wrote that the content analyst 'should use
qualitative and quantitative methods to supplement each other' and that 'it is by
moving back and forth between these approaches that the investigator is most likely to
gain insight into the meaning of his data' (1969:11). Indeed, there has been 'a growth
in media research using interpretive and hermeneutic styles and methodologies'
(Gunter 2000:82), and the term 'qualitative content analysis' has been coined.
Hjimans (1996) distinguishes between following qualitative content analysis
methodologies: structuralist-semiotic analysis, discourse analysis, rhetorical analysis,
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narrative analysis, and interpretative analysis. All five are used as methods for the
qualitative analysis of media content.
5.2. Qualitative text analysis
It has been recommended that analysis of discourse can make 'more explicit the
classical approaches' to content analysis (van Dijk 1983:20), and indeed, analysis of
discourse is widely used in social sciences, especially in media research. Analysis of
discourse manages to avoid the limitations of content analysis, as well as limitations
of some other popular media analysis methodologies, like semiotics and ideological
analysis of media representations. For example, analysis of discourse avoids 'the
narrowness of semiotic analysis, with its tendency to focus solely on the text'. It also
escapes 'the broad generalisations that often characterise ideological analysis of
media representations' - namely, where 'ideological analysis begins with a specific
issue (such as race, or gender, or sexuality) and works back through the evidence of
media texts, an analysis of discourse starts its enquiry with an ear to the texts
themselves, and in a spirit of openness to the patterns that may emerge' (Macdonald
2003:2).
Following Macdonald (2003) I use the term 'analysis of discourse' rather than more
commonplace 'discourse analysis' throughout my research. She explains the
difference as following:
Although this book proceeds by analysing discourse, its approach diverges
from the methodology known as 'discourse analysis.' Developed primarily by
linguists and, to a lesser extent, by social psychologists (e.g. Potter and
Wetherell 1987), discourse analysis concentrates on verbal texts and on forms
of social interaction such as the interview or the talk show. While 'discourse
analysis' details the intricacies of communicative practice for their own sake,
the methodology that has become known as 'critical discourse analysis' (or
CDA) explores what these reveal about power relations. (Macdonald 2003:3)
Similarly, I am not interested in the media text as such for the sake of the linguistic
text alone, as discourse analysts would be. Leader articles are one possible site where
national identities are discursively constructed and that is where my research interest
lies. Fairclough's neat definition of discourse analysis as 'an attempt to show
systematic links between texts, discourse practices, and sociocultural practices'
(1995:16-17) fits my approach well. I am interested in the discursive construction
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(alias the discourse practice) of national identities (sociocultural practice) in the leader
articles (text).
There are several approaches to analysis of discourse to choose from. Van Dijk
(1999) writes that as 'discourses have many different structures', these can be
'analysed in many different ways depending on general approaches (linguistic,
pragmatic, semiotic, rhetorical, interactional etc.) or the kind of genres analysed, such
as conversation, news reports, poetry or advertisements'. One of the more widespread
approaches is critical discourse analysis. Critical discourse analysis (CDA)
represents an outgrowth of the work of the British and Australian pioneers of
Critical Linguistics, particularly Fowler and Kress, in convergence with the
approaches of the British discourse analyst Fairclough and Dutch text linguist
van Dijk. CDA has produced the majority of research into media discourse
during the 1980s and 1990s, and has arguably become the standard framework
for studying media texts within European linguistics and discourse studies.
(Garrett and Bell 1998:5-6)
Following Bourdieu (1977), 'calling the approach "critical" is a recognition that our
social practice in general, and our use of language in particular, are bound up with
causes and effects which we may not be at all aware of under normal conditions'
(Fairclough 1995:54). The aim of CDA is many-fold - to 'unmask ideologically
permeated and often obscured structures of power, political control, and dominance,
as well as strategies of inclusion and exclusion in language use' (Wodak et al.
1999:8). Hence the 'critical' in CDA signals 'the need for analysts to unpack the
ideological underpinnings of discourse that have become so naturalised over time that
we begin to treat them as common, acceptable and natural features of discourse' (Teo
2000:12). The central notion in CDA is that of power, especially the 'social power of
groups or institutions' (van Dijk 2001). CDA 'goes beyond the description of
discourse to an explanation of how and why particular discourses are produced' (Teo
2000:43). As distinct from the non-critical, more linguistic analysis of discourse,
CDA 'centres on authentic everyday communication of institutional, media, political
or other locations rather than on sample sentences or sample texts constructed in
linguists' minds'. It assumes that discourse is socially relevant, that there is
a dialectical relationship between particular discursive acts and the situations,
institutions and social structures in which they are embedded: the situational,
institutional, and social contexts shape and affect discourse, and, in turn,
discourses influence social and political reality. (Wodak et al. 1999:8)
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This dialectic relationship between discourse and society is, thus, a two-way
relationship: 'discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially shaped: it constitutes
situations, objects of knowledge, and the social identities of and relationships between
people and groups of people.' Discourse 'is constitutive both in the sense that it helps
to sustain and reproduce the social status quo, and in the sense that it contributes to
transforming it. Since discourse is so socially influential, it gives rise to important
issues of power' (Fairclough and Wodak 1997:258).
The paradigm of CDA is heterogeneous. Different researchers approach discourse
analysis differently - each according to their specific research objectives - and there
is no unitary theoretical framework. Indeed, there are many types of CDA, which can
be 'theoretically and analytically quite different' (van Dijk 2001). The following are
some of the suggested schools of CDA within the overarching heterogeneous
paradigm (Fairclough and Wodak 1997:262-268; Wodak et al. 1999:7):
• The British variety of CDA has drawn upon Foucault's theory of discourse and, in
its linguistic dimension, is closely associated with the systematic linguistic theory
as well as with Halliday's social semiotics/functional framework. Halliday's
semiotics examines 'semiotic practices, specific to a culture and community, for
the making of various kinds of texts and meanings in various situational contexts
and contexts of culturally meaningful activity' (Lemke 2004). The following sub-
schools can be distinguished within the British school of CDA:
• Critical Linguists (Fowler, Kress, Hodge)
• Social Semiotics (Hodge, Kress, van Leeuwen). Kress and van Leeuwen are
also 'pioneers in analysis of the visual dimensions of printed texts' (Garrett
and Bell 1998:14), and some of the visual analysis later in the thesis is based
on their ideas.
• Sociocultural Change and Change in Discourse (Fairclough)
• The cognitive-oriented approach of Dutch Critical Discourse Analysis or Socio-
cognitive Studies (van Dijk) uses a triadic model to show how personal and social
cognition mediates between social structures and discourse stmctures. The so-
called triadic model has three main components, looking at social functions,
cognitive structures, and discursive expression and reproduction, and how these
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three elements bridge the gap between macro and micro levels of analysis (Garrett
and Bell 1998:7).
• German Critical Discourse Analysis (Maaz, Jager, Link) is influenced by
Foucault's concept of discourse. Here one can distinguish between following more
narrow types of CDA:
• Reading analysis (Maas)
• Duisburg School (Jager)
• The Vienna School ofDiscourse Analysis or Discourse-Historical Method (Wodak
et al.) has roots in Bernstein's sociolinguistic approach as well as within the
philosophical tradition , of Critical Theory. Their book The Discursive
Construction of National Identity has been extremely useful in the current
research.
• French Discourse Analysis (Pecheux)
Most discourse analysts do not explain how one knows or shows that media (or any
other) discourse is also 'constitutive' as opposed to simply being 'reflective' of the
society. They claim that a 'discursive event is shaped by situations, institutions and
social structures, but it also shapes them', although they do add that 'discursive
practices may have major ideological effects: that is, they can help produce and
reproduce unequal power relations' between different social classes, men and women,
different ethnic/national minorities and majorities 'through the ways in which they
represent things and position people' (Fairclough and Wodak 1997:258). They also
somewhat ambitiously claim that by using CDA they are able to make more visible
'these opaque aspects of discourse' that remain usually unclear to people unaware of
CDA, like 'ideological loading of particular ways of using language and the relations
of power which underlie them' (ibid.), for example make the implicit explicit, or the
invisible visible. Furthermore discourse, being constitutive, 'entails that every
instance of language use makes its own small contribution to reproducing and/or
transforming society and culture, including power relations. That is the power of
discourse; that is why it is worth struggling over' (Fairclough and Wodak 1997:273).
The three aspects of social life that can be discursively constituted are representations
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of the world; social relations between the people; and people's social and personal
identities (ibid.)19.
Finally, Fairclough & Wodak list eight principles of CDA theory and method
(1997:268-280):
• CDA addresses social problems, analysing the 'linguistic and semiotic aspects of
social processes and problems.'
• Power relations are discursive. CDA emphasises 'the substantively linguistic and
discursive nature of social relations of power in contemporary societies. This is
partly a matter of how power relations are exercised and negotiated in discourse.'
• Discourse constitutes society and culture, and 'we can only make sense of the
salience of discourse in contemporary social processes and power relations by
recognising that discourse constitutes society and culture, as well as being
constituted by them. Their relationship ... is a dialectical one.'
• Discourse does ideological work, i.e. 'ideology is not just a matter of
representations of social reality, for constructions of identity which are linked to
power are ... key ideological processes too.'
• Discourse is historical, because 'discourse is not produced without context and
cannot be understood without taking the context into consideration.' Indeed,
'discourses are always connected to other discourses which were produced earlier,
as well as those which were produced synchronically and subsequently' - an
aspect that requires intertextuality and sociocultural knowledge when analysing
the discourse.
• The link between text and society is mediated, and CDA is 'about making
connections between social and cultural structures and processes on the one hand,
and properties of text on the other.'
• Discourse analysis is interpretative and explanatory. Any 'discourse can be
interpreted in very different ways, due to the audience and the amount of context
information which is included.'
• Discourse is a form of social action. As a socially committed scientific paradigm,
CDA is 'a natural tool for those who wish to make their research socially activist'
(Garrett and Bell 1998:6).
19 These three 'broad domains of social life that can be discursively constituted' are further discussed in
Fairclough (1992).
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Trying to summarise the various discourse analytical approaches is quite complicated.
There seems to be a consensus about the aims of the approach - to reveal underlying
ideological patterns and make the implicit explicit. But there is no obvious consensus
about how that aim is to be achieved methodologically. One reason behind this
fuzziness and non-consensus is CDA's inter-disciplinary focus. Doing discourse
analysis is a multi-faceted, methodologically multi- and interdisciplinary undertaking
(Fairclough 1992:225; Teo 2000:43; Pardo 2001:91). But this does not seem to keep
the authors from working with CDA and applying the method in various contexts.
Gunter, although not a discourse analyst himself, gives possibly one of the most
helpful, although very general, descriptions of the method:
The procedure in most discourse analyses consists of a layered combination of
several techniques. Specific linguistic analyses (e.g. choice of words such as
'riots' instead of 'disorders', or the search for textual patterns) and rhetorical
strategies are followed by thematic analyses. This is a general form of content
analysis to determine the main topics in a text. In most cases, but not all, it is
followed by a macrostructure analysis, in which the interrelationship between
topics in a text is represented in diagram form. Thus discourse analysis can be
both general and detailed at the same time. The detailed analysis is rhetorical
in nature. (Gunter 2000:88)
Triandafyllidou explains how she proceeds with 'qualitative discourse analysis'20 of
media texts, when studying the Italian press discourse on nation and immigration. She
used standard database management software (Foxpro2) to conduct 'simple code-and-
retrieve operations'. She first carried out a content analysis, using identifying
categories for the article and then several coding categories corresponding to the
national identity dimensions identified by Smith (1991): ethnicity, culture, territory,
language, religion, civic traditions and national character:
Thus texts were initially coded using a theoretically derived coding scheme.
Through reading the articles several times, catchphrases, metaphors, rhetorical
devices or short segments of text that illustrated a particular view on some
national identity dimension in relation to immigration were identified and
typed in as memo (text) variables. The main criterion used in identifying these
passages was the extent to which they referred to Us-Italians or Them-
foreigners or the relationship between the two. The aim of this type of coding
was to collect all the instances in which the newspapers presented the issue of
immigration in terms of an Us-and-Them relationship. At a second level, the
occurrences of each national identity dimension in the data were counted and
20 As opposed to 'quantitative discourse analysis'?
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the themes mentioned in relation to each dimension were identified.
(Triandafyllidou 1999:66-67)
Apart from those two quite helpful but not at all comprehensive or detailed guidelines
for applying discourse analysis empirically, the researcher is left with Fairclough's
conclusion that 'there is no procedure for doing discourse analysis; people approach it
in different ways according to the specific nature of the project, as well as their own
views of discourse' (1992:225). Indeed, given the desired emphasis on the 'mutually
informing development of theory and method,' Chouliaraki & Fairclough do not even
'support calls for stabilising a method for CDA' (1999:16-17).
5.2.1. Analysing discursive construction of national identities
To analyse the discursive construction of Scottishness, and the Self/Other dialectics in
Scottish newspapers in the context of constitutional change, I am combining elements
of critical discourse analysis (especially discourse-historical method), grounded
theory and elements of content analysis. I have created a corpus of texts for the
analysis, the principles involved in compiling the data corpus are explained in Chapter
6. The items of analysis are the leader articles of newspapers, as these represent the
condensed 'corporate view' of the editorial teams of these publications and the same
underlying views can be assumed to be found in other sections of the newspaper as
well. The editorial cartoons are used as illustrations to the textual editorials, as well as
being analysed separately later on.
Following Berg (1995) and Gunter (2000), I intended to approach the analysis of the
media texts both from the quantitative and qualitative angle. Quantitatively, I planned
to code the themes in the leader articles and the characters (political figures, historical
heroes), using the so-called non-frequency technique of content analysis, described by
Holsti (1969:7). According to this technique, the researcher codes whether a theme
occurs in an article or not, and will not count on how many occasions the given theme
or character was mentioned. This is different from a more common content analytical
approach that 'involves establishing categories and then counting the number of
instances when those categories are used in a particular item of text (Silverman
1993:59). However, I quickly realised the futility of such approach. The topics of
Scottish politics, history, culture, etc. were overarching and present in most of the
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articles. Quantification of topics and characters would not contribute to the overall
quality of the research and was therefore decided against.
Consequently, my research ended up being mainly qualitative. Van Dijk has
researched racism and interethnic relations and media in the Netherlands and
elsewhere. He has focused on 'preferred types of topic (such as those of difference,
deviation and threat), story development, news structures, argumentative and local
semantic moves ... as well as stylistic and rhetorical properties of such discourse'
(van Dijk et al. 1997:167). van Dijk has done a lot of CDA research relevant to
nationalism and identities, and has mainly concentrated on the question of racism and
discrimination, i.e. the discursive construction of the discriminated and/or suppressed
Other. But the Other can also be positive, as was explained in Chapter 2. Recognising
'differences does not automatically translate as implied 'inferiority" nor necessarily
implies racism (Fitzgerald 1991:198-199). This implied and assumed inferiority of the
Other seems to be the basis of all research conducted by van Dijk, making his
research approach somewhat less suitable for the study of positive Others; neither
does he discuss the discursive construction of the national Self. The discursive
construction of national Self and Other are intimately related, as they constitute two
sides of the same identity 'coin'. Thus an approach is needed that looks at both sides
of that coin. Discourse-Historical Method attempts 'to integrate systematically all
available background information in the analysis and interpretation of the many layers
of a written or spoken text' (Fairclough and Wodak 1997:266), and seems more useful
in the study of the discursive construction of Scottishness and otherness.
Imagining the national community 'is part of a wider ideological, discursive
consciousness', writes Billig (1995:10). Thus it is the discourse of identity formation
that needs to be studied. When looking at the discursive construction of national
identities, the aim is
to throw light on the largely contingent and imaginary character of nation and
sharpen awareness of dogmatic, essentialist and naturalising conceptions of
nation and national identity which ... threaten to make impossible [the] equal
pluralistic coexistence of various ethnic groups, language communities,
religious communities and forms of life. (Wodak et al. 1999:9)
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Note how the authors have made a value statement here about two competing views
of how nation should be understood - whether a nation should be an 'equal pluralistic
coexistence of various ethnic groups' or conceptualised as 'dogmatic, essentialist and
naturalising'. This is not surprising. Gunter (2000:88) has warned that the 'problem
with discourse analysis is that the critical stance of researchers using it may render its
forms of analysis biased'. CDA
sees itself not as dispassionate and objective social science, but as engaged and
committed. It is a form of intervention in social practice and social
relationships: many analysts are politically active against racism, or as
feminists, or within the peace movement and so forth. (Fairclough and Wodak
1997:258)
In the field of national identity construction, 'socially committed' researchers
employing CDA hope that 'methodological and epistemological awareness of
problematic 'othering' will automatically help to create a fairer representation in the
future' (Fiirsich 2002:64). CDA 'is not an exception to the normal objectivity of
social science' though. Social science is inherently tied into politics, and having
political interests 'does not imply that CDA is less scholarly than other research:
standards of careful, rigorous and systematic analysis apply with equal force to CDA
as to other approaches' (Fairclough and Wodak 1997:259). However, Riggins warns
that 'if a reader of a piece of research suspects that he or she is learning more about
the analyst than about the content of the text, the analysis obviously has failed'
(1997:3).
Although the definition of nations as described in this paragraph by Wodak et al.
seems to be limited to 'hot' nationalism ('dogmatic, essentialist and naturalising
conceptions of nation and national identity'), their approach is nevertheless also
applicable to cases of 'banal' nationalism. My research on Scotland is guided by their
studies. Wodak and her colleagues emphasise their theoretical understanding of
national identity and identity formation, assuming the identities to be social
constructs, construed in discursive events. They believe that 'the discursive
construction of national identity revolves around the three temporal axes of the past,
the present and the future'; that important ordering criteria for that process are 'origin,
continuity/tradition, transformation, (essentialist) timelessness and anticipation', as
are 'spatial, territorial, and local dimensions'. The methodological approach used by
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Wodak et al. to analyse Austrian national identity has three closely interwoven
dimensions of analysis: the contents/topics, the strategies and the linguistic means and
forms of realisation. I use all these three dimensions of analysis recommended by
Wodak et al. to study the discursive construction of Scottishness.
The first, Contents dimension of analysis distinguishes five major thematic areas
(Wodak et al. 1999:30-31):
• The idea of the homo nationalis and homo externus (category involving emotional
attachment to the country, national mentality).
• The narration and confabulation of a common political past (category involving
founding and/or origin myths, mythical figures, political successes).
• The linguistic construction of a common culture (includes the topics of language,
religion, art, science, technology and everyday culture).
• The linguistic construction of a common political present and future (category
involving the topics of citizenship, political achievements and problems, European
Union).
• The linguistic construction of a 'national body' (e.g. landscapes).
Not all of these five thematic areas are always present in any unit of analysis - the
choice of themes is highly context-driven. For instance, when analysing political
commemoration speeches, Wodak et al. realised that the construction of a common
culture and of a 'national body' almost never occurred, whereas these were present in
focus groups and interviews21. Also, they did not encounter attempts to construct a
homo nationalis (or an 'Austrian person'). Political commemoration speeches
concentrated 'almost exclusively on the narration of a common political past and on
the discursive construction of common political present and future' (Wodak et al.
1999:74). I will look mainly at homo nationalis and homo externus, (alias national
Self and Other). However, I also look at the common political present and future,
common culture and common political past. Law notes that 'Scottish heroic figures
and events provide pronounced sets of national signifiers' (2001:303) - is that evident
in the media? All these topics are related to the 'discursive construction of "national"
21 That can also be explained by the fact that at the focus groups and interviews the moderator /
interviewer asked participants questions that lead to discussion about common culture and a 'national
body'.
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identity which is based on the formation of sameness and difference' (Wodak et al.
1999:31), hence to the construction of the national Self and Other. As already noted,
not all of the thematic areas will always be relevant. It is most likely that during the
time of major constitutional change, the topics of the common political present and
future are deployed to a greater degree in newspaper editorials.
Strategies are the other principal element involved in the discourse-analytical
approach. Strategies are 'plans of actions with varying degrees of elaborateness, the
realisation of which can range from automatic to conscious, and which are located at
different levels of our mental organisation'. There are various macro-strategies - 'the
strategies involved in the discursive construction, perpetuation, transformation and
dismantling of nations and national identities', which all 'subsume a range of more
local strategies which relate to the respective macro-function' (de Cillia et al.
1999:160-163; Wodak et al. 1999:31-35). Although the different strategies are
analytically distinguishable from one another, 'these strategies occur more or less
simultaneously and are interwoven in concrete discursive acts' (Wodak et al.
1999:33). Strategies are used to different levels in different situations and contexts,
and can therefore be adapted and modified to a particular piece of research. Strategies
are not a priori categories which are imposed on the data, but can be derived from the
analysis.
With regard to strategies, I diverge somewhat from Wodak et al. First of all, based on
Ricento (2003:617), who notes that 'strategies are designed to shape thinking and
persuade auditors/readers', I call these 'rhetorical' and not 'discursive macro-
strategies'. Also, whereas Wodak et al. list four main strategies (construction,
perpetuation, transformation and dismantling), Ricento only distinguishes between
three main discursive strategies (constructive, transformation and perpetuation) in his
analysis of the discursive constmction of Americanism (2003:617). Similarly, not all
of the above rhetorical strategies were present in my data. Whereas constructive,
transformation and perpetuation strategies were relatively common, I could not
identify any instances of dismantling or destructive strategies, nor justification sub-
strategies. In an Austrian context, the latter was mainly used in relation to Austria's
Nazi past (Wodak et al. 1999:90). There is no similar 'collective shame' in Scotland.
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Whenever the Britishness of Scots is downplayed, this is done through emphasising
Scottishness, falling under the transformation, not the dismantling strategy.
I am interested in the strategic choices made by the newspaper editorial teams.
Therefore, I will try to assess whether the leader article aims to discursively (Wodak
et al. 1999:33) do any of the following:
• Construction strategy is an 'attempt to construct and to establish a certain national
identity by promoting unification, identification and solidarity, as well as
differentiation'
• Justify some action in the name of the national identity construction
(perpetuation/justification strategy). Perpetuation strategies 'attempt to maintain
and reproduce a threatened national identity, i.e. to preserve, support and protect
it'. Justification strategy, a sub-strategy of perpetuation strategy, is 'employed
primarily in relation to problematical actions or events in the past which are
important in the narrative creation of national history. They attempt to justify or
relativise a societal status quo ante by emphasising the legitimacy of past acts of
the 'own' national 'we'-group which have been put into question, that is they
restore, maintain and defend a common 'national self-perception' which has been
'tainted' in one way or another'.
• Transformation strategy is an attempt to 'transform a relatively well-established
national identity and its components into another identity the contours of which
the speaker has already conceptualised'.
• Destructive/dismantling strategy aims 'at dismantling or disparaging parts of an
existing national identity construct, but usually cannot provide any new model to
replace the old one'.
There are other strategies in action in media texts, which are relevant for the study of
the Self/Other dialectic. These are assimilation and dissimilation strategies, which
serve the above-mentioned discursive macro-strategies.
• Strategy of assimilation emphasises or presupposes sameness. Assimilation
strategies can be constructive, destructive, perpetuating or justifying.
• Strategy of dissimilation emphasises or presupposes difference. Dissimilation
strategies can be constructive, destructive, transformatory or justifying.
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Another two strategies, not so dissimilar to each other, can be identified in the media
discourse. These are: attributional bias, and universal strategy of polarisation. Luther
(2001) describes attributional bias as a rhetorical strategy, which is often used to
justify acts by the Self and discredit acts by the Other. She distinguishes between
situational attributions, i.e. acts due to the surrounding context (external, separate
from the mind), and dispositional attributions, i.e. acts due to something residing in






Anything positive done by the Self is claimed to come from inside the actor. In
contrast, if the Other does something good, it is attributed to the situation and
environment, because the Other is inherently not good. Similarly, if the Self does
something questionable, this is credited to external factors, whereas the Other acts
negatively due to dispositional attributions, i.e. the Other is inherently capable of
questionable actions. Luther's attributional bias can be compared with what van Dijk
calls a 'universal strategy of polarisation', i.e. a strategy of positive ingroup





Thus, whenever the ingroup ('us') does something positive, the positive properties are
highlighted. Negative properties of the ingroup are mitigated or downplayed. In
contrast to this, the positive actions of the outgroup ('them') are mitigated and
downplayed, whereas negative properties of 'them' are emphasised.
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And finally, the linguistic means of realisation is the third element of Wodak et al. 's
discourse-historical approach that I'm following. The linguistic means and forms of
realisation include the 'lexical units, argumentation schemes and syntactical means
which express unity, sameness, difference, singularity, continuity, change, autonomy,
heteronomy, etc.' (de Cillia et al. 1999:163). Most prominent and important are
various references:
• Personal references (anthroponymic generic terms, personal pronouns,
quantifiers).
• Spatial references (toponyms/geonyms, adverbs of place, spatial reference through
persons, by means of prepositional phrases such as 'with us', 'with them').
• Temporal references (temporal prepositions, adverbs of time, temporal
conjunctions, temporal references by means of nouns, semi-prefixes with temporal
meaning).
Billig writes that 'the crucial words of banal nationalism are often the smallest: 'we',
'this' and 'here" (1995:94). I am focusing mainly on the use of personal deixis 'we',
as this is most revealing in national identity discourse. In addition, I will be looking at
other national deixes, among them 'nation', 'people', 'country', 'history'. The theme
of deixis is introduced in much more detail in Chapter 8.
In addition to various personal, spatial and temporal references, one can look at the
phenomenon of vagueness in referential or other expressions, euphemisms, linguistic
hesitation and disruptions, linguistic slips, allusions, alliterations, rhymes,
comparisons, metaphors, hyperboles, rhetorical questions, and the mode of discourse
representation (Wodak et al. 1999:35; van Dijk 1993:264).
5.3. NVivo Research tool
The exploration of my data is conducted with NVivo research tool. It is one of the
software tools developed by QSR. NUD*IST stands for Non-Numerical Unstructured
Data Indexing Searching and Theorising. NUD*IST Vivo, or NVivo for short is used
in this research, as it is more suitable for detailed qualitative analysis than N6, the
current more widely used version of NUD*IST22. NVivo does not analyse the media
texts on the behalf of the researcher, but 'it enables the researcher to keep good
22 For a further description and comparison of the two software tools, see www.scolari.co.uk/asr/qsr.htm
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records of their hunches, ideas, searches and analyses and gives access to data so they
can be examined and analysed' and thus making the qualitative analysis 'easier, more
accurate, more reliable and more transparent' (Gibbs 2002:10-11). As a qualitative
software tool, which has been designed to conduct fine-detailed, or microscopic
analysis, to use Billig's metaphor again, NVivo is especially suitable for the
discursive analysis of media texts.
The data corpus (i.e. 110 leader articles) was imported into NVivo, and then usual
qualitative data analysis procedures were followed. The texts were repeatedly and
thoroughly read for emergent themes (including descriptions of various Others),
actors, rhetorical strategies, linguistic means of realisation. In-vivo coding was used to
highlight extracts and phrases focusing on certain topoi, and finally a node tree was
constructed, which enabled code-and-retrieve and in-depth detailed qualitative
analysis to be conducted.
5.4. Visual sociology
Kress and van Leeuwen, mentioned earlier in the context of CDA, consider texts from
a multimodal perspective and 'argue that with the increase in the use of visual mode
with texts, it is essential that scholars now focus on and clarify the interplay between
the verbal and the visual' (Garrett and Bell 1998:14-15). As part of my research, I am
looking at the role played by Scottish devolution in political cartoons, using visual
methodologies to do so. First of all, as Wigston has pointed out, there are no
supportive definitive theories to assist in the analysis of political cartoons (2002:74).
This is not surprising considering 'the sheer magnitude of the theoretician's task', as
Coupe notes: 'a theoretical understanding of political caricature involves an
understanding of caricature itself, the caricaturist, his [sic] audience, and the historical
epoch and social structure within which the caricaturist operates' (1969:79). In this
section I will first briefly introduce the field of visual sociology, and then outline
some of the methodologies that can be used to analyse cartoons. Finally, I will discuss
the methodology used in the visual aspect of my research.
Analysing visual images in sociology is not always easy: 'Despite the huge amount of
academic work currently being published on things visual, there are remarkably few
guides to possible methods of interpretation and even fewer explanations of how to do
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those methods' (Rose 2001:2). Apart from methodological issues, there is a tendency
to view images as illustrations only. There is a 'problem of images', reflected in 'their
poor appreciation as valid research material in some parts of some academic
disciplines' (Banks 2001:140). Smith wrote only recently that e.g. photographic
material is rarely seen as data 'worthy of analysis in their own right, and not merely a
handy illustrative resource intended only to vivify the serious business of analysis
accomplished by the written text' (Smith 1996). The tendency to view visual data as
purely illustrative and thus not worthy of more focused analytical treatment has been
attributed to the problems faced in 'connecting up visual sociology as a subfield to the
central theoretical traditions and debates of social science' (Emmison and Smith
2000:ix). Surprisingly, this neglect of the visual in sociology takes place in a situation
where 'the visual is central to the cultural construction of social life in contemporary
Western societies' (Rose 2001:6), where images etch 'themselves into popular
memory' and thus 'reproduce discourse long after words have faded' (Macdonald
2003:4).
The field of visual sociology is relatively new, gaining ground in the 1960s (Harper
1998:134). Today, the International Visual Sociology Association is organising
successful annual conferences; its official journal Visual Studies (formerly Visual
Sociology) has been published since 1986; there is a lively IVSA mailing list. The
field is growing in popularity and respectability. Flick notes that visual data are only
now 'increasingly being rediscovered in qualitative research' (1998:161). One of the
reasons for studying visual images is that 'most fundamentally, images allow us to
make kinds of statements that cannot be made by words; thus images enlarge our
consciousness and the possibilities for our sociology' (Flick 1998:147). For example,
the graphic imagery of cartoons can even 'convey messages that would be
unacceptable if spelled out in words' (Feldman 2000:173). Nevertheless, Emmison &
Smith note that visual sociology is still 'perceived as an isolated, self-sufficient and
somewhat eccentric specialism'. Despite the belief that 'becoming more reflexive
about [visual data], and becoming more methodologically skilled within it, should
enhance the quality of our research', many sociological researchers unfortunately
'simply aren't interested in what visual sociologists have to say' (Emmison and Smith
2000:ix-x).
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Visual images, including political cartoons, can be used in and by sociology in several
ways. There are three main methodological ways of proceeding in visual sociology
(Banks 1995; Flick 1998:151): (1) make visual representations, i.e. studying society
by producing images; (2) examine pre-existing visual representations, i.e. studying
images for information about society; (3) collaborate with social actors in the
production of visual representations. I will focus on the second option and will look at
visual representations of Scottish devolution, and Scottishness in that context, in the
political cartoons in British and Scottish newspapers. In doing this, I am guided by
what Gillian Rose calls critical visual methodology, i.e. 'an approach that thinks about
the visual in terms of the cultural significance, social practices and power relations in
which it is embedded' (2001:3).
5.4.1. Visual methodologies
Analysis of the discursive construction of national identities is explained earlier in this
chapter. The analysis of discourses does not need to be restricted to the language, but
can also encompass non-verbal communication and visual images (Chouliaraki and
Fairclough 1999:38). Discourses 'are articulated through all sorts of visual and verbal
images and texts, specialised or not, and also through practises that those languages
permit' (Rose 2001:136). Images can therefore also be described as a sort of
discourse, because 'a specific visuality will make certain things visible in particular
ways, and other things unseeable, for example, and subjects will be produced and act
within that field of vision' (ibid. : 137). Thus analysis of visual discourse can be used
'to explore how images construct specific views of the social world, in which case ...
visuality is viewed as the topic of research, and the discourse analyst is interested in
how images construct accounts of the social world' (ibid. :140).
The visual aspect of my research is guided by the following questions: how to analyse
and understand the visual discourse; and how to proceed if one wants to understand
the visual discourse of Scottishness in the media? There are various methodologies
available for a visual sociologist, but not all of them are suitable for the type of
research I am conducting. I will therefore not discuss the methodologies for dealing
with moving images, etc. I will focus on the site of the image itself (i.e. the cartoon),
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and not on the site of production or the site where the cartoon is seen and interpreted
by audiences. Both the production and interpretation of cartoons is interesting and
relevant, i.e. I acknowledge the need to 'emphasise the role of editorial selection,
journalistic deployment and routine professional practices' and that 'any study of
meaning in the media will be handicapped if it ignores audience or reader responses'
(Macdonald 2003:22-23). However, analysing these other two sites is beyond the
scope of my research and thus not covered here.
5.4.1.1. Quantitative analysis of cartoons
I will look at cartoons both quantitatively and qualitatively. First of all, content
analysis, which was already discussed earlier in this chapter, is one suitable
methodology for analysing political cartoons, and has been deployed in a number of
studies (Dines-Levy 1990; Day 2000; Feldman 2000; Malesevic' 2000; Wigston
2002). Bell defines content analysis as 'an empirical (observational) and objective
procedure for quantifying recorded "audio-visual" (including verbal) representation
using reliable, explicitly defined categories ("values" on independent "variables")
(2001:13). Just as with textual content analysis, 'visual content analysis is a
systematic, observational method used for testing hypotheses about the ways in which
the media represent people, events, situations, and so' (Bell 2001:1). Although content
analysis does not 'demonstrate how viewers understand or value what they see or
hear', it does show 'what is given priority or salience and what is not. It can show
which images are connected with which, who is given publicity and how, as well as
which agendas are "run" by particular media' (ibid. :26) - taking us back to the notion
of agenda-setting introduced in Chapter 3.
Nevertheless, content analysis 'does not analyse individual images or individual
"visual texts" as semiotic methods do' (Bell 2001:1), and thus many researchers
supplement content analysis with a qualitative interpretation of images. Content
analysis 'might be best thought of as a necessary but not sufficient methodology for
answering questions about what the media depicts or represents' (ibid. :13). Such
analysis on its own is seldom able to support statements about the cultural
significance of the particular image and of effects or interpreted meaning. Rose
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outlines further shortcomings of content analysis in analysing visual images (2001:66-
67). Content analysis:
• Deals with numbers, assuming that if something occurs very often, it is more
important than something that occurs less often. However, frequent occurrence
does not equal significance.
Furthermore, 'something that is kept out of the picture may nonetheless be
extremely significant to its meaning', suggesting that 'certain representations of
what is visible depend on other things being constructed as their invisible
opposite; and content analysis is incapable of addressing these invisibilized
others'.
• Counts the occurrence of the code. It does not, however, 'discriminate between an
aspect of an image that exemplifies a code perfectly, and one that is only a weak
example of it.'
• Breaks an image into parts and does not count for any interconnections between
these parts. One could look at the statistical correlation between the parts, but that
may not the best way to understand how an image works.
• Is unable to articulate the expressive content of an image, and is also unable to
evoke the mood of an image.
• Claims to be an objective research method, and thus is not reflexive. However, as
Rose emphasises throughout her book, reflexivity is at the core of critical visual
methodology, and as a researcher, 'it is important to consider how you are looking
at a particular image and to write - or perhaps express visually - that into your
interpretation' (Rose 2001:28).
Based on these criticisms, one can see that elements of qualitative analysis should be
used to expand the depth and breadth of the knowledge gained from the suitable and
valuable data corpus for social science research on its own right.
5.4.1.2. Qualitative analysis of cartoons
There is a wide range of qualitative methods that could be employed in analysing
political cartoons. These include semiotics, iconography, psychoanalysis, etc. I will
briefly explain some of these various visual methodologies below, and then outline
the approach used in my research.
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One of the suitable methodological approaches is semiotics. Semiotics is a study of
signs and sign systems and can be a very productive way of thinking about visual
meaning of images. Semiotics relies on the distinction between the signifier and the
signified of the sign, and assumes every image to have two layers of meaning -
'denotation' (what, or who, is being depicted), and 'connotation' (the ideas and values
are expressed through what is represented and through the way in which it is
represented) (van Leeuwen 2001b:94). Semiotics requires detailed analysis of images,
and 'its reliance on case studies and elaborate analytical terminology create careful
and precise accounts of how the meanings of particular images are made' - it
'confronts the question of how images make meanings head on'. Semiotics assumes
that 'constructions of social differences are articulated through images themselves'
(Rose 2001:69, 72, 96), and it is therefore a particularly useful approach in current
study of discursive construction of identity and the Self/Other dialectic. Semiotic
analysis includes the following steps (Rose 2001:91-92):
• Decide what the signs are.
• Decide what these signs signify 'in themselves'.
• Think about how the signs relate to other signs both within the image and in other
images.
• Explore their connections (and the connections of the connections) to wider
systems of meaning, from codes to dominant codes, referent systems or
mythologies.
• Return to the signs via their codes to explore the precise articulation of ideology
and mythology.
But despite of being conceptually elaborate, 'for all its analytical richness, semiology
does not offer a clear method for its application'. Also, semiotics' preference for
'detailed readings of individual images raises questions about the representativeness
and replicability of its analyses' (Rose 2001:73, 97). Reiterating Rose, for example,
one could ask why I chose the particular cartoons to analyse in Chapter 9, and
question whether these cartoons are representative of other cartoons in my data
corpus. In addition, one can wonder whether other researchers looking at the same
political cartoons would 'read' them in the same way. And finally, although semiotics
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is concerned 'with the question of representation ... and the question of the 'hidden
meaning' of images' (van Leeuwen 2001b:92), then it does not address the issue of
context. Barthian visual semiotics studies 'only the image itself, and treats cultural
meanings as a given currency which is shared by everyone who is at all acculturated
to contemporary popular culture, and which can then be activated by the style and
content of the image' (ibid.). This echoes similar criticism by Macdonald with regard
to semiotic analysis of media texts in general (2003:2).
Van Leeuwen suggests that iconographic analysis would overcome that concern.
Iconography deals with the question of representation and the 'hidden meaning' of
images, just like semiotics. But in order to support its interpretations, iconographic
analysis 'also pays attention to the context in which the image is produced and
circulated, and to how and why cultural meanings and their visual expressions come
about historically' (2001b:92). Whereas semiotics distinguishes between the
denotation and connotation layers of meaning, iconography distinguishes between
three layers of pictorial meaning (ibid. : 100-101):
• Representational meaning, which is similar to 'denotation', recognising what is
represented on the basis of our practical experience.
• Iconographical symbolism, recognising not only the denotation of a particular
person, thing or place, but also the ideas or concepts attached to it (cf.
connotation).
• Iconological symbolism, ideological meaning of the image.
Using iconographic approach to study 'the contemporary visual representations of
significant issues can bring to light the origins of certain conventions and undo the
ideologically convenient effects of what Bourdieu has called 'genesis amnesia" (van
Leeuwen 200lb: 102).
I am looking at cartoons at two levels. First of all, I conduct a simple content analysis.
I look at the use of a number of images in cartoons - Scottish and British
iconography, persons, etc. A semiotic and iconographic reading of the cartoons
follows, looking at the representational meaning of cartoons (what is presented), and
iconographical symbolism (what ideas and concepts are attached to those images).
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5.5. Interviews
A thorough analysis of the mass media should look at all three dimensions of the
media - production, content, and reception (Spitulnik 1993; Curran and Seaton 1997;
McCullagh 2002). The media content, which is the main focus of current thesis, is
'increasingly the product of complex bureaucracies and large commercial
organisations, so it is essential to look at the institutional contexts in which media
messages are assembled' (McCullagh 2002:6). I therefore also conducted a number of
in-depth interviews, together with Dr Rosie and Dr Maclnnes in London, Edinburgh
and Glasgow between 2002 and 2004 (see Appendix 11.3). The semi-structured
interviews covered a number of areas: biographical background of the journalists,
story writing process, publication and editing procedures, national identity of the
journalists etc. The interviews were transcribed verbatim and these 'personal and
subjective recollections of the production process' (Dhoest 2004:396) have been used
throughout the thesis to illustrate and explain findings and arguments, providing
useful background information and further understanding of various issues.
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6. Data corpus
This chapter consists of two main parts. The first three sections explain the reasons
and considerations behind including various newspaper genres in my data corpus. I
am looking at three newspaper subgenres: although the main emphasis of this research
is on the analysis of leader articles, I will also analyse headlines and political
cartoons. The last part of the chapter outlines the choice of time frames and
newspapers, and principles of data sampling for the analysis.
6.1. Headlines
Headlines represent 'a special type of communicative medium in which a maximum
quantity of information is imparted with a minimum of words'23. Newspaper headlines
have important textual and cognitive functions (van Dijk 1991:50), but although 'the
importance of the role of headlines in the communicative act performed by
newspapers can hardly be exaggerated ... the nature of this role has virtually never
been explicated in the literature' (Dor 2003:695). Inspired by this vacuum, I will
analyse the headlines of all articles in my data corpus as part of my research, but will
do that separately from the articles themselves. Looking at the headlines
independently from the articles is justified, as 'headline is a unit, separate from the
item itself' (Jucker 1996; cited in Kronrod and Engel 2001), and thus forms a separate
sub-genre in journalism (Bell 1991). Methodologically, the analysis is similar to the
analysis of discourse used for study of leader articles, focusing on linguistic means of
realisation, especially the use of national deixes. The analysis is rather informal, and
not systematic and explicit. It aims to 'reveal the ideological implications of the
headlines, that is, from which socio-political position the news events are defined'
(van Dijk 1991:62).
How can headlines be conceptualised? Historically, headlines were not used in British
newspapers until after c. 1800 (Schneider 2000), and simple headings were much
more common until then. Whereas headlines provide a summary of a kind of the
following text, headings 'do not give any specific information about the content of the
news stories following. They simply serve the purpose of better grouping the news'
23 A definition provided by M. Meeks in the summary of an article by A. A. Verbin, 1984, Cambridge
Scientific Abstracts database
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(Schneider 2000:48). For example, the heading usually includes information about the
article's place and date of origin (report heading, e.g. London, December 21) or
indicates the section of the newspaper (section heading, e.g. Home News, Foreign
News, etc.). It was only when newspapers became more widespread and popular,
expanded in size and scope (the abolition of the Stamp Duty in 1855 allowed
newspapers to expand), and truly became a mass medium, that headlines were
introduced to facilitate better orientation among all the articles available in any given
copy.
Headlines serve several functions in the newspaper. Based on various sources, I
propose the following main functions:
• To act as attention grabbers, together with other visual material (photographs,
cartoons, illustrations, etc.). Headlines are usually always in more visible font, use
different font type (bold, italics, underline) and font size. They are 'the most
conspicuous part of a news report: they are brief, printed 'on top', in large bold
type, and often across several columns' (van Dijk 1991:50). Such highlighting of
headlines makes them more visible for the reader.
• To summarise the main points of the article, which is seen as one of the main, and
most important functions of the headline. 'A reader need only to glance at the
headline ... to obtain a fairly accurate idea of what the whole report is about' (Teo
2000:13; cf. van Dijk et al. 1997:168), they 'express, in a highly concise form, the
crux of the news event' (Teo 2000:13), the topic of the article. It is important to
note though that the 'traditional notion of headlines-as-summaries definitely does
not capture the function of headlines in more popular newspapers, and especially
in tabloids' (Dor 2003:697)24.
• To trigger interest and persuade the reader to read the following text. As the
headline is the first thing the reader notices, together with visuals, 'it is supposed
not only to inform the reader, but also to persuade him/her to read the whole item'
(Nir 1993; cited in Kronrod and Engel 2001). This is sometimes achieved through
omitting words and articles, which arouses 'curiosity in order to draw the reader's
24 The difference in the aim and form of leader articles in broadsheets and tabloids is considerable,
which is one of the reasons why the current research only focuses on the quality end of the newspaper
market. Tabloids and broadsheets are difficult to analyse comparatively, despite Esser's tabloidisation
of news claims (1999). Seymour-Ure (1998b:43) has elaborated on the differences between leader
articles in the broadsheets and tabloids.
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attention to the texts underneath' (Kronrod and Engel 2001:686), stimulating
readers to learn more about missing details. Grammatical incorrectness of the
headlines is mainly due to omitted articles or auxiliary verbs25. In addition to
leading to vagueness and ambiguity, this 'may also have a special ideological
function, for instance when the responsibility for an action must be concealed'
(van Dijk 1991:50).
• An important cognitive function of the headline is to orient the reader to process
the text in a pre-determined direction, i.e. to guide the reader to adopt a particular
conceptual model for understanding the following article. Headlines 'are
important not simply because they highlight key points in the main body of each
article, but also because they suggest to the reader a conceptual model within
which the news event in question is to be located' (Hargreaves 1996:608). Thus the
headlines frame the article, 'provide us with perspectives' on these articles, and
offer interpretative frameworks through which the articles are to be understood
(McCullagh 2002:25). The information given in the headline 'signals the reader
how to 'define' the situation or event' and 'the information expressed in the
headline is strategically used by the reader during the process of understanding in
order to construct the overall meaning, or the main topics, of the rest of the text
before the text itself is even read' (van Dijk 1991:50-51).
• Finally, the headlines play an important role in everyday routines of news
production. Journalists themselves 'use summarising headlines to understand and
memorise the information they get from the discourses of their many sources,
which may well define the situation for them as they in turn do it for the reader'
(van Dijk 1991:51). It is often the (copy) editor, who comes up with a suitable
headline, and not the journalists themselves.
Given that headlines are powerful attention-grabbers serving important functions in
the newspaper, it is reasonable to assume that they are carefully constructed, and are
'not arbitrary parts or labels of news reports' (van Dijk 1991:69). Teo writes:
In a genre of discourse where space is a premium, news headlines have to be
crafted in such a way as to employ the minimum number of words to package
maximum information. Thus, every word in a headline is carefully chosen and
structured so as to maximise the effect of the headline. (2000:14)
25
Auxiliary verbs are used in front of another verb to alter its meaning, and include the following: he,
can, could, do, have, let, may, might, must, ought, shall, should, will, would.
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Consequently the headline 'usually contains concise information which has a very
high newsworthy value according to the editor' (Kronrod and Engel 2001:685), as
'the right material should be chosen for the headline' (Dor 2003:705). The lexical and
topic choices made in the headline can have important ideological implications. For
example,
journalists may 'upgrade' a less important topic by expressing it in the
headline, thereby 'downgrading' the importance of the main topic. In other
words, headlines are a subjective definition of the situation, which influences
the interpretation made by the readers, (van Dijk 1991:51)
Looking at the headlines gives us an insight into how the newspaper understands and
imagines its readership, as 'the construction of a successful headline requires an
understanding of their readers - their state-of-knowledge, their beliefs and
expectations and their cognitive styles' (Dor 2003:696). It follows that looking at the
headlines helps to understand the ideology of the newspaper (Teo 2000:14).
6.2. Leader articles
The data corpus includes 110 leader articles from two major Scottish broadsheets, the
Herald and the Scotsman, 40 from 1979 and almost twice as much (70) from 1997. I
have another 44 leader articles from the same time period from British broadsheets,
used in the analysis of headlines. Although I am analysing individual leader articles, I
am aware that each article is only one element of the overall discourse and that
discursive construction of national identity is constituted by a multitude of texts (Le
2002). However, Billig suggests that the editorial column is one arena where the
media 'use the nationalised syntax of hegemony, simultaneously speaking to and for
the nation' (1995:114). Hence leader articles lend themselves well to the analysis of
discursive construction of national identities.
Leader articles, also known as leading articles, editorial articles, editorials, or simply
leaders, usually appear 'on an inside page under a reduced banner of the paper's
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Leaders are usually set 'in distinctive type or wide columns, or enclosed in a box, or
surmounted by an emblem; signals, all of them, that readers should realise that the
article is special' (Seymour-Ure 1998b:43). There can be a number of leader articles
in each issue - up to three leader articles per editorial column are quite common in
British and Scottish newspapers. Leader articles are usually printed in the same page
and at the same location. Whereas in the popular tabloid papers the leader article tends
to have a fixed place - for instance, the Sun generally places its editorial column on
page two, in the broadsheet papers the page of the editorial column varies, depending
on the size of various newspaper sections. The leader article is almost always on an
even-numbered page. In 1979, Scotsman leaders were printed on even pages within
the range of 6 to 14, Glasgow Herald leaders were either on page 4 or 6. On the day
of the 1979 devolution referendum, both Scottish broadsheets chose to print their
leaders on the front page as real eye-catchers - in addition to their usual column inside
the paper - emphasising the perceived importance of the devolution referenda. In
1997 the Herald placed its leader articles somewhere between pages 10 to 22, and the
Scotsman on pages 12 to 20. On the day after the 1997 devolution referendum, the
Scotsman brought its leader article to the front page once more. As Coats and Mulkey
wrote a while ago, this move indicates the perceived prominence of the issue
(1950:540).
According to Seymor-Ure (1997; 1998b), leaders are the definitive corporate view,
anonymous and 'magisterial'. Traditionally, the whole op-ed page, i.e. the leader
article(s) and opinion pieces published on the opposite page, was used by the editor
and seen by the readers as 'a showcase for one favoured set of views' (Rosenfeld
2000:6). The leader article generally does not express the personal view of the editor,
but is rather a statement of the newspaper's institutional view about a (usually
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political) event or issue (Bell 1991:13; van Dijk 1993:265; Le 2002:386)26. It is the
'voice of a paper' (Brown 1979:81), or 'what a manager might nowadays wincingly
call the paper's mission statement' (Seymour-Ure 1998b:43). This collective
anonymity, created by 'nameless editorial writers' (Rosenfeld 2000:8), is also
reflected in the way leader articles are written, as described later.
As anonymous corporate view, the opinions expressed in the leader articles can be
expected to 'generally feed through into a paper's political coverage' (Seymour-Ure
1997:586). Hence leader articles can be used as proxies for the whole newspaper
(Althaus et al. 2001). This view is reflected in my interview data, with some
qualifications. Those who edit newspapers assume that leaders do influence and
'trickle down' to other articles throughout the paper and consequently provide 'a
benchmark for the staff themselves' (Seymour-Ure 1998b:43). Those who write (non-
leading) articles do not generally see themselves as constrained by the leader opinion.
Thus although rank-and-file journalists tend to say that they do not need to strictly
follow the editorial line (as expressed in the leader articles) and the news articles are
meant to make sense independent of it, they do admit that the editorial line invariably
determines selection of stories and that indirect influence is considerable.
The need to follow (or not) the editorial line differs between various papers. One
interviewee noted, for instance, that
on a paper like the Mail, you broadly knew what the paper thought about
certain issues and you knew the way stories were meant to be written, without
having to be told it formally or overtly. You picked it up by osmosis, really.
But what was also true on a paper like the Mail, journalists are directed to
write specific stories in certain ways. A story would come up and it's a very
top-down newspaper, as most tabloid papers are ... when producing the news,
we'd be told 'we want to do this story and we want to do it in a certain way
like this.' (Interview 17)
This is not how interviewees describe the practice in broadsheet newspapers.
Broadsheet journalists believe they have a freedom to write stories as they see it.
Nevertheless, even in broadsheet papers,
there are times when the editor of the news desk or some of the other
executives ... expresses a strong interest in the story and a strong interest in
26 And in return, 'reading editorials usually involves the formation of opinions not only about what is
said, but also about the writer, or the newspaper' (van Dijk 1998:28).
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seeing it presented that way. If that's a reasonable interpretation, that's the
way it will appear. (Interview 17)
Obviously, it is important to note that leader writers and news journalists construct
their stories in very different ways, and therefore they assess the influence of the
leader articles differently as well. Nevertheless, the anti-devolution stand expressed
e.g. in the Daily Telegraph (see section 7.1.) headlines and leader articles, as
described previously, does influence the overall reporting - or non-reporting - of the
news through agenda-setting, framing etc.
6.2.1. The role of leader articles
As a genre, editorials may be classified both as a special type of media discourse, as
well as belonging to the large class of opinion discourses. Editorials differ from the
news discourse, since in case of the leader articles, 'the news event is already known,
and the main function of editorials is to formulate the newspaper's official opinion
about this recent event, possibly backed up by some arguments' (van Dijk 1993:265).
Van Dijk attributes to editorials a 'prominent function ... in the expression and
construction of public opinion', and he claims that 'for those people who read them,
they help to make up their mind about the events of the world, even if often by critical
opposition against them' (ibid.). Leader articles are 'a means of having a dialogue
with your readers. It's a means of taking a stand' (Interview 15). Consequently, 'to
convince its readers' is one of the main functions of editorials (Le 2002:386).
Newspapers, in general, 'provide individuals with clear ideological spectrum' and
then the readers 'want their newspapers to guide their opinion, not simply to reflect it'
(Interview 9). The editorial column is expected to formulate opinions about current
news events, and to provide factual, evaluative and pragmatic information about news
events (e.g. to summarise and evaluate the event and give a conclusion in the form of
a recommendation, advice or warning). Analysing editorials helps us 'trace the
formulation of opinions and the expression of ideologies' which is important, as these
have 'persuasive, political, social, and cultural functions' (van Dijk 1993:266). These
functions are especially manifest in 'such important sociocultural and moral domains
as ethnic relations and the reproduction of racism' (ibid.), as well as in the field of
national identity construction.
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6.2.2. Who reads leader articles anyway?
One criticism of the analysis of leader articles is that they are not widely read. Indeed,
already in 1925 Beuick wrote that 'political editorials are on the wane in their
influence and in their number' in the US and 'the editorial article has ceased to
[influence] in the same measure as it did more than twenty-five years ago', i.e. c.
1900. He joked that 'the editorial pages of the great majority of newspapers might
very well be filled with comic strips or radio wiring diagrams as far as reader interest
is concerned', given 'the majority of readers do not bother to read editorial opinion'
(Beuick 1925:161). The picture may not be as bleak as Beuick suggests. The reading
of leader articles varies considerably between different types of newspapers
(broadsheet versus popular press) and different countries. For example, Esser reckons
that only 8 per cent of British newspaper readers 'usually read' the editorials. This
number increases considerably amongst the readers of broadsheets. For example, one
in five of the readers of the Times 'usually read' the leader column (Esser 1999:299).
And in Germany, where the 'tabloidisation' of newspapers is weaker than in Britain,
45 per cent of all newspaper readers state that they 'usually read' the leader articles -
six times more than in Britain (Esser 1999:299). The Guardian's former editor said
that 'it's always very difficult to tell quite how important leaders are', but based on
reading-and-noting exercise results he estimated that leader articles are read by 'about
a third of your readership, which isn't bad because almost nothing is read off the front
page by more than about 40-45 per cent and it goes down to about 2 per cent quite
easily' (Interview 15). But then again, another interviewee does not think a very high
percentage of readers pay attention to leader articles - he certainly gets less feedback
on his leader articles than on his columns (Interview 9). However, the reason for
different feedback may lie elsewhere than in lower readership. The fact that the leader
articles are written anonymously, whereas the columns are personalised, may simply
mean that readers find it more difficult to respond to an anonymous corporate body
(the newspaper) than to a clearly identifiable writer (the columnist). Also, Seymour-
Ure suggests that 'it is common for named columnists to work also as anonymous
specialist leader writers, and it will not be surprising if they keep their best
performances for their bylined articles' (1998b:46). Readers of a given leader article
may have found them less interesting than the bylined comment by the same leader
writer, and thus is more likely to write a reader's letter to the comment.
Ill
Thus editorials do not necessarily have massive popular influence, as the readers of
tabloid newspapers, which count for most of the newspapers sold in Scotland and
Britain every day27, generally do not pay much attention to the leader column. But we
can assume that one-fifth to one-third of broadsheet readers do read the leader
article(s) regularly.
Furthermore, the influence of leader articles on elites is important. Elites and opinion
leaders use leaders and other editorial articles to 'monitor opinion in contexts where
their first-hand knowledge is inadequate' (Brown 1979:75). For example, an
interviewee from the Guardian distinguished between the influence of leaders on
politicians and opinion leaders, and 'ordinary' readers:
There's no definitive answer in this. Some people argue that most members of
the public don't read the leaders and that the importance of the leader is
exaggerated. Certainly during General Elections, I'm not sure the public will
vote according to the editorial line of the paper. But having said that,
politicians regard leaders as much more important than members of the public
do. Politicians will get upset over leader lines that criticise the policy of their
department. It's true of embassies as well. The Israeli Embassy will be cross if
we take an editorial line that's too pro-Palestinian. The Foreign Office will be
upset if we take a line that's critical of the Foreign Secretary and will engage
in argument. So they do have influence but maybe their influence is mainly
with the politicians and the policy makers rather than with the general public. I
think the general public will only read an editorial if they're specifically
interested in that subject. I don't think [that] they would read the entire column
every day. (Interview 10)
Even Beuick, who suggested that editors might just as well fill the editorial column
with 'comic strips or radio wiring diagrams', conceded that 'some few business and
professional men ... admitted that they did read the more weighty editorial opinion'
(1925:159).
Brown concludes that 'the impact of editorial opinion on other institutions and elites
has been noted, but there is no evidence to suggest that such columns themselves
influence readers' (1979:81-82). Nevertheless, van Dijk (1996) stresses that 'after
opinion programs on TV like talk shows, and together with the Op-Ed articles,'
editorials are still probably 'the widest circulated opinion discourses of society',
despite the size of their actual daily readership. Indeed, 'research in media
27 See Appendix 11.5 for circulation statistics.
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communications shows that newspaper editorials play an important role in the
definition of the public agenda priorities' (Le 2002:374).
'It may well be,' as Seymour-Ure suggests, that papers value leader articles 'more
than their readers do' (1998b:43). At the same time, the study of leader articles is not
necessarily interesting because they influence the readers, but because of their
agenda-setting role. As a public statement of the corporate view of the newspaper they
give an idea what the newspaper wants their readers to think about, but not necessarily
how they should think (McCombs and Shaw 1972:66).
6.2.3. Writing the leader articles
How are leader articles written? The Guardian leaders are written by a dedicated
leader writing team, consisting of 4-6 persons. They may do other things at the paper
as well, but not as their primary responsibility. Every morning, a leader writing
conference takes place, usually chaired by the Editor. During the leader writing
conference, 'you will have a conversation about what the subject should be and what,
in general terms, the line to be taken is' (Interview 15) and 'discuss what the issues
are for that given day and who feels strongly about what' (Interview 10). In the
afternoon, the topics are checked again, as the leader agenda is clearer by 3.30pm or
so. The leaders are handed in approximately between 6-7pm. Apart from a dedicated
team of leader writers, some other journalists may write them occasionally, depending
on the topic. In general, the leader writers have specialised on special topics: 'One of
the leader writers specialises in Foreign Affairs, another one will concentrate on
Domestic Policy, another on Economics, another on Social Policy' (Interview 10).
Whereas 'Fleet Street' newspapers usually have couple of dedicated leader writers, in
Scotland, the leader is often written at the last moment and whatever is written, goes
in. Consequently, the quality of leader-writing suffers (Interview 9).
A general assumption is that the leader column is written by the Editor of the
newspaper. For instance, Rosenfeld (2000) hints that although anonymous,
'"unsigned" is not quite right for editorials: the editors are often named in the
masthead printed on the editorial page'. Indeed, many Editors would write leaders
themselves, and if not writing themselves, they would try to sub-edit the leaders, 'not
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to change the line but just to try to make sure that they have a consistent style to them
and to stop people making silly mistakes' (Interview 15). But leaders are not always
written by the staff journalists. For instance, one of our interviewees often writes
leaders for other papers these days, although he could not name the papers 'for
obvious reasons' (Interview 9), reinforcing the idea of leaders as the anonymous,
corporate view. The current editor of the Guardian, Alan Rusbridger, does not write
many leaders for his paper, although 'he does write leaders on other papers that I
know about, like the Times, curiously'. The former editor of the Times, Peter Stothard,
apparently 'really didn't write leaders at all', despite taking leader conferences, 'so
there's no rule about this' (Interview 15). Seymour-Ure adds that 'at least three
editors wrote opinion columns in their own names from time to time, as well as
writing anonymous editorials' (1998b:45).
6.3. Editorial/political cartoons
The aim of looking at the political cartoons is to analyse the visual construction of
Scottishness, and the representation of devolution in political cartoons published in
major Scottish and British newspapers. Including the cartoons in my data corpus
resulted in me getting involved with a wholly new field of research - visual sociology.
I have explained the general principles of visual sociology and research using visual
methodologies in Chapter 5. Here I will first discuss the role of political cartoons in
newspapers, and assess why cartoons matter. The analysis of political cartoons in
British and Scottish media in 1979 and 1997 can be found in Chapter 9, although I
have used some cartoons from my data corpus for illustration in this chapter as well.
Gillian Rose has written a book for the researcher who may have 'found some
intriguing visual materials to work with, knows that they raise some interesting issues,
but isn't quite sure how to proceed from there' (Rose 2001:2). This was exactly the
situation I found myself in few years ago. Analysing cartoons as part of my
postgraduate research was not my initial intention. But while collecting data and
conducting preliminary analysis of the leader articles for my research, I came across a
number of political cartoons on the Op-Ed pages, many of them depicting devolution
referenda and politics in Scotland, or Scottishness in general. Often they do this in
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more clear-cut and outrageous way than the leader articles themselves - a point I will
return to later.
6.3.1. Defining political cartoons
Cartoons 'vary considerably in their content, quality and sphere of influence'
(Wigston 2002:76), but generally they are representational or symbolic drawings that
make 'a satirical, witty, or humorous point' (Low and Williams 2000), or 'an
independent statement or observation about political events or social policy' (Feldman
2000:165). Political cartoons belong to several genres of expression. They 'share
some qualities with other graphic art forms, comic art forms, and journalistic
commentary, but they are ultimately distinctive and unique forms of communication'
(Edwards 1997:xi). Cartoons are a form of linguistic expression, together with other
forms of political humour, despite their focus on the visual. And like other forms of
linguistic expression, they draw upon 'the semantics and pragmatics of political
language, contextual information and the political culture of a given society'
(Feldman 2000:165). A typical cartoon, then, 'makes an independent statement or
observation about political events or social policy' (ibid.). Technically speaking, a
typical cartoon may or may not have a caption, and may comprise more than one
panel, although the latter is less common in case of political cartoons.
Wigston highlights the uniqueness of cartoons 'when compared to other forms of
mass-produced art which offer a reproduction of an object or event, such as
photographs' (2002:76). The unique characteristics of political cartoon are following:
• They are not meant to exist as originals, but as copies in a newspaper.
• They are intended for mass reproduction.
• They are aimed at the general public and not at the 'contemplative readers'
(Streicher 1967:433).
• They do not aim 'at being high art forms, but at influence and political practice'.
Wigston also insists that 'it is necessary to understand where the political cartoon fits





















Wigston distinguishes between political and social caricatures. The first aim to
'ridicule, debunk or expose persons, groups or organisations engaged in societal
power struggles'. The latter deal with 'non-political matters and has no concern
regarding the distribution of power in society' (Wigston 2002:76). Edwards makes
another important distinction between editorial cartoons and comic strips. Editorial
cartoons 'bridge fact and fiction. They create imaginative worlds, but the central
characters come from real life - politicians, Popes, First Ladies, and other public
figures'. Comic strips, in contrast, can make political statements, but 'the central
characters are fictional' (Edwards 1997:xii). Common cartoon topics cover different
political or public affairs, a nation, political party, idea or social issue, social customs,
personalities. While 'the differences between editorial cartoons and other cartoon
forms may be ambiguous', these differences matter, 'because editorial cartoons raise
different expectations and offer a different experience to many readers' (Edwards
1997:xii). Although distinguishing between social and political cartoons can
sometimes be difficult, most of the cartoons in my data corpus can be described as
political cartoons.
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6.3.2. The role of political cartoons
There are three main functions that the cartoons serve in newspapers. Firstly, like
headlines, the cartoons act as eye-catchers. They aim to halt the page-skimming
reader, and draw their attention to the editorial page (Ammons et al. 1988; Tanner
2000). Secondly, by attracting readers to the editorial page, the political cartoons have
an informative role as they 'remind readers of the achievements and flaws of the
political process' (Feldman 2000:173) and by doing this perform 'an important
educative role' (Tanner 2000). But cartoons do not just inform the readers, they also
interpret current political affairs for the readers: the images are not just records, but
they can also be constructs (van Leeuwen and Jewitt 2001a). Therefore, and finally,
the main function of the cartoons is related to their socially constitutive nature. The
cartoons aim to be part of the opinion discourse, they are 'editorials in pictures' or
'speaking pictures' as Seymour-Ure (1998:3) and Edwards (1997:8) respectively
claim. Wigston (2002:74) suggests that cartoons indeed 'serve as an important adjunct
to editorials, providing a summary of a certain situation or event'. 'The persuasive
aspect of political cartoons is underscored by their traditional appearance within a
socially and politically influential mass media outlet, the editorial pages of a
newspaper' (Edwards 1997:8-9).
Cartoons can complement leader articles in their 'opinion changing' mission. Indeed,
in many newspapers, the cartoonists are part of the editorial staff, although
increasingly cartoonists also work for larger media syndicates. As part of the editorial
staff, the cartoonists work with the editor. For example, Feldman found in his analysis
of the depiction of Japanese political leaders in editorial cartoons, that the latter
usually mirror the content of political articles (2000:176) and thus improve the
chances of changing opinion. As such, the best cartoons are those 'which do not
merely reflect current political opinion, but guide it' (Maurice and Cooper 2000) and
this makes clever cartoons 'instruments of tremendous editorial power' (Cuff
1945:96). Both editorials and cartoons seek to change opinion, but they do it best in
cooperation. An early study by Brinkman (1968) found the following relationships
between cartoons and editorials:
• Cartoons presented with editorials result in greater opinion change than the
presentation of cartoons or editorials alone.
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• An editorial presented alone results in greater opinion change than a cartoon
alone.
• Editorials and cartoons presented together are most effective in achieving opinion
change.
• Similar arguments used in cartoons and editorials are more effective in producing
closure than alternative arguments.
Thus 'cartoons can theoretically bring about opinion change under certain ideal
circumstances' (Wigston 2002:91) and be 'an effective agent in moulding public
opinion' (Maurice and Cooper 2000). The power of cartoons is also related to their
emotive appeal:
... visual representations can be effective in shaping people's understanding of
political reality and can influence the beliefs and behaviour of the public and
politicians - sometimes even more powerfully than verbal messages. ...
Gombrich (1982:138-140), for example, asserts that while language is superior
to pictures alone at conveying information and formulating arguments, the
visual image is 'supreme' in its ability to arouse emotions. (Feldman
2000:173)
Although Brinkman (1968) suggested that 'an editorial presented alone results in
greater opinion change than a cartoon alone', Day believes the opposite. She claims:
It can be presumed that cartoons play a major role in newspapers, with the use
of an image perhaps creating a greater impact on readers than mere words:
'Because cartoons take up a small proportion of newspaper space compared to
news and advertising, the focus of attention on them is proportionally greater
than on the much more diffuse programming of the video media' (Puette
1992:74). (Day 2000)
The following sections will consider some potential influence of political cartoons on
the viewers and readers, by discussing their reception and content.
6.3.3. Reception of cartoons
Any influence of cartoons, of course, is related to their 'correct' interpretation by the
readers. Social identities are constructed through ideologies of social difference, and
'different social groups (however defined) encode the world in very different ways
and may thus interpret visual images in very different ways' (Rose 2001:96). An
influential study by Carl (1968) found that a high percentage of people misinterpreted
the meaning of political cartoons shown to them:
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Findings from the study indicated that readers' interpretation of cartoons
varied dramatically from the original intention of the cartoonist. Correct
interpretations varied according to employment level (which was determined,
in turn, by education level) and class status. White-collar respondents showed
a higher correlation (22%) than blue-collar respondents (9%) with the artists'
intention. The evidence provided by this study implies that in most cases
cartoonists are not getting their messages across to readers. This finding has a
negative impact on the use of political cartoons in facilitating change in
opinion. (Wigston 2002:91)
Feldman reminds us that 'political humour lies hidden deep within a society's psyche,
drawing on common experience, images, and stereotypes from that society, and its
culture' (2000:168). Unless the reader is familiar with the meaning of icons and
symbols depicted on the cartoon, they are unlikely to take note of the subtle and
hidden deeper messages on the cartoon. For example, the following cartoon assumes
the familiarity of the myth of the Pandora's box in order to be correctly understood:
Cartoon 98. Published in The Times on 1 March 199728
Wigston implies that there are a number of factors influencing the interpretation of
political cartoons. These include the reader's ability to perceive detail in the drawing,
28
Appendix 11.2 contains further details on the cartoons used in the thesis.
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their cultural background, environment, their psychological mindset, their knowledge
of current events and history and their ability to see analogies and a knowledge of
allegories. Due to a number of different factors that influence the interpretation of
cartoons, 'it is incorrect to assume that political cartoons are easily understood'
(Wigston 2002:91-92; see also Gamson and Stuart 1992:62). As a result, 'we can
never really know exactly what the impact of a given cartoon was on a given reader or
group of readers' (Coupe 1969:83). Despite claims that cartoons play a major role in
the newspapers and influence people possibly even more than written articles, that a
picture is worth a thousand words (Seymour-Ure 1986, 1998a; Day 2000; Feldman
2000), Coupe suggests that 'in an epoch of mass literacy it would be perverse to
maintain that the resident cartoonist is likely to exert a greater influence than the
leader-writers and commentators in plain prose' (1969:84).
Whatever the influence of cartoons on the readership, the prominence of political
cartoons in the press 'is an outcome in its own right, independent of evidence on the
degree to which the audience is being influenced' (Gamson and Stuart 1992:56).
Edwards adds:
Research does not conclusively indicate that editorial cartoons have direct
effects on voter preference. But the position of editorial cartoonists as a
'public forum' of political commentary, their use of cultural symbol and
allusion, and their capacity to mirror the constmcted realities offered by elites
and consumed by the public, makes them important artefacts in the arena of
political discourse. Through the window/frame of the political cartoonist ...
we see the political culture displayed and interpreted. (1997:xiv)
6.3.4. Content of cartoons
As mentioned, many cartoons are quite outrageous and would probably not be printed
in text form. Consider the following cartoon:
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Cartoon 29. Caption: 'Och, I put down 'Yes' - but I thought It was EVOLUTION we were voting for.'
Published in Daily Mail on 2 March 1979
This is a typical example of the possible outrageousness of cartoons. In this case the
Daily Mail - 'the bugle of "Middle England'", as Nairn calls it (2002a: 118) - is
implying that Scots are in some undefined way racially and biologically backward and
in need of evolution, as opposed to devolution. This political incorrectness is typical
of cartoons, and 'the power of pictures sets cartoons apart from other editorials. Their
graphic imagery can convey messages that would be unacceptable if spelled out in
words' (Feldman 2000:173; see also Seymour-Ure 1986:170).
As mentioned earlier, cartoons make a satirical, witty, or humorous point, and in
doing so, they are 'almost always condescending' (Choy et al. 1994:20-21). However,
Wigston notes that although satire and ridicule have always been associated with
cartoons, the 'original concept did not imply any form of ridicule' (2002:77).
Therefore, cartoons do not necessarily have to be also caricatures, and sometimes they
simply offer 'a political allegory on a given political situation' (Coupe 1969:87).
Indeed, 'from a rhetorical perspective, the entertainment function of editorial cartoons
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is secondary to its provision of political commentary' (Edwards 1997:xii). If we look
at the following cartoons, then caricature and humour are not the most significant
features of them. The first cartoon was published following the sudden death of
Princess Diana:
Cartoon 53. Caption: 'Collateral damage.' Published in the Herald on 4 September 1997
Instead of parody and caricature, the cartoon, by presenting a black-and-white image
of the Saltire over the eyes of Diana, aims to 'instantly make a point that would be
difficult to articulate in written text and often leave a lasting impressions on the
reader' (Wigston 2002:74). Here is another cartoon by the same author:
Cartoon 56. Caption: 'The flat battery.' Published in the Herald on 8 September 1997
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This time the cartoon depicts an exhausted Donald Dewar, but again, the cartoon is
not intended to be punitive; it is just summarising the state of affairs, by suggesting
that Dewar has run out of energy due to the devolution campaign shadowed by
Paisley crisis29 and the death of Princess Diana. Consequently, this depiction of
Donald Dewar presents him in a rather sympathetic light. As Coupe (1969:92) writes,
'the constant repetition of a given politician's features establishes him as a person in
our minds and the familiarity inevitably breeds [a] measure of sympathetic contempt'.
Thus the aim of the cartoon is not necessarily to ridicule Donald Dewar, but to offer a
poignant summary of the situation.
As my cartoon corpus is not representative, findings cannot be generalised. But
looking at the discursive construction of Scottish devolution and identity in cartoons
helps us understand the symbolic contest on this issue and how it has evolved during
the two devolution campaigns. And they are worth looking at, as cartoons, just like
leader articles and other media texts, serve an agenda-setting function (Edwards
1997:7).
6.4. Compiling the data corpus
The last part of the chapter will explain the choice of time frames, choice of
newspapers, and sampling of data for the analysis.
6.4.1. Time frame
Billig in his Banal Nationalism is particularly interested in the flagging of nationhood
on ordinary days, i.e. on days which are not 'of national celebration or intense
electoral campaigning' (1995:109). However, I have chosen to analyse the media
discourse during the devolution referendum campaigns in Scotland. I have several
reasons for choosing these time frames. Therborn (1995:230) writes that 'in the field
of collective identities, the most dramatic and important moments are wars and the
29 In the wake of the 1997 devolution referendum, the Labour MP for Paisley South, Gordon
McMaster, committed suicide on 27.7.1997. It was widely speculated at the time that a whispering
campaign may have played a prominent part in McMaster's suicide. Apparently McMaster was a
'victim of a poison pen campaign run by a local councillor.' (Andrew Parker & Jason Allardyce, The
Scotsman, 4.8.1997). The 'Paisley sleaze' was consequently a prominent issue at all Labour press
conferences in the run up to the devolution referendum, and figured prominently in cartoons at the
time.
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breakdown of a given state order'. Devolution in Scotland cannot be classified as a
breakdown of a given state order, but it nevertheless constitutes a major constitutional
change that problematises national identity. McCrone (2001a: 153) writes:
Quite suddenly, identity politics are back on the agenda, for, in Mercer's
words, 'identity only becomes an issue when it is in crisis, when something
assumed to be fixed, coherent and stable is displaced by the experience of
doubt and uncertainty' (1990:43). This problematising process makes it much
easier to see how people are involved in 'personalising' national identity.
The same goes for the media. In such moments of change and crisis, the identity-
construction is more explicit, as 'the 'Nation' and national sentiments can be cast up
for discussion and become a generalised point of focus and come close to generating
something akin to Durkheim's "collective effervescence'" (Mcintosh et al. 2004:46).
Paraphrasing Anderson (1991), the imagining of Scottish national community is in
full swing, making it sociologically just as interesting as banal flagging on so-called
ordinary days. Also, the Self/Other dialectic is intensified at the time of political,
social and economic crises, as the identity of the nation is put in question and the
significant Others become more salient.
Hence, I have chosen these particular moments of time that Chilton (1987) has aptly
called 'critical discourse moments', i.e. events that 'stimulate commentary' by various
social actors and the media (cited in Gamson and Stuart 1992:64). I am looking at
how the mass media in Scotland use and contest Scottishness in 'the various struggles
around the formation of a Scottish parliament'. This gives us an insight into how
'identity is used to mobilise people in support of, or in opposition to' (Reicher and
Hopkins 2001:x-xi) the devolution project. Consequently, my chosen critical
discourse moments are the Scottish devolution referenda of 1 March 1979, and 11
September 1997. My data corpus covers a four-month time period - a month before
and a month after each of the referenda. Although the devolution campaign started in
both cases much earlier, the one-month period prior the referendum covers the most
intense period of national 'navel-gazing' and debating of nationness. Stretching the
period under analysis for another month after the devolution referendum allows us
cover the discursive reflections of the referendum result, and the impact of the 1979
defeat and 1997 victory (at least as defined by the pro-devolutionary Scottish
newspapers in question) on the fate and future of Scottish nation.
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6.4.2. Newspapers
My data corpus includes leader articles from following titles: The Scotsman, The
(Glasgow) Herald, The Guardian, The Daily Telegraph, The Times (was on strike in
1979, so leader articles have only been collected in 1997), The Independent (only
1997, as the paper was launched in 1985). Although I have gathered material from
both British and Scottish broadsheet newspapers, in the thesis I am only analysing in-
depth the material from the two main Scottish broadsheets, The (Glasgow) Herald and
The Scotsman.
I used microfilms and paper copies to collect data from 1979, and microfilms and CD-
ROMs to access data from 1997, using the resources the University of Edinburgh
Main Library, and the National Library of Scotland. For cartoons, I used microfilms at
the National Library of Scotland, as well as the online CartoonHub database in Kent.
6.4.3. Data sampling
Purposive sampling was used instead of truly random sampling to compile the data
corpus for the current research. The latter did not seem justified in this case, because
of the 'limited usefulness and inherent difficulty in drawing true random samples of
media content'. In research 'where scholars are interested in particular sort of
coverage, such as foreign or campaign news, sampling by days often produces a great
deal of irrelevant material' (Althaus et al. 2001:708). When choosing 'a relatively
narrow time limit for the study', 'the reliability and validity of this type of coding is
likely to be better than that of proxy coding ... case studies limit the generalizability
of results' (Althaus et al. 2001:709). Again, as my data corpus includes 110 leader
articles, I do not claim 'representativeness in a statistical sense' as such (Edmunds and
Turner 2001:2). Nevertheless, I do believe that the research furthers our understanding
of subtle changes in national identity formation in the media.
My data corpus consists of three different corpora:
• 110 leader articles.
• 86 political cartoons.
• 18 transcribed interviews with journalists in Edinburgh, Glasgow and London.
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Below is a more detailed explanation of the principles of data collection and use of
various corpora.
6.4.3.1. Leader articles
All leader articles were read day by day for the selected time frame, totalling 460
leader articles, and all leader articles that discussed devolution in general, or the
devolution referendum in particular, were included in the data corpus. Such a
sampling rule yielded 110 leader articles, i.e. 23.9 % from all leader articles in that
time frame:
Newspaper 1979
The Scotsman 103 leaders in total 151 leaders in total
27 about devolution 40 about devolution
(26.2 per cent) (24.5 per cent)
The Herald 99 leaders in total 107 leaders in total
13 about devolution 30 about devolution
(13.1 per cent) (28.0 per cent)
The data corpus includes all the leader articles from the Scotsman and the (Glasgow)
Herald from a month before and month after the referendum that discussed devolution
and its various aspects in Scotland. Thus for 1979, the time period covered is from
February 1st until March 31st (referendum on March 1st), and for 1979, the time period
covered is from August 11th until October 10th (referendum on September 11th).
Roughly speaking, about one-third of all articles are from the 1979 devolution
referendum, and two-thirds from the 1997 referendum; three-fifths of the articles are
from the Scotsman, and two-fifths from the Herald:
1 Total: 110 1979 1997 i
The Scotsman 27 (21.0%) 40 (38.1%)
The Herald 13 (12.4%) 30 (28.6%)
All leader articles were copied verbatim into text document (RTF format) and
imported into NVivo database. As I am looking at the discursive construction of
national identities, then 'discourse analysis depends not on the quantity of material
analysed, but its quality. "What matters," [(Tonkiss 1998:253)] says, "is the richness
of textual detail, rather than the number of texts analysed'" and the qualitative
researcher 'may quite legitimately select from all possible sources a few that seem
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particularly interesting' (Rose 2001:143). Thus although the data corpus consists of
110 leader articles, not all of them are analysed in-depth in the findings chapter.
6.4.3.2. Political cartoons
The visual analysis is based on cartoons collected from the two Scottish broadsheets
and a number of British newspapers. Most of the cartoons are retrieved from the
searchable online database of the Centre for the Study of Cartoons and Caricature,
University of Kent at Cantebury (http://librarv.kent.ac.uk/cartoons). In addition to the
cartoons available online, I have a number of microfilm printouts of relevant cartoons.
The cartoon corpus includes all the relevant cartoons from the Herald, Scotsman,
Guardian, Telegraph, Independent and Times, as well as cartoons from other
newspapers available in the CartoonHub database. The cartoons cover the same time
period as my textual data, enabling comparison between textual and non-verbal
discourses. 48 political cartoons are from the two Scottish broadsheets, and another 38
political cartoons from the same time period from the British tabloids and
broadsheets. Consequently, my data corpus contains 86 cartoons from a month before
and a month after the devolution referenda. The cartoons were distributed as
following:
POLITICAL CARTOONS
Year 1979 1997 Total
The (Glasgow) Herald 9 16 25
The Scotsman 12 11 23
The Telegraph 7 3 10
The Guardian 0 8 8
The Times 0 3 3
The Independent 0 5 5
The Sun 4 0 4
Daily Mail 3 0 3
Daily Express 3 1 4
Evening Standard 1 0 1
Total 39 47 86
The cartoons are analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively. The quantitative
method of content analysis is used to identify the main actors and topics in the
cartoons; qualitative method is used to identify further topics and discourses of the
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cartoons. The qualitative study is conducted in order to contextualise fully the
cartoons in the general media discourse during the devolution referenda.
6.4.3.3. Interviews
Interview data is mainly used to illustrate and contextualise data from leader articles
and political cartoons. All interviews were transcribed and added into NVivo
database. Interviews form an integral part of the Leverhulme media research project30.
The interview data corpus consists of 18 interview transcripts conducted by Dr
Maclnnes, Dr Rosie and myself during 2002-2004. Full outline of interviews can be
found in Appendix 11.3.
30 See http://www.institute-of-governance.org/forum/Leverhulme/TOC.html for more details.
128
7. Homo nationalis and homo externus
This chapter will look at the discursive construction of national Self and Others. It
will start by looking at the headlines, then analyse the construction of homo Scotus
and homo externus in the leader articles of the (Glasgow) Herald and the Scotsman in
1979 and 1997.
7.1. Headlines
Chapter 6 suggests that headlines summarise and frame the article, provide the readers
with perspectives, and offer interpretative frameworks through which the leader
articles are to be understood. Often they 'encapsulate the newspaper's ideological
values and attitudes' (Teo 2000:14). Van Dijk writes:
a choice of words in newspaper headlines plays an important role. Not only
do they express the definition of the situation, but they also signal the social
and political opinions of the newspaper about the events. That is, headlines not
only globally define or summarize an event, they also evaluate it. Hence, the
lexical style of headlines has ideological implications. (1991:53)
To illustrate this, consider, for example, the following headlines from the Daily
Telegraph in February 1979. A week before the referendum the paper led with a
leader article entitled How to say 'no' in Scotland (Feb 21). Shortly afterwards, the
paper dedicated an editorial to devolution three days in a row: Devolution madness
(Feb 26), Why 'noes' must vote (Feb 27) and A kingdom on the brink (Feb 28). It is
evident from the lexical choices made in the headlines alone that the Telegraph was
strongly opposed to the devolution - and eager to convince its readers likewise.
Looking at the headlines of the leader articles in my data corpus (see Appendix 11.1),
for the first time frame, 1979, several points are of interest. First of all, on the day of
the referendum, both the Guardian and the Telegraph withheld from mentioning the
devolution referendum in Scotland in their leader articles. In contrast, the Scottish
broadsheets brought their leader articles from their usual spot to the front page, a
move indicating the perceived prominence of the article (Coats and Mulkey
1950:540). The leader articles on devolution were printed on the prime spot and under
an enlarged headline - emphasising the importance of the referendum both for the
newspaper and for its readers, alias Scotland.
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There is lots of banal and not so banal flagging of the nation in the headlines. First of
all, there is manifest flagging of Scotland: Scotland's choice (SCOT050279), An act
offaith - for Scotland (HERA130279), Scotland's exports (SCOT270279), Scotland
must give a decisive answer today (HERA010379). Scotland is anthropomorphised in
some of these headlines through personification metaphors. By giving Scotland an
agency, the non-living entity Scotland is brought to life. Such personification
metaphors have 'high suggestive force', as in reference to 'the mental construct of
nation, these metaphors also imply intra-national sameness and equality' (Wodak et
al. 1999:44). The (whole of) Scotland has a choice today, and it is Scotland that must
give a decisive answer today, implying that the choice is uncontroversial and
consensual. The same personification metaphor can also be described as metonymic
use of 'Scotland' as in 'country for persons'. Cases where
something is replaced by human being or a group of human beings, represent
cases of the tropological crossing of metonymy and personification.
Simultaneous tropological multiple membership is ignored; if one views
personification metonymies (which are characterised by combination of, for
example, the name of an institution plus a verb which normally describes
human behaviour) exclusively as personifying metaphors, as does Reger
(1977, 1978). His biased perspective gives the wrong impression that such
personifying metonymies serve to bring something to life, making it more
concrete, whereas in fact the opposite is true: such metonymies are
abstractions of concrete (responsible) actors. (Wodak et al. 1999:47-48).
Thus while the headline Scotland must give a decisive answer today (HERAO10379),
on the one hand, uses a personification metaphor for bringing Scotland to life, it is
also metonymically replacing the people of Scotland with more abstract and
generalising notion of 'Scotland'.
And then there is 'we', the national first person plural, representing one way of banal
flagging of nationhood. Billig analyses a number of headlines in his book, including
'Turning our industrial sunset into new dawn' in the Guardian and 'Why our taxes
need never rise again' in the Daily Telegraph, claiming that 'the headline did not
specify who 'we' were: readers could be expected to recognise their national selves'
(Billig 1995:115). The 'national self' in question was Britain, he suggests. But it is
more complex than that in Scotland. Consider the following example from the
Scotsman, a leader article called Why we must vote Yes (SCOT230279). Billig is right
- this 'we' does not refer to the Scotsman's, editorial team only - it is a national, not
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editorial 'we'. It is Scottish national31 and Scottish readers could indeed be expected
to recognise their 'national selves'. Similarly, after the disappointing referendum
result, the Herald asks Does this have to be our last word? (HERA030379), again
referring to the people of Scotland rather than to its editorial team in Glasgow. But a
few weeks later the Scotsman headlined with Here we go again, referring to the
imminence of General Election that awaits not the newspaper, not Scotland, but the
whole of Britain. Here, the national frame of reference is different from the previous
ones. I will return to the notion of 'we' in the next chapter.
The Scotsman ran a special series of leader articles, Agenda for the Assembly, in 1979,





Lifcc A noble but grnesornely tattered old plaid the
fabric nf Scots law baa grown threadbare over the last 270
years. Holes gape In areas of social concern which Stair
nniriM- Iknunli# a./ — _3_— a,. — . 4. .1. i « a -
The Scotsman, 12 February 1979, page 6
This is rather unusual for leader articles, as they tend not to be 'serialised'. By doing
this, the Scotsman implied that the topic was worthy enough of special attention, and
was effectively setting the agenda for its readership by flagging the Assembly32.
For the 1997 devolution referendum the picture was somewhat different. Both
Scottish broadsheets and all major British broadsheets ran an editorial on the day of
devolution referendum in Scotland: The rebirth of the nation (SCOT110997), A
worthy and lively debate: All worries of apathy have been dispelled (HERA 110997),
Seize the opportunity: Scots can be trusted to govern their own lives (GUAR 110997),
31
Billig seems to suggest the existence of 'British national we' across the UK.
32 Note that the Glasgow Herald always referred to the Assembly, whereas The Scotsman wrote about
the [Assembly, the latter possibly indicating higher perceived importance of the proposed institution in
1979.
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Return of the Braveheart as a new battle unfolds (TELE110997)33, Decision day:
'Yes, no' would the worst result ofall (TIME110997), Yes, yes is the best and bravest
answer (INDE110997)34. All but the Telegraph also dedicated their editorial cartoons
to devolution in Scotland - a marked shift from 1979, when the main British
broadsheets did not consider the devolution referendum even worthy of their editorial
textual comment on the day.
Overall, the picture during the 1997 referendum campaign is quite similar to 1979.
There is the routine patriotic flagging of Scotland in the headlines again: Scottish tax-
varying powers (HERA220897), New role of Scottish Secretary (SCOT250897),
Racism in Scotland: Attacks on English a disgrace (HERA290897), Shadow boxing
for Scottish business (SCOT050997), A glittering prize for Scotland (SCOT070997),
Considered view of Scotland the sober (SCOT140997), The opposition Scotland
needs (SCOT150997), Responsibility for Dounreay: Scottish Office must act
decisively (HERA 150997), Scottish Tory realism: Home Rule best chance to revive
fortunes (HERA260997), Pride ofplace for a Scottish parliament (SCOT051097), Is
Scotland in Europe or not? (SCOT061097). The words 'Scotland' and 'Scottish'
appear in 10 headlines out of 70 in Scottish broadsheets, i.e. in 14% of all articles.
Again, note the anthropomorphised use of 'Scotland' in some instances.
There are also several examples of banal flagging of Scotland, of flagging that does
not really say it, but we all know - or are assumed to know - what the paper means.
For instance, The wealth of the nation (SCOT 180897) is about taxation powers of
devolved Scotland; Industry must find a voice (SCOT290897) writes about Scottish
industry; Museums and the national interests (SCOT300897) is about the National
Museums of Scotland; Raise the voice ofa nation (SCOT080997) and The rebirth of a
nation (SCOT110997) both refer to Scotland. There is no need to specify that it is
Scotland as, Billig has correctly told us, this is banal knowledge. But just when the
Scottish readers might have got used to recognising their Scottish national selves in
the 'nation' named in the headlines, the Herald leads with Emotions of a nation
(HERA040997). In this headline the deixis 'nation' refers to the British nation
33 Note how the Telegraph uses the Braveheart metaphor, riding on the back of the 1995 Hollywood
blockbuster.
34 No comparative data is available for The Times and The Independent in 1979. The first was on the
strike, and the second was only launched in 1986.
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mourning the sudden death of Princess Diana, and not just to the Scottish nation. And
finally, there is the above-mentioned national deixis 'we' again: Why we need Tam
(HERA 110897), The real decision we face (HERA200897), Life must go on: Why we
foster devolution debate (HERA030997), Now let's celebrate: We wish you a happy
new era (HERA130997) - some of them referring to Scotland, some to the
newspaper.
Some headlines contain war or fighting metaphors - as in A home rule peace process
(SCOT110897), and Refighting a losing battle (SCOT270897); some include
evolutionary metaphors: The rebirth ofa nation (SCOT110997), and The first day ofa
new life (SCOT130997). Especially the second headline gives a lot of promise of a
bright future ahead - the use of 'first' and 'new' indicate a change from the
(Westminster-dominated) past.
Overall, the language of the headlines is very positive and optimistic: A glittering
prize for Scotland (SCOT070997), The rebirth of a nation (SCOT110997), A triumph
of the settled will (SCOT120997), The first day of a new life (SCOT130997), Now
let's celebrate: we wish you a happy new era (HERA130997), etc. Devolution is seen
through a positive prism, bringing prosperity and happiness to Scotland. By making
this clear in the headlines, the following articles are framed in a similarly positive and
optimistic way.
7.2. Discursive constructions of homo nationalis
One element of the discursive construction of national identity is the strategy of
group-definition and construction, or 'we-discourse'. For example, Wodak et al.
identified 'essentialist representations of the Austrian national character and the homo
Austriacus' in their research (1999:25). They operationalise the concept of homo
nationalis as following:
The stereotypical image of a homo Austriacus is connected to the belief that
there is a 'typical Austrian character', 'typically Austrian' behaviour, and an
'Austrian mentality', and in the end is also connected to the fantasy of
'Austrian ancestry'. It has also served as a kind of avatar of 'essentialist'
notions of what is specifically Austrian. (Wodak et al. 1999:54)
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Such essentialist stereotypes correspond to the ethnic definition of nationness, or the
idea of Kulturnation. They also illustrate the psychological understanding of national
character as 'rooted in nature rather than society':
... psychological work on nationhood tends to naturalise national identity. It
does so both in the sense of representing national identity as a natural aspect of
a people rather than an aspect of its social practices, and also in the sense of
presupposing that each nation has a single authentic nature. (Reicher and
Hopkins 2001:28)
7.2.1. Homo Scotus
It is interesting to see whether Scotland, usually presented as a civic nation as opposed
to ethnic nation, is essentialised in the media in a similar way. Is there an attempt to
construct a homo Scotus or a 'Scottish person' in the media? What does being Scottish
mean according to the Scottish media? The following section aims to shed light on
these questions. It will look at instances trying to describe the 'character' of Scotland,
'the people' and 'the nature' of Scotland etc., in a similar vein to the attempts to
discursively create a homo Austriacus in Austria. This can be described as generic
construction of the Other, trying to 'give a universal answer to questions of 'what they
are like' or 'what they look like" (Galasinska and Galasinski 2003:849).
7.2.1.1. Banal existence of distinct Scottish identity.
David McCrone writes that 'being Scottish has become stronger and more culturally
diverse in the past twenty years'. But to say so does not imply 'that we know what
people mean when they say they are Scottish, or that it is like a badge pinned to the
lapel, there for everyone to read' (2001a: 174). There is a tendency to imply in the
Scottish media that there is something that can be called Scottish identity, but it is less
commonplace to try to define it, to pin it down. The readers are assumed to know
what Scottish identity means and that they agree on a common definition of
Scottishness - hence the media need not to offer definitions of Scottishness. National
identities are seen as 'essential, given, and non-problematic' (McCrone 1998:635),
and 'at a common-sense level Scotland plainly exists' (McCrone 2001a:37). Take the
following extract from the Herald:
preserving the distinct Scottish identity on which the present demands for
devolution are partly based. (HERA230279)
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The extract uses justification strategy and appeals to the need to preserve 'the distinct
Scottish identity', but no further explanation is provided as to how Scottish identity is
special and distinct. The reader is assumed to agree, firstly, that Scottish identity is
distinct (note the hidden assumption of the existence of the Other(s) that Scotland is
distinct from), and secondly, also to know what that distinct identity is about (i.e. the
nature of that distinctiveness). No-one doubts the distinctiveness of Scottish nation,
not even the Tories:
No-one, not even leaders of the Conservative Party, has dared to deny Scottish
nationhood. (SCQT080997)
This wording highlights the taken-for-granted nature of Scottish nationhood. And this
particular distinctiveness is fuelled by distinct Scottish institutions. The following
extract informs:
The main reason is that a bad scheme does not destroy a good principle, which
is that a nation - such as Scotland undoubtedly is, with its own legal,
educational, and other systems, not to speak of a strong sense of national
identity - has the right to govern its own affairs. (HERA260279)
The article insists that Scotland is 'undoubtedly' a nation, and the sense of national
identity is equally strong - similarly to the political nationalist who takes the claim
that Scotland is a nation 'as axiomatic so that it is a self-evident truth' (McCrone
2001a:47). But it elaborates that Scotland's 'own' legal, educational and other
systems make Scotland a nation. This is re-emphasised three paragraphs later in the
same leader article (note how Scotland has suddenly curiously been personified as
'she' instead of 'it' previously):
The Union was a political work of genius, which for more than 250 years has
conferred incalculable benefits on both Scotland and England. Scotland
especially benefited. She retained her distinctive institutions, above all, her
law and her Kirk, while enjoying all the economic advantages of a united
island. (HERA260279)
Scotland is, again, unquestionably a distinct nation. It has distinctive institutions and a
strong sense of national identity, and even its prison service is distinctive:
The report of the inquiry into the prison service in the UK is awaited, but
clearly there will be much more for the Assembly to discuss in the light of
Scotland's distinctive experience. (SCOT790216)
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Scotland's experience is unique and distinctive, and the newspapers do not see that
this 'fact' requires further explanation. The Scotsman continues with a very similar
uncontested construction of Scottishness:
There would be the chance of developing educational aims suited to Scottish
traditions and needs, instead of importing policy like a Bill with clauses
tagged on to apply to Scotland. (SCOT080279)
Perhaps it was the Scottish way to do this thing, after years of hesitation,
with final certainty. (SCOT 120997)
A Scottish way of doing Scottish things
There may yet turn out to be a distinctively Scottish way of doing things, of
course. The Scottish sense of community is important. Our priorities as a
society need not be identical to those of our neighbours. But the virtues which
will earn us our corn will remain the same. The global market economy is a
reality that cannot (and should not) be wished away. Here, at least, the road
here is open to an enterprise economy driven by Scotland's social values.
(SCOT130997)
The current bills and legislations are inherently non-Scottish. What these 'Scottish
traditions and needs' consist of, is not explained in the leader article. It is a-matter-of-
fact statement, and once again it is assumed that every reader will nod in agreement
with the newspaper and not question the existence and character of these distinctive
and taken-for-granted traditions and needs. The second and third extracts are similar -
every reader is expected to agree that there is a 'distinctively Scottish way of doing
Scottish things', and to know what these are. Also, Scotland have special, Scottish
social values - all of which distinguish Scotland from its Other(s). Note the strong
Self/Other dialectic in the last extract.
7.2.1.2. Characterising the Scottish nation.
Scotland is often said to be constructed as civic, not ethnic, nation. In such a context,
expressions of nationness are expected to be civic as well. Thus 'a refusal to identify
or promote a national character may [...] be a way of expressing a non-nationalistic
nationhood against a background where nationalism can be equated with imperialism,
racism and bigotry' (Reicher and Hopkins 2001:205). That is to say that a civic
identity would be promoted, stripped of any 'ethnic' dimensions, including national
character. The reason behind this is that
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the very use of the term 'national character' carries the danger of mistaking
description for explanation, for its meaning is marked by its origins. In
psychological discourse, it is hard to escape the trappings of a term like
'character' which points to intra-psychic structures as the basis for public
behaviours. It is a problem that afflicts all those who use such language,
whatever their disciplinary origins and whatever their intentions. (Reicher and
Hopkins 2001:29-30)
In any case, the idea of a 'national character' is 'a mere stereotypical phantasmagoria
which has no real counterpart outside of the minds of those who believe in it' (Wodak
et al. 1999:29). Thus homo Austriacus does not exist, and neither does homo Scotus.
However,
when embracing a national category, when seeking to define the nation and,
above all, when invoking the national imagination in order to mobilize its
population, the use of psychological trait terms was as commonplace in the
mouths of politicians as it is in psychology textbooks. (Reicher and Hopkins
2001:205)
The same happens in the media, where attributions of a particular character to the
Scottish nation abound. The following extracts attempt to construct and describe 'the
national character' of the Scots in more detail:
Indeed, it is a tribute to the perspicacity of the Scots that they have
recognised that this Act has many shortcomings. [...] A nation as proud as
the Scots is surely willing to take the chance to win what is a great prize.
(HERA010379)
We might be dour and reticent but, with this historic decision, we have
earned the right, yes, to be flamboyant in celebrating our boldness.
(HERA 130997)v '
Scots are described as 'perspicacious,' 'proud' and brave/courageous. Scots may be
dour and reticent, but they are also bold. There is no bad without good. However, the
Scottish scepticism and self-doubt can occasionally be self-defeating:
The Scots are a sceptical people, and there is nothing wrong with that. Too
often, however, it has been our habit - more of an intellectual vice - to doubt
even ourselves. Given our history, this is foolish. Given the possibilities of the
future, it is utterly self-defeating. Self-belief is essential when you are
remaking a nation. Scots, on this occasion, have nothing of which they need be
afraid. (SCOT080997)
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The last extract has an interesting reference to 'remaking' the Scottish nation. It
suggests that Scotland has been made, and then unmade in the past - possibly in 1707,
and is now in the process of being remade. But not all characterisations of Scots are
positive:
The power to shape our educational system should be a particularly valuable
product of devolution. Here, if anywhere, we need to regain the sense of
responsibility and enthusiasm which mature people get from making their
own decisions and not living under the tutelage of policy-makers
preoccupied with other problems. (SCOT080279)
1
Scotland, we believe, will regain its self-respect and lose its sense of
resentment. [...]
In recent years, in particular, Scotland's creativity has seemed stifled, its
energies dissipated. The country has seemed to shrink to match the
modesty of the ambitions it has been allowed. A parliament alone will not
change that, but without a parliament there is no real hope of revival.
(SCOT110997)
Scots - marked by the national deixis 'we' in the first extract - need to regain the
sense of responsibility, enthusiasm, and their maturity. Immaturity, irresponsibility
and indifference are not traits to take pride in; neither is the sense of resentment, lack
of self-respect, stifled creativity, dissipated energy and modest ambitions mentioned
in the second extract. Note how these are all presented as non-intrinsic to the Scots,
but brought on by external factors. If Scots only did not live under 'the tutelage of
policy-makers preoccupied with other problems', they would regain their maturity,
responsibility and zealousness. If Scotland would be allowed to be more ambitious, all
the ills would at least begin disappearing. This supports Luther's findings that
situational attributions 'tend to be made in reference to negative actions/affairs'
(Luther 2001:215). Situational attributions are indeed quite common in Scottish media
whenever something negative is discussed in relation to Scotland. This can be seen
again in the following extracts:
In the last analysis it will be good for Scotland because it will restore the self-
confidence which dependence has sapped and exorcise the defeatism which
possesses the No camp. It will preserve a sense of national identity,
encourage a constructive kind of patriotism and revive faith in our
culture and traditions. The Scotland Act is no model of legislation. The
powers of the Assembly are limited. Yet the choice is momentous. A No
success would complete the process of assimilation, of reducing Scotland to a
mere geographical expression. Scotland's survival as a nation, a worthy partner
in the UK, depends on an emphatic and decisive Yes. (SCOTO10379)
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Indeed, we could argue, if our purpose was contention, that these are the two
principal symptoms of the malaise which a parliament should cure: a culture
grown too frightened of taking risks; a people grown too practiced at
spectating during the exercise of power. (SOS070997)
Nations evolve. They evolve best making free choices, freely expressed.
Any nation prevented from so doing - or preventing itself - stultifies and
shrinks. Home rule, in that sense, is a preventative measure, a way of
ensuring that Scotland - culture, economy, politics and the rest - does not
atrophy or withdraw into itself. (SCOT080997)
Scotland said Yes. The "auld sang" pronounced ended in 1707 by the last
Scottish chancellor begins again. We approach the 21st century with the hope,
at long last, that Scottish life can be freed from lassitude, that the drain of
talent from Scotland will be ended, that native energy and creativity will,
like political power, come home.(SCOT 120997)
The newspaper is campaigning for a Yes vote, and uses the strategy of blaming
Scotland's ills on Scotland's dependence, on that outside factor. Being governed by
Westminster and not by a Scottish/national legislative body, is threatening Scottish
identity and, more than that, it is threatening 'Scotland's survival as a nation'. And
another example of situational attribution:
But the final argument is psychological and perhaps emotional. The lack of
national democratic institutions has grievously sapped Scottish self-belief.
Standardising forces have eroded the external signs of our nationhood,
speech, custom and dress, and left us confused and adrift. The deferential
philosophy of dependence on English largesse attacks the qualities of
enterprise, invention and self-reliance in which we once took pride.
Dependence is in any case something of a myth, though a powerful one. There
is hardly an area of Scottish life that cannot be uplifted and quickened by an
Assembly. (SCOT23Q279)
Describing homo Scotus as lacking self-belief, self-reliance, invention and enterprise,
as being confused and adrift, the Scotsman points again the finger elsewhere. It is not
Scotland's fault - it is the result of the situation that Scotland unwillingly finds itself
in. SNP activist Jim Sillars wrote that 'Scots have been saddled with two burdens.
One, the belief that we are subsidised and poor and, the other, that we owe the English
a great deal for past favours' (1986:100). The above quotation is indicative of this -
Scots are dissatisfied with their state of affairs, as this dependence is bad for
Scotland's psyche. But still, the dependence on the England is not attacked directly,
but indirectly and subtly indicated through the negative effects it has had on Scotland.
In terms of rhetorical strategies, if Scots are described in negative terms, this is
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justified and explained in terms of external factors (situational bias) - all the problems
in Scotland are caused by external factors. The 'philosophy of dependence', lack of
'self-belief', confused and adrift state, all can be traced back to the lack of institutions
and standardising forces outwith the control of Scots themselves. This is echoed also
in the following extract from the Herald:
If anything, a parliament should act as a liberating effect on Scots, raising
trampled dignity (whether correctly or not) and removing the resentment of
others telling us what to do. (HERA290897)
The extract is from a quite self-critical editorial discussing the increasing occurrence
of anti-English attacks in Scotland. It is therefore the English that have trampled the
Scottish dignity, and it is the English that are telling the Scots, who are marked by
personal deixis 'us', what to do that is resented - situational attribution again.
Another attempt of constructing homo Scotus is made by the Scotsman, who describe
Scotland's soul-seeking:
The handsome neo-classical lines of the old Royal High School in Edinburgh
have over the years acquired layers of reek. For all the complaints about its
cost, the Scottish Assembly will be an intimate parliament and the modest
symbol of a small nation hesitantly finding its soul again. Calton Hill is a
fitting place from which to begin a process of revival, renewal and change.
The harmony of the old building's design speaks not of false hope or
vainglory but of rational ambition, its exterior grime of realism.
(SCOT23Q279)
Through metonymic use of the Royal High school (i.e. the building for people/nation),
Scotland is characterised as a nation with 'rational ambition' and not full of 'false
hope', i.e. the characteristics of the building are used to describe the people. The
metaphor of revival, renewal and change is used again. Many of the above extracts
use the transformation strategy, talking about 'remaking', 'regaining', 'restoring',
'reviving' etc in relation to certain characteristics of the Scottish nation.
Whereas negative traits of Scotland (lack of self-belief, lack of entrepreneurial spirit
etc.) have been attributed to situational factors, then 'dispositional attributions (i.e.,
act due to something residing in the actor - internal; psychologically based) would
tend to be made in reference to the home nation's positive actions/affairs' (Luther
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2001:215). Indeed, even democracy can be described in essential terms, as in the
following extract:
And our religious history, in which presbyterianism imbued almost every area
of life, has left us with an ingrained belief in democratic principles.
(SCOT230279)
The belief in democratic principles is 'imbued' and 'ingrained', it is characteristic of
'us' Scots as such. Democratic principles as something that is typical to Scottish
character, and not just something attributable to the surrounding political context.
Whereas previously the 'dependence' on Westminster politics drained Scotland of its
self-belief and sense of responsibility (situational attribution), the belief in democratic
principles is internal to Scotland (dispositional attribution), and not anything that
might have come from above, from years of living under the guiding hand of
Westminster (which would be a situational attribution). This particular dispositional
bias is another element of the so-called Scottish myth: 'Alongside the lad o'pairts
stereotype sat a belief in the inherent democracy of Scottish society' (McCrone
2001a:98).
Small is beautiful? Another topic that is present often is the smallness on Scotland:
... the Scottish Assembly will be an intimate parliament and the modest
symbol of a small nation hesitantly finding its soul again. (SCOT230279)
Ireland is an encouraging example of a small nation prospering in the EEC.
(SCOT110379)
... in the end of the day support for devolution depends not on calculation but
on faith and hope in the future of a small nation whose character has
undergone a quickening process of erosion. (SCOT030379)
The real question - whether we still believe in the power of government to
create an inclusive civic culture which can, with vision and determination,
enhance a small country's performance and improve the lives of its people -
goes on begging for an answer. (HERA200897)
The first extract uses words like 'intimate', 'small', 'modest' and 'soul' to generate a
feeling of unity and consensus. The third extract also implies that Scotland is
confused and in doubt, with a 'character' that is eroding. As in many places
elsewhere, Scotland is anthropomorphised and attributed human traits, a 'character', a
rhetorical assimilation strategy that implies 'intra-national sameness' (Wodak et al.
1999:44).
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7.3. Discursive construction of homo externus
As explained in Chapter 2, identity is 'operative only dialectically, i.e. in connection
with its opposite, otherness' (Therborn 1995:229). Therefore, the media constructs
two identities simultaneously. In parallel to the discursive construction of homo
Scotus, the media engage in the discursive construction of the Other(s). This process
is somewhat more complex, and two aspects can be identified. First there is the
element of identifying the homo nationalis in relation to the Other, or rhetorical
strategy of differentiation and assimilation. This differentiation does not always have
to be negative, as discussed earlier (see the positive/negative typology in Chapter 2).
This positive/negative othering is complemented by the attempt to attribute identities
to the Other. Just as the homo nationalis is given an identity and character though
discourse, the homo externus is described in similar terms.
7.3.1. England and the English
The Englishman and the Scot have long served as one another's alter ego.
Karl Miller, Doubles
For illustration, consider the recent book Being Scottish, edited by Devine & Logue
(2002). Although not an academic analysis, it gives a snapshot of people's definitions
of Scottishness. Both in the editors' introduction, and throughout the different
personal statements of Scottishness, we come across the issue of the Other. More
often that not, the Other is defined as (the) English. Here are just few examples:
• 'Do contemporary Scots define themselves more or less against the English or the
British?' (editors, p. xi)
• 'I do not know if this desire for independence is more marked among Scots due to
the size of our country compared to our imposing big brother to the south' (Euan
Baird, p. 12)
• 'Perhaps being Scottish is simply not being English' (Sheila Brock, p. 34)
• 'People all around the world love us because we are crap and we just can't see it.
Second rate, second best, second fiddle, at least what we've been told. No threat to
anyone and definitely NOT ENGLISH' (Owen Campbell, p. 51, original
emphasis)
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• 'Seven years old, steaming slowly, in an overheated classroom, white-knuckling
my ruler, I discovered what shilpit, peelie-wally beasts the English were. They
apparently cheated at Culloden. At everything they won, in fact' (Isla Dewar, p.
63)
As we can see, occasionally Scottish people start defining who they are by stating
who they are not - the English. Often 'being Scottish is simply a device for not being
English' (McCrone 2001a: 149; see also McCrone et al. 1999:167-171). This negative
othering of the English has a long pedigree. The 1320 Declaration of Arbroath is
strong in its anti-English sentiments, stating that 'for as long a hundred of us remain
alive, we will never on any conditions be subjected to the lordship of the English'. Of
course, modernist nationalism scholars would argue against nationalist interpretations
of such distant past. However,
Although it is a much more difficult task to know what the thirteenth-century
peasant made of being Scottish, the historical consensus does seem to be that
at least the 'middling folk' and foot soldiers of Scotland at the time certainly
made something of it. The concept of the 'community of the realm' -
communitas regni - appears to have been a sufficiently understood concept to
rally the nation against the English foe, just as there is support for the
existence of 'national' consciousness in England in the Middle Ages
(Greenfeld 1992). In short, the conditions for generating national awareness
contra the 'other' were surely there for Scotland and England in the context of
each other. (McCrone 200la: 156)
The availability of England as the Other for generating national awareness in Scotland
has been deployed by various 'architects of nationalism' in Scotland, be they
politicians, media, intelligentsia or other. Whether the aim is to 'defend the Scottish
tradition from the threat of anglicisation' (Devine 1999:391), or to narcissistically
emphasise the differences between the two national communities while they are
growing more similar (McCrone 2001a: 102-103), nationalism in Scotland has been
conceptually opposed to England (Hearn 2000:39).
7.3.1.1. The English in Scotland
There is a considerable English community in Scotland. The 2001 census revealed
that 8.1 per cent of the population in Scotland were born in England. However, in the
discourse of othering the English are usually referred to as the people 'south of the
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Border', as an external Other. This is, in itself fascinating - 'the English' are faceless,
external, and not the 'English in Scotland'. Murray Watson writes:
One of the most extraordinary omissions from Scottish historiography is a
comprehensive and rigorous study of the impact of English-born migrants in
Scotland. Paradoxically, the relationship between England and Scotland is a
theme that constantly attracts the interests of historians. Yet, apart from
isolated citations, English-born migrants, who form one of the largest migrant
communities in Scottish history, have remained invisible from serious
historical study. (2002:23)
So despite the 'clear evidence that English migration into Scotland contributed to
Scottish economy and social development in the twentieth century' and already 'by
1921 the English had overtaken the Irish as the largest migrant group in Scotland'
(Watson 2002:24), the immigrant English and their descendants remain the external
Other and the 'English in Scotland' remain somewhat overlooked (Watson 2002;
Mcintosh et al. 2004).
As stated, the category 'English' usually denotes the English 'south of the Border'.
There were few exceptions though. The Herald editorial of 29th August 1997
discussed the claimed increase of anti-English racism in Scotland, accompanied by an
editorial cartoon depicting an elderly English couple.
Racism in Scotland: Attacks on English a disgrace
Racism is a hateful thing, the refuge of the ignorant and the weak-minded. It
bends truth, breaks hearts and, as we show conclusively this morning, it is
alive and flourishing in Scotland.
[.-]
And so we come to the Scots, a mongrel group if ever there was one. It is not
surprising that there is some anti-English feeling in Scotland because there is
a tradition of such behaviour. Typically, it is not found in feelings of
superiority but in rage at perceived inferiority; that English people have
bought our homes, taken our jobs and run our district and community
councils; that Edward may have been sent home to think again but that
ultimately his lot won. Much of this sort of feeling ignores the fact that
incomers bring life, energy, and economic investment with them. Many a
resentful little community in the west or north-east of Scotland would be a
good deal more impoverished today if incomers from England, or wherever,
had not kept the local shop going and built their extensions and patios with
local builders. There is another side to the coin. Anyone moving into an area
has a duty rooted in common sense to behave with sensitivity. Sadly, there
are those with loud voices from all over Britain who are unaware that
listening and learning is often more important than delivering one's own
opinion.
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It is disgraceful that racist attacks on English residents in Scotland are
growing. Current events have brought politics into the issue with fears that
matters will grow worse under a devolved Scottish parliament. We earnestly
believe such opinions to be wrong. If anything, a parliament should act as a
liberating effect on Scots, raising trampled dignity (whether correctly or not)
and removing the resentment of others telling us what to do. We should
remember that hundreds of thousands of English people will vote in the
referendum and that many, we hope, will serve as Members of the
Scottish parliament. Honourable Scottish politicians, and that includes the
leadership of the SNP, will have no truck with anti-English behaviour. All of
us must combat it energetically for it is not a problem for a few but for our
community as a whole. (HERA290897)
The above extract is revealing for a number of reasons. The first paragraph is very
emotional and colourful (hateful, ignorant, weak-minded, bends truth, breaks hearts).
It uses a life metaphor (alive and flourishing) when talking about racism in Scotland.
It then continues with a downplaying/trivialisation strategy by stating that 'there is
some anti-English feeling in Scotland', and consequently the majority of the Scots are
not anti-English. The statement that typically anti-Englishness 'is not found in
feelings of superiority but in rage at perceived inferiority,' can be interpreted as
justification strategy. More specifically, a strategy of scapegoating or victim-
perpetrator inversion is used to show that Scots do not consider themselves superior
(which would be considered arrogant), but dislike the English because the Scots
perceive themselves inferior to the English (in which case the dislike of English is
justified, using a strategy of situational attribution). One can trace a weak sense of
national identity here - implying that strong, confident Scots would not be racist. The
English have brought on this dislike themselves: they have been 'trampling' the
Scottish dignity and have been telling 'us', i.e. the Scots, what to do, which is
resented by the Scots. Although the English are not named in the 'Anyone moving
into an area has a duty rooted in common sense to behave with sensitivity' context, it
is hinted that the English have been insensitive and have not followed common sense.
Again, the strategy of victim-perpetrator inversion is used.35
35 The second paragraph also contains a negative othering of the Highlands: 'many a resentful little
community in the west or north-east of Scotland'.
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Cartoon 51. Caption: 'I can't understand it ... after all we've done for them.' Published in the Herald
on 29 August 1997
Also, the use of the ironic cartoon next the leader article above undermines the leader
article. Together with the cartoon, 'the English' are shown as ignorant and stupid, and
the blame is laid with the English. Although this is done in the article in a more
implicit way, the ironic depiction of the ignorant older English couple on the cartoon
makes this 'hidden' message more explicit and clear.
Here is another instance of discussing the English in Scotland, this time from the
Scotsman:
Several answers can be offered. One is that Scottish talent has long drained
southwards. An Edinburgh parliament might be a step towards reversing the
trend. Secondly, it is the simple truth that an increasing number of English
people are choosing to live and work in Scotland. We have assets they
recognise, in other words, and these can and should be developed.
(SCOT090997)
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It is worth noting here, how the English, although (thinking of) living in Scotland, are
still contrasted to the Scottish 'us': 'We have assets they recognise,' states the leader
article. Generally, though, when the English are mentioned in the media, it is in
relation to the English in England, not in Scotland. Above examples are exceptional
and not the norm. Even on the following cartoon, 'being extra nice to the English' is
again, part of foreign or 'furrin' affairs:
7.3.1.2. England / The English in England
The English are othered in many different ways in the media discourse. Sometimes
they are singled out as the source of all evil. Sometimes they are used in a neutral (at
least explicitly) comparison. And on rare occasions, the English are used as a positive
reference point. The English and England are used interchangeably in the media and
in this thesis. Firstly, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between them in the
media discourse, and secondly, one is often used metonymically to mean the other,
i.e. often 'England' is used to mean the people of England, and vice versa.
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To start with, here are the references to the positive English Other. Here are two
extracts that situate Scotland and England in the Union:
The Union was a political work of genius, which for more than 250 years has
conferred incalculable benefits on both Scotland and England. Scotland
especially benefited. (HERA260279)
England is used as an equal Other, a partner in the Union. The extract emphasises the
benefits of the Union, especially to Scotland, and the next extract is in many ways
similar:
Let us take as a premise that it is desirable to sustain the unity of the United
Kingdom. Indeed, our close and cousinly links with the English, our
affection for them and respect for their culture, the degree of domestic,
social and economic intercourse between us - these facts make separatism (a
pejorative word for independence) unthinkable. (SCOT230279)
Note that it is the intercourse between the Scots and English that is the focus of
attention. It is not the English as such that are positive, but the relationship between
'us', the Scots, and 'them', the English. It is Scotland, who does all the positive
actions - it is emphasised that Scotland feels affection and has respect for them, the
English - fitting neatly into the scheme of positive ingroup description. Note that the
leader writer uses the term 'English' here - and not England. The first is a collective
and implicitly national body of people, the second a more neutral geographical
reference. A powerful family metaphor is used to imply homogeneity between the two
nations. Scotland and England are cousins. Reicher and Hopkins (2001:96) write
family metaphors are popular and widely used in describing the relations between
Scotland and England, especially by the unionists.
Secondly, the English are used in the discursive construction of Scottishness as the
negative Other. The media try 'to show how they sustain a dialectic which configures
to present Scotland as a separate nation, and, crucially, quite unlike its southern
neighbour' (McCrone 200la:80). This is done through the negative othering of the
English. The following extract starts by negative othering, then throws in a small
compliment to some English, before continuing with negative description of 'the
English' again:
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All of this presents real problems to those campaigning on both sides but,
despite the blood-curdling threats of the disintegration of the United Kingdom
and the quite stunning displays of ignorance by some English
commentators, who misunderstood the entire devolution issue to the
extent that they were happy to describe devolution as splitting Scotland
from England, the Scottish experience has been a happy one. This applies not
just to the result but also to the relationship with England which has been
amicable and beneficial to both nations. The English, by and large, have
shown great maturity and sense about the issue of devolution in Scotland
and now in Wales. Hopefully it will lead them to explore more meaningful
and fruitful methods of government for themselves. They, and we, will
undertake this task as part of a United Kingdom where the constituent nations
contribute equitably and control their own essential national functions. That
is the way of the future, here, in Wales, and hopefully in England.
(HERA 160997)
Firstly, note again that it is the relationship between England and Scotland that has
been amicable and beneficial, i.e. Scotland has contributed to that, as relationship
always has two sides to it. Thus while complimenting the English, Scotland is also
complimenting itself. Secondly, mitigation strategy is used in stating that it is only
some English (by and large) who have shown maturity and sense in regards to
devolution. Thus it is by no means all English that have acted in such positive way.
Again, the positive properties of the outgroup are mitigated and downplayed as part of
the polarisation strategy. And thirdly, although referring to England in the context of
an amicable and beneficial relationship, the extract is still clearly othering the latter -
contrasting the Scottish 'we' to the English 'them'
Of course, one can argue that the above extract refers to the minority. Indeed, the
beginning of the extract does so explicitly. What an average reader of the above
editorial will remember later cannot be known, but it is not unreasonable to suggest
that all he or she could recall is that the English are ignorant about the real nature of
devolution in Scotland. This statement is followed by one of the rare complimentary
descriptions of the English (discussed on the previous page). However, the tone of
that extract is rather patronising. It is only some English who have climbed above
their more typical (?) childish behaviour and shown 'maturity and sense' - again,
mitigation is used as a means of strategy of polarisation. The Scots 'hope' that the
English will learn from 'us' (i.e. Scots) and inspired by the Scots will go and 'explore
more meaningful and fruitful methods of government'. Although the editorial nods
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approvingly towards the few mature English that understand devolution, the tone of
the article leads to speculation that this might be just out of politeness of the Herald
leader writer. Of course, the suggestion that devolved Scotland should be the green
light for constitutional reform in England is not rare, and this topos will be discussed
later.
While being negatively othered in the media, the English are sometimes (unduly)
blamed for the ills of Westminster. Technically, of course, Westminster is a UK
institution, and not English36. But there are a number of examples that can be
described as so-called mixed-proxy cases. In a leader article Agenda for Assembly.
Educational stimulus, the differences between Scotland and England, as represented
in their different educational systems, are systematically evoked. The transformation
strategy is used in the editorial in order to emphasise the uniqueness of Scotland
(assimilation strategy), and the difference of England (dissimilation strategy).
Furthermore, England is construed as a threat, as a reason behind the current problems
in Scotland:
Scotland has its own educational system. But the important decisions (school-
leaving age, comprehensive structure, etc.) are taken elsewhere, and pressure
for assimilation with the larger English system is a pervasive force.
(SCOT080279)
In a similar vein to the "Scottish f Conservative = English" equation (discussed later),
'Westminster' is described as English. The reliance on external 'elsewhere' is
criticised, and the used of 'pressure for assimilation' indicates an element of
aggression here. The leader article informs about and warns against English
heteronomy. The Scottish education system is used as a particularising synecdoche,
i.e. as part for whole (pars pro toto) (Wodak et al. 1999:44). Although the leader
article mentions only the Scottish education system in referring to the fact that
Scotland cannot take any significant decisions in that particular area of decision¬
making, as these are taken 'elsewhere', i.e. in England; the assumption behind the
article is that 'the assimilation with the larger English system is a pervasive force' is a
metaphor that represents other areas of Scottish everyday life as well. Scotland needs
its own assembly in order to escape this assimilation. The next extract is similar:
36 The Westminster Other is described later in the context of the British Other.
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The propagandists who make the most noise about the Scotland Act's
unfairness to the English [...] are not usually to be found complaining about
the all-round unfairness which their precious electoral system inflicts upon
voters throughout Britain. (SCQT050279)
As it is the English propagandists who 'make the most noise' about the unfair
proposed legislation, it is also 'them' whose 'precious electoral system' inflicts
unfairness on the Scots (note the ironic use of 'precious'). The following extract is
also critical of the English politicians:
Far too much has been made of the West Lothian question. The idea of Scots
MPs decisively affecting English questions should not unduly surprise a
Parliament which for years has loaded Scottish committees with English
MPs (who regard this task as a Parliamentary Siberia) so that they reflect
the composition of the whole House. (SCOT230279)
The use of verb 'loaded' is revealing, because of its negative connotations. The claim
that English MPs have regarded discussing Scottish issues 'as a Parliamentary
Siberia' implies just how remote and unwelcome this must have seemed to the
English MPs. The implication is that the English MPs did not care and were not
interested in Scottish issues, but routinely affected them 'decisively'.
And last, but not least, let us look at the neutral comparisons. Although the English in
those occasions are neither positively or negatively othered, they are used as the Other
nevertheless. This is probably the most common use of the Other. Subtly and banally,
the media suggest that these comparisons between Scotland and England are
important. Those banal references to England imply that it is important to show where
Scotland stands in relation to England, and how these two compare. Here are few
examples:
Housing is a pivotal issue in Scottish politics. Last year 54 per cent of homes
were rented in the public sector, compared with 32 per cent in the United
Kingdom and 30 per cent in England. (SCOT 140279)
Its population of prisoners is too high; overcrowding is not as bad as in
England and is believed by officials to be not yet acute except in one or two
prisons, but has been described by the staff association as "diabolical".
(SCOT160279)
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The future of the Health Service has been engaging the attention of a Royal
Commission, and the major parties seem committed to a further reorganisation
in England. It may be said, without complacency, that the structure of the
Health Service in Scotland is simpler and better and not obviously in need
of another shake-up. (SCOT130279)
Above extracts are similar to some of the extracts about Wales (discussed later).
England is used as a reference point to show Scotland itself in a more positive light
(especially in the last two extracts). The following extract compares Scotland and
England, but as Scotland comes out slightly worse in the comparison (its health
expenditure is higher), then a justifying clause is used:
Health expenditure is higher per head in Scotland than England, but this
merely reflects greater need and a higher incidence of illnesses and not
specially benevolent treatment by Westminster. (SCOT130279)
To avoid showing Westminster in a positive light, the article uses mitigation strategy
by casting doubt on the benevolent nature of Westminster treatment. Discussion about
Scots law is also tied up with the Self/Other dialectic:
Like a noble but gruesomely tattered old plaid the fabric of Scots law has
grown threadbare over the last 270 years. Holes gape in areas of social
concern which Stair never thought of. Discordant patches show where London
legislation - on contract and obligation, for instance - has been stitched into a
roughly Scottish form.
[...]
This is an ambitious programme. But we are now at a turning-point, where
either Scots law is rescued and modernised or the case for simply abandoning
it and going over to the English pattern becomes difficult to rebut.
(SCOT120279)
Later in the chapter, the concept of 'wandering we' is discussed. Here it is interesting
to note again, how the proxies of England and 'London' are used interchangeably in
the above extract. First the article complains about the effects of London legislation
on Scots law, but then continues with the criticism of the negative effect of the
'English pattern' on the fabric of Scots law.
The next extract tries to conceptualise the 'right' kind of devolution:
If a sense of nationhood was a strong component in the Scottish decision, and
if a lack of that particular sense was an element in the wobbly Welsh decision,
what on earth will be the catalyst, the defining element in the push by some
of the English regions for a form of devolution of their own? Obviously there
cannot be a London or a north-east nationhood. Are we being too sniffy in
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wondering whether a conglomeration of purely economic reasons is sufficient
for a degree of devolution which is in any way meaningful? Perhaps we are.






















The 'what on earth' in the first half of the extract is casting serious doubt on the
ability of England on the whole, or some English regions, to attain some form of
devolution. The chances of devolution happening in England are deemed to be very
unlikely, and the leader article simply cannot see any devolution coming from
anywhere (with)in England. Hence the above extract is suggesting that the only
meaningful reason for devolution is national, i.e. like in Scotland. Purely economic or
any other non-national conglomeration is possibly not good enough.
" Emergency! Mora devolutiantttt are on tlig wtiyeRt
Cartoon 145. Published in The Sun on 27 November 1975
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Again, the next extract does not distinguish between the English influence and
Westminster influence:
The deferential philosophy of dependence on English largesse attacks the
qualities of enterprise, invention and self-reliance in which we once took
pride. Dependence is in any case something of a myth, though a powerful one.
(SCOT230279)
Although it is the English largesse that is seen as dangerous to the Scots character, it
is Westminster that the extract is really talking about.
But of course, manifestly 'neutral' and banal references to England are not always as
innocent. For example, there were a number of articles hinting that the English, too,
should reform their way of government.
If the Assembly casts new light on some obscure but important areas of
Scottish affairs, it will do Scotland a service and perhaps also inspire the
English to look for reform of their own system of government.
(SCOT050279)
But might not the English themselves be gratified to get a measure of
Home Rule as a result of Scottish devolution? And might not their
appetite for constitutional change be whetted? (SCOT220279)
It means regaining responsibility for matters which a mature people ordinarily
decide for themselves, whilst co-operating with our neighbours in common
concerns. Devolution is part of a wider movement against centralisation
working elsewhere in Europe and which may eventually affect English
regions. (SCOTO10379)
But we trust the Welsh will be similarly bold and decisive in their referendum,
endorsing Mr Blair's determination to scrap big government. If they do so, the
English regions might follow. (HERA 130997)
All above extracts suggest that the English need to reform their own system of
government. The 'perhaps' the first extract is curious - it almost casts doubt on the
ability of the English to recognise the (obvious) need for reform. Although the
English and their 'perhaps inspiration' for constitutional reform are mentioned only in
passing, the sentence is more loaded than is obvious maybe in the first place.
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7.3.1.3. The 'English' Conservatives
I discuss the Conservatives as a sub-category of the English Other. Part of the
negative othering of the Tories is due to the fact that the Scots see themselves as
'moderately more left-wing than those in the rest of Britain as a whole' (Hearn
2000:3). The Tories are claimed to be inherently alien to the Scots. For example, the
Scottish novelist William Mcllvanney in his 1994 speech 'invokes a national identity
historically rooted in egalitarian values, and opposed ... to the values of the
Conservative Party and the unbridled free market' (Hearn 2000:1). National identity
and political values are connected, writes McCrone, and 'to say that one is Scottish is
to say that one has left-of-centre values' (2001a:27,l 14). Consequently, right-of-
centre views are associated with being English. Although the 'national political
values' of the Scots may not be so different from the Welsh and northern England,
'these values in Scotland have become closely associated with national identity'
(Hearn 2000:3). As a result, anything or anyone who opposes those 'Scottish political
values' becomes a negative Other. As McCrone writes,
the Conservatives in Scotland in the 1980s were genuinely perplexed that they
had failed to mobilise what they saw as 'Scottish' values of thrift, hard work
and enterprise. Their problem was that the Thatcherite project was largely
perceived as an alien, an English, political creed, north of the border, and not
an expression of indigenous Scottish values. (2001a:51)
The above quotation (my emphasis) shows the curious equalising of Englishness and
Conservatism. Eric Hobsbawm explained this by saying that 'the proxies had got
mixed up, that being 'English' and 'Conservative' had somehow become entangled'
(McCrone 2001a: 149), as is hinted in the next two leader article extracts. Both the
extracts are from 1997 devolution referendum, and are both referring to the (Scottish)
Conservatives as the 'English' party:
BARONESS Thatcher has better reason than most to understand why home
rule is an issue. She it was who destroyed the Tories' rational attachment to
devolution when she assumed the party leadership. She it was, as prime
minister, who did more to alienate Scotland from Westminster government
than any other prime minister. In the end, indeed, Thatcherism induced
many Scots to believe the Conservatives were simply an 'English' party.
(SCOT090997)
However, the slide towards separation will become inexorable unless one
significant group of people gets its act together quickly. This group is the
Scottish Tories. They have a vitally important role to play in this new game of
ours. It is difficult to believe that they will remain in such close association
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with the party which shares their name in England and it surely cannot be
much longer before they accept that devolution for Scotland must mean that as
a party they, too, must start thinking for themselves.
The referendum result gives them the opportunity to shake off the tag they
have borne so long as 'the English party' and offers them the chance to play
a real role in the public life of this country. The preservation of the Union, the
retention of the links with the rest of the United Kingdom, the rejection of the
spurious claims of the nationalists, will all give them a new credo for playing a
full and active part in the new parliament.
However, to do it they must make themselves an identifiably Scottish
party. They must kick out their present leadership and seek to galvanise a
mass membership by offering genuine democratic structures. The leader of the
Scottish Conservatives, or whatever they call themselves, must be elected on
the basis of one member, one vote. They must consult their members widely in
the formulation of policy. That way they will attract the calibre of person who
can make the necessary contribution to the maintenance of the Union and the
effective working of the parliament. (SCOT150997)
If we look at the use of personal deixis 'we' in the last extract, the Scottish Tories,
however Scottish, are still 'they'. 'They' have to learn how to take part in this 'new
game of ours'. Although the Scottish Tories are geographically located in Scotland,
they are still not really 'Scottish', and definitely remain too tarnished with being
'English'. Of course, the Conservatives are not without supporters in Scotland. Even
at the 1997 General Election, when the Tories failed to return a single Scottish MP to
Westminster, they did gain almost one fifth of the votes in Scotland (Brown et al.
1998:154). The Scotsman commented on this 'dogged' support to the Tories day
before the 1997 referendum:
If, like us, you favour a double 'Yes' this might not seem to matter. If you also
favour a parliament representing all of Scotland, however, this Tory collapse is
troubling. Do these inept remnants seriously propose to represent the one
in five voters who remain doggedly loyal to Conservatism? If so, they have
betrayed that support by their incompetence. If not, the 'No' campaign has
been the last feeble throw in a game that was lost from the start.
(SCOT 100997)
At the first elections to the new Scottish Parliament in 1999, the Tories gained 17.5
per cent of the vote and 16 list MSPs. At the second elections in 2003, the Tories'
share of votes was 16.5 per cent, and they currently have 18 MSPs at Holyrood,
including one constituency MSP (David McLetchie, Edinburgh Pentlands). However,
for the purposes of discursive construction of Scottishness, the Tories are an alien, a
negative internal Other, even when talking about the Scottish Tories.
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7.3.2. Wales
Wales is an interesting case in the Scottish media. Although both Wales and Scotland
held devolution referenda in 1979 and 1997, there were just a few references to Wales
in Scottish national broadsheets in 1979. On one occasion the Welsh icon of leek was
referred to in the context of negative othering of the European Economic Community:
The EEC is undoubtedly an object of popular hostility, a fact to which the
Brussels bureaucrats insensitively contribute with inane attempts to apply





Cartoon 192, Published in the Sunday Telegraph on 15 November 1998
The other two references to Wales were from the post-referendum period and
mentioned health problems of some Welsh quarrymen (SCOT230379; SCOT240379)
and how that might influence the way the Welsh MPs vote at the looming vote of no
confidence in Westminster. One cartoon in a British Conservative broadsheet depicted
a Welsh nationalist (on the right), a Scots nationalist (on the left, wearing a kilt) and
Michael Foot (in the middle) stirring the devolution pot. The image of three witches
creating trouble aims to warn the readers about the dangers related to devolution in
Scotland and Wales:
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Cartoon 16. Caption: 'Double, double toil and trouble; Fire burn, and cauldron bubble'. Published in
Daily Telegraph on 27 February 1979
Overall, the references to Wales in 1979 are few. In 1997, Wales figures slightly more
often in the Scottish media. Three discursive strands can be identified in relation to
Wales. I call them the non-Other, Celtic sibling and Weak Wales.
The non-Other
There are instances where one could expect references to Wales, but they did not
happen. To say it bluntly, Wales is the non-Other, a non-entity. The 'nothingness' of
Wales can be seen in the following two extracts, for example:
The Assembly is the first stage in the journey towards a place for Scotland
in the modern world, a small country living in close intercourse with its
cousin England; and it is a step from which we must not shrink.
(SCOT230279)
What other nation has its own legal system but cannot make its own laws?
What other people is so conscious of its identity and yet cannot express
identity through its political institutions? [...] [Scotland is] one nation in
partnership with its neighbour, sharing much, but a nation nevertheless.
(SCOT080997)
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Note how according to above extracts, Scotland lives in partnership with one Other
only. Sometimes the media suggest that the residual part of the UK, if you take out
Scotland, is England. In the first extract, a family metaphor of the cousin is used, and
the only cousin that Scotland has is England. The second extract implies that Scotland
only has one neighbour, England. Of course, Scotland does not share land border with
Wales, and Wales' role in the Union differs. But both Scotland and Wales were
campaigning for devolution and one could expect more 'sympathy' towards Wales
from Scotland. The invisibility of Wales in the Scottish media discourse is noticeable,
especially in comparison to England.
Celtic sibling
Here Wales is used as neutral reference point. The message is that devolution is
happening in Scotland, and it is happening in Wales.
Devolution is, or is supposed to be, a flagship policy. Neither is it exclusively
Scottish, for the Welsh will have their assembly ... (HERA280897)
This is a neutral extract, which draws readers' attention to the fact that Scotland is not
the only place where devolution is happening, as the Welsh are preparing for a
referendum as well. The next extract is also of the neutral kind:
The Welsh split
The people of Wales are next in line to face up to the responsibilities of taking
part in the constitutional improvement of the United Kingdom. Whether they
will embrace the opportunity of gaining an executive assembly is obviously
unknowable at the moment. We will understand some of the processes at
work in Wales better this morning when it will be possible to analyse a major
opinion poll taken in the aftermath of the double-yes vote in Scotland. Those
in Wales who object to the formation of the executive assembly clearly expect
that there will be a knock-on effect from the events of last Thursday but, just
as the constitutional changes proposed for Wales are different from those
in Scotland, a number of the attitudes involved are also different.
(HERA160997)
However, the headline (The Welsh split) sets the tone in the beginning, indicating that
the Welsh are not as unanimous in facing up to the responsibilities. This is done in
opposition to Scots, who have already faced up to such responsibilities of improving
the United Kingdom. The last sentence, especially, is casting doubt on the ability of
the Welsh to face devolution with similar enthusiasm as the Scots did just few days
earlier. This takes us to the next topos - that of the weak Wales.
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Weak Wales versus Strong Scotland
Finally, there is Wales as the negative Other that is smartly used to 'hype up'
Scotland, to show Scotland in better light. By drawing the reader's attention to the
weakness of the Welsh, the strengths of Scotland can be highlighted. For example:
But we trust the Welsh will be similarly bold and decisive in their
referendum, endorsing Mr Blair's determination to scrap big government.
(HERA130997)
By stating what 'we' [the Herald, the Scots?] expect from the Welsh, the editorial is
stating that Scots have been bold and decisive in their referendum. Although the
extract is not negative towards the Welsh, the tone is very patronising ("we' trust').
The following three extracts do the same, but in a less subtle way. They clearly
describe the Scots in a positive light, and then doubt whether the Welsh can live up to
it:
Despite that, the vote in Scotland showed a heartening level of agreement
right across the country. It is unlikely that the same can be said about
Wales because there is a very evident split between the poorer north and more
affluent and Anglicised south. (HERA160997)
The concept of the settled will of the people may surely be applied to
constitutional reform in Scotland with confidence. In Wales it seems it
requires a good deal of bolstering and determined tweaking if it is to be
used at all. (HERA200997)
Wales seems to lack both the sense of identity and the appetite for such a
project. Labour's apparent belief that devolved power can be offered around
to anyone who might be persuaded to want it thus no longer seems tenable.
(SCOT200997)
According to the first extract, the Scots showed 'a heartening level of agreement right
across the country'. The editorial continues by stating that this is something the Welsh
are unlikely to do. The second extract confidently states that the 'settled will of the
people' in Scotland was expressed on September 11th. Wales does not qualify though
- similar statement in Wales would need 'a good deal of bolstering and determined
tweaking.' And maybe, the newspaper ponders, even tickling the Dragon's belly is not
enough?
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Cartoon 115. Published in The Times on 23 July 1997
The Welsh are simply not as good as the Scots, at least in regard to devolution. And
this comes as no surprise:
The restricted powers for Wales were cast in the way they were because
nobody believed that there was a strong demand for significant political
muscle or the existence of anything approaching a sense of nationhood. It
may be harsh to describe that as a self-fulfilling prophesy but it begins to look
that way.
[...]
If a sense of nationhood was a strong component in the Scottish decision, and
if a lack of that particular sense was an element in the wobbly Welsh
decision (HERA200997)
The Welsh have no sense of nationhood (not even a weak one, not even approaching
such a sense), there was no political muscle to flex on the referendum day in Wales.
The non-nationness of Wales is emphasised by the Scotsman as well in an extract
using transformation strategy:
there is a difference between a nation and a principality. It is now
established beyond doubt that Scotland and Wales are different cases. The
point of home rule here was to enable Scotland as a nation to fit more easily
within the United Kingdom. Wales seems to lack both the sense of identity
and the appetite for such a project. (SCOT200997)
The cruel judgement after the poor turnout and indecisive referendum in Wales is that
Wales simply is not a nation, at least not in the way as Scotland is. Wales is only a
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principality, and the latter has no national basis to it37. The extract almost denies the
multinational character of the United Kingdom, apart from England and Scotland, that
is. United Kingdom is bi-national, and the other constituent parts are not national.
Indeed - the Herald wrote few days earlier that
the Scottish experience has been a happy one. This applies not just to the result
but also to the relationship with England which has been amicable and
beneficial to both nations. [...] They, and we, will undertake this task as part
of a United Kingdom where the constituent nations contribute equitably and
control their own essential national functions. (HERA160997)
The following extract begins with a paragraph that could have been copied verbatim
from many an editorial in 1979. But no reference to the 1979 devolution referendum
in Scotland is made there. The 1979 controversial devolution campaign in Scotland
had been replaced with almost consensual campaign in 1997. And the controversial
1979 campaign was all but forgotten. Thus a similar situation in Scottish history is
mitigated, whereas the Welsh one is highlighted and flagged up constantly.
Matters are complicated by the no campaign in Wales which sends out
contradictory messages, damning the prospective assembly on the one hand as
a toothless creation and on the other as likely to hold sufficient powers to lead
to the break-up of the United Kingdom.
The no campaign cannot have it both ways and its temper has not been
improved by the possibility that Scotland's resounding approval will affect
matters in Wales. The intriguing factor in all of this is the proximity on many
levels other than the simply geographical between Wales and England. We
are dealing in generalisations here, and that is always dangerous, but
there does not seem to be the same sense of nationhood in Wales as in
Scotland, despite the fact that the Welsh language is far more widespread
and Welsh culture is strong and thriving. (HERA 160997)
After establishing the unmistaken unanimity of referendum result in Scotland, the end
of the extract is fascinating. It rightly suggests that language and culture do not make
a nation. Although Welsh language is more widespread and Welsh culture strong and
thriving [and in Scotland Gaelic is marginal], there is not a similar sense of
nationhood in Wales as there is in Scotland. What makes it interesting though is the
way how the Scottish newspaper feels it has the right to put down the Welsh feeling
of nationhood. The rhetorical strategy used is characteristic of the so-called racist
discourse. The Herald knows it is dangerous to generalise, and in normal
37 The BBC guide The Changing UK from March 1999 states that BBC 'should never say the
Principality when we mean Wales (except of course when talking about the Prince of Wales'). The
Scottish newspapers have not adopted such guidelines apparently.
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circumstances the leader writers probably would not generalise, but here, in Welsh
case, it seems justified.
Cartoon 79. Published in Independent on Sunday on 14 September 1997.
The cartoon juxtaposes a happily flying Nessie (representing Scotland, wearing a tartan scarf and
waving a Saltire in a plane signed 'Parliament') to the sad-looking dragon (representing Wales) -
whose Assembly-inscribed wings simply aren't strong enough.
As said before, all above extracts are rather patronising in their language. 'We hope'
and 'we trust' the Welsh will do the same [as us, the Scots]. In a situation, where one
would expect a constructive strategy of emphasising similarity (a la the Scots and
Welsh are in the same boat), the strategy of dissimilation prevails in Scottish
broadsheets, as far as Wales is concerned.
Ideologically speaking, these last extracts use once more the strategy of polarisation,
i.e. the strategy of positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation. Wales is
constantly and consistently downgraded, in order to emphasise the positive aspects of
Scotland. As van Dijk says, 'the rhetoric of alliteration; parallelism, or other forms of
repetition serves not only to emphasise negative properties of the Others, but also to
underline the good qualities of Our people' (1993:264). Parallels are drawn to Wales,
and developments in Wales and Scotland are compared, in order to underline the good
qualities of Scotland, and the negative qualities ofWales.
163
7.3.3. Irish/Ireland
Historically, the Irish migrants in Scotland have functioned as a negative internal
Other. A number of Irish migrants arrived in Scotland in late nineteenth and early
twentieth century. As mentioned in Chapter 2, the immigrants often end up as the
negative Other, against whom the identity of a nation is constructed. Hjerm says 'it is
even difficult to see how "others" or immigrants ... could ever be viewed in non-
derogatory way' (Hjerm 1998:5.2). This was the fate of the Irish immigrants,
especially the Irish Catholics, in their early days in Scotland:
The arrival of the Irish exacerbated pressure among a developing urban
proletariat already facing the social dislocations of rapid modernisation, and
Catholic Irish labour was, on occasion, used by employers to depress local
wage levels. These Catholic Irish were often seen as more than simply
economic rivals: many viewed them as a root cause of many social evils.
Integration would have been difficult enough, given the differences in speech,
custom and religion which divided them from their new neighbours. (McCrone
2001a: 13)
Although not all Irish immigrants were Catholics, the Catholic Irish were more
'visible,' and thus provided an easier object of othering in the tough economic and
social climate of 1920s and 1930s. This negative othering was occasionally almost
institutionalised, as when the Scottish Presbyterian churches campaigned explicitly
against the Irish:
At a more sinister level, between 1922 and 1938 the Presbyterian Churches
mounted a systematic campaign against Irish immigrants and Roman Catholics
of Irish descent, whom they saw as driving down wages, taking employment
from native Scots and also a major cause of criminality and intemperance.
(Devine 1999:383)
Reverend Duncan Cameron even claimed in late 1920s that 'the Scoto-Irish were an
even more dangerous enemy of the Scots than had been the German Empire in the
Great War!' The 1920s campaign attempting to make the Catholic Irish scapegoats
was unsuccessful (Devine 1999:384), and the negative othering of Scoto-Irish has
since receded. There was no evidence of the Scoto-Irish as negative Other in the
Scottish media discourse in 1979 or 1997. Ireland however, does function as an
external Other for Scotland, and a positive one at that. Ireland and Scotland both
campaigned for Home Rule at the end of the nineteenth century, and Ireland gained
Home Rule in 1922. The Irish Home Rule and consequent independence are often
referred to in discussions about devolution in Scotland. For example:
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Four generations of Scots have debated devolution or Home Rule. In 1879 the
debate concerned the need for a Minister for Scottish Affairs, and eventually,
in 1885, the post of Secretary of State for Scotland was created. Since then,
although Scottish Home Rule Bills always fell by the wayside until 1978, and
the tragic mishandling of Irish Home Rule helped to delay Scottish Home
Rule for more than half a century, there has been a great deal of development
of devolution in the administrative sense. But it falls to the present generation
of Scottish voters to inaugurate political devolution. (SCOT050279)
The postponement, avoidance and side-stepping of Scottish political
devolution have a long history. Liberal Governments between 1885 and 1914
reasonably suggested that Scottish Home Rule should await the settlement of
the more pressing problem of Irish Home Rule - failing to anticipate that
there would be a World War, a loss of Irish patience and no more Liberal
Governments. (SCOT220279)
The first extract, in addition to using Irish Home Rule as a marker, a historically
expanded 'we' is created. Four generations of Scots are linked to the present
generation of Scots.
Here is a reference to Ireland as an example of positive system of government, as
opposed to the negative and unwelcome Westminster system of government.
Whether it will make the most of it remains to be seen, but the assembly will
have an opportunity to learn not merely from the Westminster system of
government, which nowadays tends to be highly regarded only by the
narrowest of its own inhabitants, but from all the other systems from
Scandinavia to Ireland to North America. (SCOT050279)
The above extract is showing Self/Other dialectic in action, e.g. how a negative
othering of Westminster happens in conjunction with a positive othering of Ireland,
Scandinavia and North America. In the context of the EEC/EU, Ireland is the positive
Other, at least for the Scottish Nationalists:
If Mr Callaghan plays the European card, he could find himself trumped by
the Tories, and by the SNP, for whom Ireland is an encouraging example of
a small nation prospering in the EEC. (SCOT 100379)
Ireland is brought as an example of successful and independent small nation
independence in Europe - echoing a similar campaign by the SNP. If Ireland can
prosper in the European Community, then so can Scotland. If Ireland can thrive as a
small independent nation, then so can Scotland. Again, the topos of a small nation is
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raised here. And finally, here is another extract showing the relevance of Ireland for
the Scots:
Indeed we could argue, if our purpose was contention, that these are the two
principal symptoms of the malaise which a parliament should cure: a culture
grown too frightened of taking risks; a people grown too practised at
spectating during the exercise of power. Why should the Scots be any less
responsible, any less able to govern than the Danes or the Irish? (SOS070997)
Again, the small Scottish nation is shown to be equal to the Danes and the Irish, and
thus just as deserving of devolution and self-government, as the Danes and Irish.
7.3.4. Homo Britannicus
Britain is one of the most prominent Others in the discursive construction of
Scottishness in the media. The same strategies are used here as in the construction of
Scottishness. Here is an attempt to characterise Britishness:
there being something fundamentally unacceptable to British notions of
fairness in public debate that one side in this controversy should have three
times as much television exposure as the other. (HERA170279)
In which way can we say that the notion of fairness is particularly British and not
universal? Yet here it is used to characterise 'Britishness'. The following extract
attempts to characterise a sub-section of the Scottish population, namely the business
community:
Where stands Scotland's business community on the devolution fashion
parade?
Distinctively in pin stripes but extremely reluctant to enliven its working
clothes with a dash of tartan. And that is just the disappointingly small
number of business leaders who are prepared to stmt their stuff on the political
catwalk. (HERA220897)
The extract contrasts a Scottish 'dash of tartan' with 'pin stripes', i.e. truly 'Scottish'
businessmen and 'British' businessmen. Although one can debate whether the
pinstripe reference is English or British, in this context it illustrates the way the
Scottish business community fears the loss of the protective and larger British market
in case of devolution. In any case, the Scotland's business community is not truly
Scottish, but Anglo-British.
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Cartoon 59. Published in The Scotsman on 9 September 1997
Another strand of argument is related to the claimed benefits of the Union. This
involves situating Scotland in the UK framework, nesting Scotland in the British
Other. Devolution is not just in the interest of the people of Scotland, but the future of
the whole of Britain depends on the constitutional reform:
It is an instrument for our use, a great opportunity which must not be missed,
not only for the sake of Scotland but also for the health of the British
constitution at large. (SCOT230279)
Devolution is, or is supposed to be, a flagship policy. Neither is it exclusively
Scottish, for the Welsh will have their assembly and the constitutional
reform of the United Kingdom will follow in train. It is, therefore, of the
first importance for the whole of Britain. (HERA280897)
'Why should Scotland have a parliament?' [...] because both Scotland and
Britain need home rule for Scotland. (SCOT080997)
We believe that in Scotland the hopes for future present themselves with
particular clarity and signal the way ahead for Britain as a whole.
(HERA050997)
Britain itself will meanwhile be renewed and the reform of the
constitution advanced. [This is] not trivia. (SCOT110997)
There are many who believed they were voting to end the Union on Thursday.
They need constant reminding that Scotland voted for a parliament which is
still firmly wedded to the United Kingdom. (SCOT1500997)
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And here is another extract from the Herald, one of the two editorials published just a
few days after the death of Princess Diana and before the devolution referendum in
Scotland.
... what has happened to our country and where we go from here. This is a
uniquely difficult question to address. It is unlikely, as we said yesterday, that
there has been a sea-change in the nation from the sort of people who bear
emotion stoically to those who are able to display it publicly; from stiff
upper lip to trembling lower lip.
The people of Britain have always had a deep reservoir of emotion and we
need look no further than the dreadful event at Dunblane38 and the utterly
comprehensible displays of public mourning which followed it to see evidence
of this. Yet we must at least examine the possibility that a change of attitude.
(HERA050997a)
The first paragraph of the above extract ends with characterising the nation - the
British nation, not the Scottish one. The nation in question consists of people who
previously used to 'bear emotion stoically', but now is able to express their emotions
in public; a nation who was previously described by 'stiff upper lip,' and now with
'trembling lower lip'. A change indeed. The second paragraph continues to
characterise the nation. There has been no change, as the nation in question has
always had 'a deep reservoir of emotion'. Interestingly though, the example in this
case is a Scottish one (Dunblane), not a British one. This sea-change in the mood of
the nation and the lip-metaphor was picked up by cartoonist Martin Rowson:
38 On 13 March 1996, a gunman shot dead 16 children and their teacher in Dunblane Primary School in
Scotland.
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Anatomy ci New Britain Htvi It'urr&weU bccwof CARE and
CONCERN
New dewy glmt of NATION'S HOOD
New trebly poet of OPEN EMOT'tCN
New "1 jMb-y'tow- ****




Cartoon 82. Published in the Guardian on 15 September 1997
The cartoon jokes about the 'huggy Britain', 'open emotion' and 'new dewy glint of
nation's mood' - and suggests that Tony Blair PM is using all these changes and
novelties to his political advantage.
7.3.4.1. Westminster
There is another dimension to the British Other - Westminster. It is not just other
nations and states that are evoked as the Other. Wellings (2002:107) suggests that
'political institutions can also be invoked as markers of identity', and indeed, this is
the case in Scotland. Invoking Westminster can be seen as replacing national
categories with populist categories - i.e. it is not necessarily Scotland versus
Westminster, but rather ordinary people versus (distant) politicians. But in the
following section I discuss some of the ways how Westminster is used as the Other in
the media.
The 1979 referendum partially failed, because the No-campaign managed to attach
to the Assembly all the sins which the public associate with central
[Westminster] government. Truly were the sins of the father visited on the
unborn son. (SCOT030379).
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Robert McNeil wrote disappointedly, that despite of high hopes and expectations to
the new Scottish parliament, 'all we get is son of Westminster' (McNeil 2003).
Dissatisfaction with Westminster way of government grew throughout the second half
of the twentieth century and provides a frequent object of othering. Hence
Westminster is often evoked as the Other in the media discourse, as the following
extract from the Scottish tabloid Daily Record reflexively shows:
For the first time in nearly three centuries Scots will be able to make their
political voices heard without shouting down to Westminster and always
blaming Westminster for EVERY damn thing that goes wrong.
(DREC080279)
As the proposed Scottish Assembly or Parliament (in 1979 and 1997 respectively) are
markers of Scottish nationhood, then a non-Scottish institution of a similar kind is
discursively used to mark the Other - the Westminster. Two main themes can be
identified in relation to the Westminster Other. Firstly, there is the issue of democratic
deficit. So-called 'radical democratisation' was one of the three main perspectives in
the devolution campaigns (Hassan and Warhurst 2002). According to this perspective,
being governed by Westminster is undemocratic, as Scotland is mis-, under- and un¬
represented. Secondly, and related to the first one, there is sheer dissatisfaction with
Westminster and its way of government.
Non- and un-representative Westminster?
First, lets us look at claims that Westminster is not properly representing Scottish
opinion. The whole idea of devolution in Scotland was to bring government closer to
the people, and to cater better for Scottish needs and opinion. It is therefore also a
prominent theme in media discourse.
The idea that the Scottish Grand Committee should meet there, that the
Parliament's procedural rules should be changed to make it more
representative of Scottish opinion, have won the widest support.
(SCOT240379)
The greatest danger to the unity of Britain lies in the status quo which meant
that for 18 years Scotland voted in large Labour majorities with a respectable
vote also for the Liberal Democrats and the SNP, only to be governed, election
after election, by Tories. [...] A decent degree of devolution, bringing
responsibility for our own domestic affairs to a Scottish parliament, will
end for good the democratic deficit of the past. The status quo, with its
acceptance of the previous anomalies and its blind misunderstanding of the
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feelings which they raised, holds the real potential for raising the spectre of
separatism. (HERA080997)
The first extract is from a leader article written three weeks after the devolution
referendum in 1979. Though arguing that the Westminster parliament should be
brought into 'sync' with Scottish opinion, the extract is also implying that the current
Westminster Parliament was unrepresentative of Scottish opinion.
Outdated and undemocratic Westminster?
Here is a rather colourful - and condemning - description of what is going on in
Westminster. Once again, Westminster is the negative Other, 'unable' to govern
Scotland properly. Aiming to justify the need for the Scottish Assembly, the leader
blames Westminster for inefficiency and a number of other problems:
The annual negotiations between the Government and the local authorities are
conducted in considerable obscurity, with all the mumbo-jumbo which the
witch-doctors of our complex society pass off as rational analysis:
incantations (advance politicking), spells (equalisation formulae) and
invocations of a deity (the Treasury). At Westminster the legislature, whose
power rests on the financial restraints it may impose on the executive, has for a
long time been unable to exercise sufficient control over public spending,
not to speak of other aspects of Government activity. Westminster is an
institution derived from a more spacious age. Now the flow of
Parliamentary paper overwhelms even the most conscientious MP.
(SCOT090279)
Obviously, the spin-doctors and their 'mumbo-jumbo' did not arrive in Westminster
with the Labour landslide victory in 1997. The outdatedness of Westminster is source
of various media accounts, all tied up with the unsuitability of Westminster as the
governing body of Scotland - and the unsuitability ofWestminster as a role model for
the proposed Scottish legislature.
Many, and probably most, of the Yes voters will have reservations about the
Scotland Act, such as the lack of revenue-raising powers for the Assembly and
the rejection of proportional representation, but still consider that an imperfect
Assembly will be better than no Assembly at all, and that future improvements
can be made in the light of experience, rather than in another prolonged
theoretical discussion by Westminster politicians. (SCOT22Q279)
Westminster politicians are out of touch with people, engaging in 'prolonged
theoretical discussions' about devolution (and probably many other issues). The
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expression 'in another' implies that politicians do that consistently and continuously.
Westminster is ponderously traditional:
With a reasonable-sized workload and civilised working hours, the Assembly
is to be welcomed; it is Westminster which is to be feared for a ponderous
traditionalism that is on a par with that of the trade union movement.
(SCOT050279)
The leader article above uses a transformation strategy. It describes a potential new
form of government, which at the same time is strongly differentiated from the current
British one - from the 'ponderously traditional' Westminster. Westminster MPs are
aware that the current system of government does not suit Scotland, and as they
cannot pretend otherwise, they just keep quiet and avoid confronting and facing that
issue.
As stated, the two strands of argument here are interconnected. Being
unrepresentative of Scotland is not the only problem of Westminster:
Why should Scotland have a parliament? First, because both Scotland and
Britain need home rule for Scotland. The strains placed upon the United
Kingdom have grown steadily in recent years. Scotland has felt government to
be remote, unresponsive and, worst of all, undemocratic. The nature of
Scotland has not been well reflected in the Westminster Parliament. Its needs
have not always been properly met within the crowded legislative
programmes of the Commons. (SCOT080997)
In addition to its unrepresentativness, Westminster is remote, unresponsive and
undemocratic, over-whelmed with legislative programmes and over-strained. These
problems are endemic, and inhibit Westminster from functioning properly and
democratically, and especially restrict its ability to reflect and response to Scotland.
The theme of Westminster having to deal with much more than it is capable of is a
recurrent one:
Parliament's handling of it has provided a most interesting and illuminating
demonstration of Westminster's constitutional conservatism, its reluctance to
surrender even a few of the responsibilities which are too numerous to be
handled effectively, and its remoteness from Scottish opinion. In the past
century of intermittent debate about devolution, the burdens of government
have multiplied enormously, and the Civil Service, including the devolved
Scottish branches of it, has grown and grown. But there are a deplorably
large number of MPs who cling to all-round authority (such as it is) for
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Westminster, even if it is manifestly failing to keep proper watch over
bureaucracy. (SCOT050279)
The Assembly has the power to make itself a considerable force for good in
Scottish life [...] the Assembly will be able to debate the issues with a
thoroughness beyond the capacities of Westminster. Its recent reform of the
Scottish divorce laws has left the process still more cumbersome and
expensive than was intended. (SCOT070279)
The power to shape our educational system should be a particularly valuable
product of devolution. Here, if anywhere, we need to regain the sense of
responsibility and enthusiasm which mature people get from making their own
decisions and not living under the tutelage of policy-makers preoccupied
with other problems. (SCOT080279)
One of the Assembly's contributions will be to subject spending programmes,
and therefore the policies underlying them, to a much greater degree of
examination than is now possible. (SCOT090279)
Secondly, there are many individual ideas crying out for attention: a new
bankruptcy code, a reform of warrant sales and of sheriffs officers, a revised
code of evidence, a reform of criminal appeals, an updating of family law, and
so on. Such changes may wait for years in the Westminster queue. But an
Assembly is designed to act promptly and with understanding on
precisely such matters. (SCOT 120279)
The break-up of Britain is hypothetical and improbable; the malfunctioning
of the centralised, cluttered Westminster system of government is not
hypothetical at all. The Scottish Assembly ought to command itself to
moderate, practical people who desire to improve the system of governing
Scotland and the UK. (SCOT220279)
All above extracts suggest that Westminster has taken on too much, and cannot cope
with the issues that concern Scotland in a satisfactory manner. The third extract ties to
establish the paternalistic approach for governance in Scotland, as adopted by the
government in London. Scots are a 'mature people' and should not live under the
'tutelage' of policy-makers who are not interested in solving the problems in
Scotland. The sixth extract emphasises that while Westminster is malfunctional,
centralised and cluttered, a Scottish Assembly would be moderate and practical,
aiming to improve the governing of Scotland AND the United Kingdom. Once again
the topos of devolution being good not just for Scotland, but for the whole of Britain,
is evoked. In all these extracts/Westminster is a negative foil, the Other, from whom
the new Scottish political body would be different. The Scottish assembly would be
uncluttered, prompt, understanding, thorough, effective, and keep proper watch over
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bureaucracy. It was therefore of necessity that devolution in Scotland would take
place, as the Assembly could considerably improve on the matter. The proposed
assembly would spend more time on discussing policies relevant for Scotland. And it
would consult the people of Scotland while doing so - again something that is not
done in Westminster:
It is also open to the Assembly to make a break with the Westminster
tradition, according to which the Government after consulting interested
parties presents the legislature with what it hopes is a fait accompli; instead the
Assembly, if it chooses, will be able thoroughly to debate issues before
legislation is contemplated or drafted. (SCQT070279)
As we know, the new Scottish Parliament prides itself for its extensive civic
consultative process, which was one of the main criteria proposed by the Consultative
Steering Committee.
Bridging the two strands of arguments - Westminster is non-representative of
Scotland and the Westminster system is outdated - are the arguments that illustrate the
outdated nature of Westminster manners through their (non-)dealing with devolution
issue.
The way in which Westminster, timidly, tediously and belatedly, tackled the
matter of Scottish devolution demonstrated once again the unsatisfactory
state of the UK Parliament. When silence and unresponsiveness, which
worked well enough for the Unionists at the time of the Covenant in 1949,
became inadequate weapons against the Home Rule pressures of the 1960s and
1970s, they were replaced by scare-talk about the disasters inherent in
devolution in general, and this piece of legislation in particular.
(SCOT050279)
Here the topic of the unsatisfactory state of political present is developed further. It is
indicated that these problems are recurrent; the unsatisfactory state of Westminster is
revealed 'once again'.
Many MPs have made no secret of their boredom about devolution, but
Parliament's handling of it has provided a most interesting and
illuminating demonstration of Westminster's constitutional conservatism,
its reluctance to surrender even a few of the responsibilities which are too
numerous to be handled effectively, and its remoteness from Scottish
opinion. [...] But there are a deplorably large number of MPs who cling to all-
round authority (such as it is) for Westminster, even if it is manifestly failing
to keep proper watch over bureaucracy. (SCOT050279)
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Scotland has its own educational system. But the important decisions (school-
leaving age, comprehensive structure, etc.) are taken elsewhere, and pressure
for assimilation with the larger English system is a pervasive force.
Education, with the regrettable exclusion of the universities, would be a major
responsibility of the Scottish Assembly. This is not one that has been
discharged with any zeal by Parliament, and discussions in the Scottish
Grand Committee tend to be perfunctory. (SCOT080279)
Note how Westminster is marked off as an 'English system' in the above extract - a
mixed-proxy case again. This is not unreasonable - as Westminster is numerically
dominated by the English constituencies and hence can be seen as an instance of
England dominating Scotland. Moreover, attacking Westminster may be a way of
othering England/the English in a way that does not render the newspaper open to
accusations of racism.
Is conflict inevitable?
The media know, however, that devolution is not the automatic solution to all
problems in Scotland. Despite the failure of the 1979 devolution referendum, the
Herald warned:
It would be unwise to suppose that the pressures that produced the devolution
campaign in the first place have now vanished for ever - that, suddenly, there
is no case for relieving the legislative pressure on Westminster, or for bringing
about the direct political accountability of St Andrew's House.
(HERA030379)
The media are aware that the proposed assembly/parliament in Scotland will not
automatically mean improved relations between the London and Edinburgh
parliaments. While the Scots may stop 'shouting down to Westminster and always
blaming Westminster for EVERY damn thing that goes wrong' (DREC080279), there
will still be issues.
Indeed, it is a tribute to the perspicacity of the Scots that they have recognised
that this Act has many shortcomings. It fails to take account of the changed
position of the Scottish MPs after devolution and is therefore a constitutional
powder-keg. It may also create a near-permanent conflict between the
assembly and Westminster by failing to equip the new chamber with even
the most modest tax-varying powers. For the majority of Scots - anxious as
they are to preserve Scottish influence at Westminster and maintain the
integrity of the union - these are important flaws in the Act. (HERAO10379)
175
Scotland may well have special interests within the EU, particularly on
agriculture and fishing, but these can best be addressed through the London-
based ministries. That, at least, is the message we are receiving.
If true, it does not bode well for the future of relationships between
Edinburgh and London. It is accepted that Scotland is heading towards it
own parliament but Labour has made clear that this move is being done to
strengthen the Union. Where is the demonstration of that unity if Scottish
ministers can be given so little influence on so significant a project?
(SCQT061097)
Remote, undemocratic, unresponsive, malfunctioning, cluttered, pervasive, tedious,
timid, perfunctory, centralised, obscure, belated, ponderously traditionalist - these are
just some adjectives and keywords used in the Scottish media in conjunction to
Westminster Parliament. Westminster is definitely a negative Other for Scotland.
Note how most of the above extracts are from 1979 referendum - maybe in 1997 the
unsuitability of Westminster is so obvious that it is not even worth mentioning?
7.3.5. Europe
There are two dimensions to the European Other - the supranational EU/abstract
Europe in general and also a particular state in Europe. I will look at these aspects
separately below.
Europe in general and the European Union
Each national identity 'is constructed and continually reconstructed as a collective
sentiment, self-awareness, self-definition and boundary setting of a national group,
but at the same time in continued interaction with the surrounding national groups in
the cultural and geopolitical context of Europe' (Triandafyllidou and Spohn 2003:8).
Europe is a supranational entity, that can act as the Other for the discursive
construction of national identity (Petersoo 2000). Scotland is no different. Ronald
Black, the Gaelic editor of the Scotsman, dreams about the time when 'Scotland will
be a normal European country', while Richard Holloway rejoices that 'now we think
of ourselves as a vibrant part of complex and changing European culture, and it feels
good' (Devine and Logue 2002:25, 102). Again, the dialectic with Europe can be
negative or positive. Garton Ash shows how Europe as a supranational external Other
can be very ambivalent in the context of the so-called 'European debate' taking place
in Britain. This debate, he writes,
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is part of a tortured national self-examination, an English, Scottish, Welsh, and
Irish agonising about self. In this debate, 'Europe' appears as a threat to the
very existence of Britain (mainly English) 'Euro-sceptics' of the Right; as a
chance to transform the very nature of Britain for (often Scottish and Welsh)
'Euro-enthusiasts' of the Left; as both opportunity and problem for the large
centre; but for all sides as something basically external. There is 'Europe'
there and 'Britain' here, and the argument is about the relationship between
them and us. (Garton Ash 1997:118)
Historically, Britain (and England) 'has always been seen as a reluctant European, a
reputation which Mrs Margaret Thatcher ... enhanced with her confrontational
approach at the European scene' (Ichijo 2002:3).
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Cartoon 228. Published in the Guardian on 20 March 2002
Hence one can say that while 'Europe' is considered a negative Other for England, it
is usually seen as a more positive Other in Scotland. While 'the conceptual
connections between being Scottish and being British and Protestant (Colley 1996)
appear to have weakened over the twentieth century,' the connections between
'Scottishness and ... Europeanness have become stronger' (Hearn 2000:11). 'Scotland
entered the new millennium as a relatively affluent European society, semi-detached
from the UK, and better able to sit with other European nations' (McCrone 2001a:29).
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Europe as a positive Other is also used in political campaigns. Think of the Scottish
National Party's 'Independence in Europe' slogan during the first Scottish Parliament
election campaign in Spring 1999 - a policy they adopted in 1988 (Reicher and
Hopkins 2001:81). At a UK level:
Tony Blair wants to forge a new relationship between the European
institutions and the UK after years of Tory hostility (SCQT061097).
The European Union provides 'an alternative political structure' to the Scots, 'a new
Union to augment or even replace the older British one' (McCrone 2001a:27):
In a European context Scotland is not running the danger of being engulfed by
a disproportionately large and powerful England; the centralising power of
Brussels is further away and less tight; identity and ethnocentrism can flower
on the backdrop of an amalgam of less distinct others. (Trandafoiu 2004:51)
Nairn (2000:17) states though, that European Union should not be just seen as 'a
convenient replacement for the United Kingdom', but rather like 'a new way of
obtaining independence in the post-imperial and post-Cold War world'. The above
quotations show, as suggested earlier, that identity is indeed always a two-sided coin.
While trying to disassociate itself from England, Scotland identifies itself as
European. As Therborn writes, 'identity should not be conceived as just a blank
negation with the Other. Identity is also, normally, something positive, an
identification with somebody, or something' (1995:230); otherness does not always
necessarily 'equate to foe, but to friend' (Reicher and Hopkins 2001:79). The negative
othering goes hand-in-hand with positive othering. It is therefore puzzling that while
negative Others have enjoyed plenty of attention from nationalism scholars, the other
side of the coin, the positive Other, has been neglected.
Europe as a supranational entity does act as the Other for the discursive construction
of national identity in the Scottish media. Ichijo has noted that 'the idea of Europe as
distinct from the EU was hardly evoked' in the British media (2002:8). And just as in
the British media, the idea of Europe as distinct from the European Union is hardly
evoked in the Scottish media. For example, the Scotsman headlines with 'Is Scotland
in Europe or not?', and then continues discussing the forthcoming Britain's
presidency of the European Union in January 1998 (SCOT061097). 'Europe' is used
metonymically as shorthand for the 'European Union'. Indeed, the use of 'Europe' in
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the media is quite complex, and the journalists are aware of the controversial use of
the term. One London interviewee admitted that
I'm sure if you were to analyse the Telegraph and other papers, you would
find that 'Europe' does get used when ... the alternative I tend to use is the
'Continent' but that's not particularly good ... if you want to refer to the other
14 members of the EU. Brussels is slightly [better, but] if you're an EU purist
you object to that too because it's not quite clear whether you're referring to
the Commission or the Parliament or the Commission and the EU, which are
distinct bodies too. (Interview 17)
Indeed, the same leader article from the Scotsman, 'Is Scotland in Europe or not?'
reflects the confusing use of terminology. The whole article deals with the
forthcoming British presidency of the European Union, and the suspected attempts to
keep Scottish politicians from being in charge of any of the committees - apparently
because
Whitehall and its ministers and mandarins want to make a point about
Scotland and its place in the Union (SCQT061097).
The 'Union' in question here is the United Kingdom, not the European Union. This,
of course, only adds to the terminological confusion. Instead of and in addition to
'European Union', the article makes full use of the correct and incorrect alternatives:
'Is Scotland in Europe or not?'; 'Britain's presidency of the European Union;'
'Scottish ministers taking a keen interest in EU affairs;' 'a new relationship between
the European institutions and the UK;' 'Scotland will be very much in the second
division of Britain's efforts in Europe;' 'that he [Donald Dewar] could go to Brussels
and explain just what Scotland's future is to be'. Five days earlier, the Scotsman
referred to European Union as 'the continent' in its leader article, when discussing
Tony Blair's speech on the UK/EU relationships (SCOTOl 1097).
Another European country
While Europe as an abstract entity often fulfils the role of the Other, then occasionally
the othering is more specific. A named country in Europe can be used as a reference
point for the discursive construction of Scottishness. For example, Angus Calder
writes in Being Scottish that 'olden Scotland ... had more affinities with democratical
Scandinavia and Gaelic Ireland than with England' (Devine and Logue 2002:47). The
Scandinavian Other is used in quite a few occasions in the Scottish media. One can
think of two reasons for the prominence of the Scandinavian Other (as opposed to
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Catalan or Quebec Other, which are the usual comparative reference points in
nationalism studies literature about Scotland). The historical Nordic (mainly Norse)
background and connections of the Scots are still mentioned here and now. And,
secondly, the successful small-but-independent Scandinavian states are often used as a
role model for the Scots. For example, the Democracy for Scotland, or 'The Vigil'
posted road signs on the Carlton Hill in 1993, 'pointing to other small but self-
governing European countries such as Norway and Denmark' (Hearn 2000:24).
The role of Scandinavian Other was emphasised by the SNP in 1970s: if Scotland
were independent, their share of North Sea oil revenues 'would be enough to
transform this small land into another Norway. Thus the country's future is
automatically identified with established and prosperous nation-states' (Nairn
1981:192). I came across a number of positive references to Scandinavian countries in
the data corpus. For example:
Whether it will make the most of it remains to be seen, but the assembly will
have an opportunity to learn not merely from the Westminster system of
government, which nowadays tends to be highly regarded only by the
narrowest of its own inhabitants, but from all the other systems from
Scandinavia to Ireland to North America. (SCQT050279)
While distancing the potential Scottish assembly from the 'dodgy' Westminster (i.e.
one which is regarded highly only by its very narrow-minded inhabitants), the extract
points to Scandinavian countries as a potential example and positive Other. Scotland
could learn from the experience of the Scandinavian countries in the future.
Sometimes the other counties are used in a 'me-too' argument:
Why should the Scots be any less responsible, any less able to govern than
the Danes or the Irish? (SOS070997)
Sometimes this othering is done ironically:
People are fond of their racial purity, another term which is incapable of being
explained in a comprehensible way. Icelanders, in many respects the nicest
people in the northern hemisphere, are desperately proud of their Norse
blood. Don't tell them that research shows a heavy admixture of Celtic blood
groups; they won't thank you for the information. (HERA290897)
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Although the Icelanders are a nice people, they have a rather ethnic definition of
themselves as a nation, as opposed to the much more civic self-identity of the Scots,
and the Herald uses that to make fun of the Icelanders.
Of course, the Scandinavian countries do not provide the only reference points to
Scotland. Here are the Netherlands as the Other:
YOU can explain the facts in any way you wish, but the conclusions of an
official pilot study into the comparative costs of criminal legal aid make for
disquieting reading. Scotland's system costs half as much again per capita as
that in England and Wales; nine times that of the system which operates in
the Netherlands.
The Dutch, it seems, have streamlined their procedures, ensuring that fewer
cases are prosecuted in the courts. (SCOT26Q997)
The following extract, on the other hand, is not very complementary to the Scots:
It may be said of public finance in Scotland, as it was of Schleswig-Holstein
(or was it the Balkans?), that only three people understand it: one has
forgotten, one has gone mad, and the other can't explain it. (SCOT090279)
A European entity in question, be it the Schleswig-Holstein in Germany or one of the
Balkan states, is a non-significant Other. The extract is implying that they are all the
same, that they do not matter, they do not deserve further specification. The country
of reference is somewhere 'out there' and where exactly is of no relevance to the
Scots. This distancing functions as a strategy of dissimilation, showing that Scotland
is different from the countries in question.
7.3.6. The World
'The World' as a very abstract, but nevertheless a positive external Other figures quite
prominently in Scottish media discourse. Scotland needs to re-establish its place in the
world arena of nation-states. A former MP George Reid (SNP) and currently the
Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament, argued in 1995 that '[A]mid this global
return to the roots of nationhood, Scotland is the sole spectre, the phantom at the feast.
The only country in the world with its own administration, law, education, even its
own national football team - but no parliament' (Reid 1995). This can be described as
'normalisation perspective', which stresses that Scotland 'should take its rightful
place on the world stage of nations' (Hassan and Warhurst 2002: 6, my emphasis).
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This hint of abnormality, of being the odd one out in the world of nations, is present in
the media discourse. Scotland needs to arrive in and return to the world:
The Assembly is the first stage in the journey towards a place for Scotland
in the modern world, a small country living in close intercourse with its
cousin England; and it is a step from which we must not shrink.
(SCOT230279)
This extract from the Scotsman contains two types of external Others. First of all,
Scotland is situated in a wider world. Secondly, the extract uses a family metaphor in
relation to the external Other, the English. The family is common metaphor in
nationalist discourse (Kamusella 1999; Phillips 1999:231). However, referring to
England as a sibling would have been too intimate. The Scotsman is aware that it is
inappropriate to speak ill about one's siblings (Kamusella 1999), and therefore a
somewhat more distancing family metaphor of 'cousin' is used. Note the element of
nested identities (Dfez Medrano and Gutierrez 2001) here. Firstly, Scotland is situated
in the UK context, together with its cousin England. Secondly, Scotland is situated in
the wider world. There are two Others in this extract, UK and 'the world', but by no
means are those Others exclusive.
Such normalising language is also common two decades later:
A devolved parliament is a historic opportunity for Scotland to take a big
step into the modern world. (HERA270897)
But the key to it all, the issue which could transform Scotland and propel us
into the modern world, is the election of a devolved parliament with the tax-
varying powers which alone will make sense of its existence and, by the bye,
sustain and strengthen the union. (HERA280897)
Our voice in the world will be stronger. (SCOT110997)
Edinburgh's parliament will serve all of Scotland. With a new electoral system
the spectre of sleaze may yet be banished. The battered Conservative Party,
ironically enough, will find hope of revival. The tide flowing for independence
will be turned, we believe, at the parliament's door. Scotland will re-emerge
into the world but the partnership of the United Kingdom will be
strengthened. (SCOT120997)
A handsome parliamentary building on Calton Hill would show the rest of
the world that Scotland is ready to do business in a brave new world. It is
the best decision and, despite the obstacles, the government must not shrink
from it. (SCOT051097)
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Above extracts indicate the importance of the potential assembly in returning Scotland
to 'the world'. It is interesting that these extracts refer to the 'modern world'. It is not
just any world that Scotland aims to return to. The current world that Scotland inhibits
is the un- or pre-modem world where Scotland lives under the tutelage of
Westminster. In the bright post-devolution future, Scotland will be part of the much
better and more modern world.
The following extract uses a justification strategy - combined with the normalisation
perspective - to campaign for the assembly. Scotland is imagined as a nation among
nations, as 'nationalism inevitably involves a mixture of the particular and the
universal: if 'our' nation is to be imagined in all its particularity, it must be imagined
amongst other nations' (Billig 1995:83). That is exactly what has been done here:
In every country, except Scotland, it is taken for granted that national history
and literature should be well taught in the schools. An Assembly would be
able to remedy that neglect without turning our backs on the international
scene and contemporary problems. (SCOT080279)
Scotland is an odd one out, and apparently in every other country in the world national
history and literature are taught, while in Scotland this is neglected. Teaching national
history and literature is presented as a taken-for-granted norm, from which Scotland
unfortunately diverges. The following extract, also from the Scotsman, is similar in its
discourse:
What other nation has its own legal system but cannot make its own laws?
What other people is so conscious of its identity and yet cannot express
identity through its political institutions? (SCQT080997)
Again, the extract points to the odd-one-out position of Scotland, and stresses the
ridiculousness of the situation. The question marks at the end of the two sentences in
the extract imply the answer - it is 'no other nation/people'. In that sense the discourse
of the Scotsman in 1997 has changed little since 1979.
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The world is also the external Other that Scotland feels responsible to, if it wants to be
taken seriously:
Above all, we must give a clear message to the world today. That means that
a high turnout is vital. The Scottish question has dominated British politics for
the past five years and it would reflect poorly on the Scots if they failed to
respond to the challenge which the referendum represents. (HERA010379)
It is difficult to overstate how humiliating a defeat for reform would be. Who,
afterwards, would take us seriously again? Who would believe the Scots
capable of conviction, or even of knowing their own minds? Derision would
be all we could expect, and no more than we would deserve. A No vote would
suggest either that Scotland has been lying to itself and to the world, or that
we simply do not care enough about our own future. What sort of nation
would that be? (SCOT 110997)
The world is not just the Other for Scotland, a reference point. It is a reflexive Other,
a mirror. Scotland needs to make sure that it is perceived positively by the Other, that
it is recognised by the Other(s) as belonging, as 'one of the them' in the world family
of nations. What 'the world' thinks of Scotland, is of importance:
We were made to look ridiculous before the world, as if we knew nothing
of what matters and cared less. (SCOT0809897)39
Last night the world was watching Scotland and we were not disgraced.
After 11 September, 1997, seven centuries on from the battle for liberty at
Stirling Bridge, 290 years after the cessation of the old parliament, we can
believe we will not be disgraced, or disgrace ourselves, again. (SCOT120997)
The second extract is constructing an historically expanding 'we' - linking the
Scotland of today to the Scotland of the past. Although the next extracts do not
specify the external Other, they imply that how Scotland is perceived by the Other is
of importance:
Would another week of repetitive, sterile argument over the power to vary
taxes really have helped that cause? Our bet is that the narrowing of opinion
we had already witnessed would only have accelerated. It would, indeed, have
been quite an achievement: making Scotland seem petty and boorish while
harming Scotland's cause. (SCOT080997)
We arrive at this day because Scotland has endured down the centuries against
all the odds and with its sense of itself, that kernel of nationhood, intact. Today
we make a claim, as of right, to our own future. If we have lied to ourselves
we will deserve no more of the world's respect. Children and grandchildren
39 The extract refers to the football match planned (but abandoned) in Scotland on the day of Princess
Diana's funeral in September 1997.
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to come will wonder what we thought, and why we failed. "The name of my
native land," wrote Robert Louis Stevenson once to a compatriot, "is not North
Britain, whatever may be the name of yours". It is a truth we must prove again.
(SCOT 110997)
There is also a good case for building on the site beside Victoria Quay in the
Leith docklands. It would be close to the new Scottish Office whose civil
servants will play a key role in governing Scotland. To the rest of the world
it could represent a fresh start and a symbol that a new Scotland had been
born, one freed from the shibboleths of the past. (SCOT051097)
The following extracts nod approvingly at Scotland and the good reputation it has in
the world:
It is the passion which earned a small nation off on the northern fringes of
Europe its name in the world. It is the passion of poets, scientists, engineers,
entrepreneurs and statesmen. It is the thing that has kept Scotland's sense of
itself intact for nigh on three centuries while other nations have been born,
flickered briefly, and have gone. (SCOT080997)
For now, we celebrate. It is long overdue but it has been earned. There can be
no more arguments now over the legitimacy of a devolved Scotland, no more
quibbling over our right to choose a future. The years to come will require
wisdom, work and skill. But we were once known, the world over, for
those very qualities. (SCOT 120997)
The above two extracts therefore differ from the previous two. While the earlier
extracts were worrying about the reputation of Scotland, then the last ones recognise
itself in the eyes of the Other as positive, these are more confident. Again, the sheer
mentioning of this recognition implies that being recognised by the Other is
important. Billig writes that sometimes '"we" will be reassured to have confirmed
"ourselves" as the Other of "our" Other' (1995:12). If 'the World' functions as the
Other for Scotland, then are the Scots longing to recognise themselves in the eyes of
the Other? The last extracts seem to confirm this need.
7.4. Concluding remarks
The chapter has discussed a number of various Others that have been used in the
Scottish media in the discursive construction of national identity during the two
devolution referenda. It has clearly shown that Scottishness is socially constructed and
inherently relational. The collective imagination of the Scottish nation depends on a
dialectical opposition - and comparison - to another identity - be it English, Welsh,
British, European or something else. There are a number of different Others that are
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perceived as relevant in the discursive construction of Scottish national identity, and
the chapter has tried to describe some of them. The existence of a distinct Scottish
identity is taken for granted, and is not disputed at any point. What is up for debate
though is the precise content and character of that identity - and it is here where
various Others are invoked. The English neighbours south of the Border, the
inherently alien Conservatives, the institutional Other of Westminster, the post-
imperial Britain - all are seen as eroding the Scottishness in one way or another.
Wales is used in a very ambiguous way to boost the self-confidence of Scotland and
to show off Scotland in a better light. But the dialectic of the Self and the Other is not
always necessarily negative - the positive positioning of Scotland in Europe and in
the modern world are indicative of that. There is no single Other that can be identified
in the context of the devolution referenda, but a multitude of different Others, evoked
depending on the context and the rhetorical argument the newspaper is trying to make.
But, as Billig says, one needs to get even more microscopic in order to fully
appreciate the identity construction process. The next chapter will do exactly this by
looking at various linguistic means of realisation exploited in the discursive
construction of national identities.
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8. National deixes
The word 'deixis' (plural 'deixes') is a Greek word for 'reference', 'to show', and is
understood in linguistics as a form of rhetorical pointing, denoting a word whose
meaning is dependent on the context in which it is used. This contextual nature of
deixis, including personal pronoun 'we', is given to (socio)-linguists. However it has
only recently caught the eye and interest of sociologists. Similarly, this thesis did not
set out to look at the deictic nature of the media language but in the process of writing
the need to become more microscopic become evident. The following chapter will
look at various rhetorical strategies that are used in discursive construction of national
identities. Focusing on Scotland and using the same data corpus that was used in
Chapter 7, the chapter shows how different category relations can be created through
often under-specified use of deictic language.
There are a number of rhetorical strategies that are invariably used in discursive
construction of national identities. One of the most comprehensive typologies has
been developed by the Vienna School of Discourse Analysis, whose 'interdisciplinary
approach combines historical, socio-political and linguistic perspectives in a
methodologically pluralistic approach' (Wodak et al. 1999:9). They focus on
following linguistic means of realisation:
• Personal references (anthroponymic generic terms, personal pronouns,
quantifiers).
• Spatial references (toponyms/geonyms, adverbs of place, spatial reference through
persons, by means of prepositional phrases such as 'with us', 'with them').
• Temporal references (temporal prepositions, adverbs of time, temporal
conjunctions, temporal references by means of nouns, semi-prefixes with temporal
meaning).
In addition to these, they look at 'the phenomenon of vagueness in referential or other
expressions, euphemisms, linguistic hesitation and disruptions, linguistic slips,
allusions, rhetorical questions, and the mode of discourse representation (direct or
indirect, or other forms of reported speech). And finally, they consider 'the linguistic
representation of those social actors who are perceived as members of national
community, and the creation of anthropomorphised social actors' (Wodak et al.
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1999:35). Their approach has been widely adopted and replicated in several recent
studies of (national identity) discourse (de Cillia et al. 1999; Pardo 2001; Ricento
2003). This chapter concentrates mainly on the use of personal deixis 'we', as well as
some other deictic notions.
8.1. The personal deixis 'we'
'Banal nationalism' has been one of the most popular concepts entering the scholarly
discussion about nationalism and national identity during the last decade. Billig
introduced it as 'the ideological habits which enable the established nations of the
West to be reproduced'. This takes the form of 'continual "flagging", or reminding, of
nationhood' through everyday discourse (Billig 1995:6-8). In order to remind
nationals about their national identity, 'banal words, jingling in the ears of the
citizens, or passing before their eyes, are required'. Such nationalism
operates with prosaic, routine words, which take nations for granted, and
which, in so doing, enhabit them. Small words, rather than grand memorable
phrases, offer constant, but rarely conscious, reminders of the homeland,
making 'our' national identity unforgettable. (Billig 1995:93)
One needs to be 'linguistically microscopic', says Billig, as it is exactly the smallest
words that are most crucial words of banal nationalism (1995:94). Among these small
words is the personal deixis 'we', which 'appears to be of utmost importance in the
discourses about nations and national identities' (de Cillia et al. 1999:163), and has
received increased attention in scholarly circles. For example, Ricento (2003) has
focused on the varied and skilful use of personal deixis 'we', including metonymical
and synecdochical use, in political speeches of early twentieth century
'Americanisers'; and Carbo (1997) analyses the rhetorical use of pronouns in the
speeches of various Mexican political leaders. Nationalism and identity scholars seem
to agree that in order to understand banal everyday nationalism, one needs to focus on
the 'we', on 'how the national 'we' is constructed and what is meant by such
construction'(Billig 1995:70).
Analysing the national deixes can be very enlightening in the study of nationalism and
national identities. Riggins (1997:8) suggests that inclusive and exclusive pronouns
are 'most revealing of the boundaries separating Self and Other', and Kamusella
(1999) agrees that 'we' helps to draw clear distinction between the members and non-
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members, between us and them. But while 'we' helps to draw clear distinctions
between members and non-members, between us and them, the deixis 'we' can be
also used to make this border diffuse. Especially in political speeches 'there is a
constant ambivalence and slippage between exclusive and inclusive "we"' (Fairclough
2000:35). This ambivalence of the 'we' depends on the 'particular rhetorical point the
speaker or writer is trying to make' (Riggins 1997:8). This, in turn, makes it difficult
to decide whether the speaker is talking about the 'we-the-party', 'we-the-newspaper'
or 'we-the-nation', i.e. there is ambiguity over who is included in the community that
is imagined in the utterance and who is not.
8.1.1. Personal deixis 'we' in the media
According to Billig (1995:94), newspapers act in national terms and 'the deixis of
homeland is embedded in the very fabric of the newspapers'. Fowler (1991:189)
suggests an existence of so-called 'implied consensus', a special conjunction of the
newspaper and its readership whenever the deixis 'we' is printed, and read, in the
newspapers. This implied consensus is 'one of the key characteristics of newspaper
discourse' (Brookes 1999:255) and such 'national deictic "context-setting"
dialogically anticipates an instantaneous acceptance of speaker-listener unanimity'
(Law 2001:301). In this section I question whether such unanimity exists between the
speaker and the listener, or between the newspaper and its readership, using the
Scottish media as an example.
Although the personal deixis 'we' is often used in nationalist discourse, Brookes
writes that
it would be wrong to suggest that whenever the words 'we' or 'us' are used in
newspaper editorials it is the nation that is being automatically denoted.
Indeed, most often the use of 'we' and 'us' was not explicitly linked to the
nation within the text itself. (1999:255)
My findings, discussed later, reveal that indeed in many occasions the 'we' does not
aim to be national. However, Brookes suggests that whatever the substantive use of
the deixis 'we', it can and should always be interpreted as national. Brookes argues
that even if
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these articles do not themselves make explicit reference to national identity,
they appear in the context of newspapers which have a shared cultural agenda
which is assumed to be national. (Brookes 1999:255)
Following (Anderson 1991), the readers are thus encouraged to imagine a community
of fellow readers in national terms, and even though not all deictic 'we's in a text are
explicitly 'national' in their nature, they are to be read as national. Especially when
the newspapers in question claim to be 'national newspapers':
National newspapers by definition are nationally distributed40, and although
there may be differences of age, gender, region, social class and ethnicity even
within the readership of individual titles, the limit is that of nation. So it is
within these contexts that the 'we' and 'us' in these articles can be understood
as referring to the nation. (Brookes 1999:256)
As with the imagined community in general, the 'we' is limited in its imagining, as
'the group referred to by "we" continues indefinitely until it reaches the boundary
formed by another group marked by "they"' (Carbo 1997:95). This argument of the
'national limit' can be contested in both directions however. First of all, the limit is
often less than nation (for example, I will talk about the exclusive newspaper 'we'
later). Also - the limit can be wider than nation, imagining e.g. a world community.
De Cillia et al. (1999:164) write that '"We" can also be found in reference to
particular subnational groups ... In a wider, EU context, "we" can also apply to the
group of "Europeans'". But even they admit that 'prevailing implication, however, of
"we" remains the national collective of "the Austrians'", i.e. the 'we' is usually
national. Hence sub- and supranational references exist, though to a lesser degree, as
can be seen in my data.
Although Brookes clarifies the use of personal deixis 'we' in the media, two questions
arise. First, Brookes claims that the shared cultural agenda of the newspapers is
'assumed to be national', along the same line as Billig's claim that 'all the papers,
whether tabloid or quality, and whether left- or right-wing, address their readers as
members of the nation' (Billig 1995:11). But can we be sure of this? When Brookes
states that the limit of individual newspapers is 'that of nation', and Billig talks about
national audience, what does 'nation' mean? Both authors rely on the unproblematic
definition of the 'nation'. But what does 'nation' refer to in the context of the United
40 The claim that 'national newspapers by definition are nationally distributed' is contested in Chapter
4. See also Seymour-Ure (1996) and Tunstall (1996).
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Kingdom? The 'nation' can refer to Scotland, Wales etc., and also the UK. The very
limit of the nation is often contested, at least when used in the media, as was
discussed in Chapter 4. In order for Billig's, Anderson's and Brookes' claims to be
true, the 'we' should always be national - and the world to be imagined as consisting
of clearly bordered and uncontested nations.
8.1.2. The personal deixis 'we' in the Scottish media.
Scottish media provide a useful case study for the analysis of national deixis. As
'references to the nation have been consistently ambiguous throughout the 20th
century - as to whether it is a reference to Scotland or Britain - the relation between
the media and the nation in Scotland has remained particularly contested', writes
Connell (2003:188-189). This is reflected in the media discourse as well, but until
now 'the extent to which Scottish newspapers are capable of engendering a sense of
Scottishness due to a tendency to address their readership as Scottish has never been
thoroughly examined' (Connell 2003:188). In this section, I will try to overcome this
shortcoming by looking at the ways that Scottish newspapers address their readers. By
focussing on the use of 'small crucial words', the section tries to understand what kind
of 'we's the Scottish newspapers are banally flagging in their texts; what 'nation' they
are discursively constructing.
What kind of 'we's can be found in the Scottish national broadsheets? The deixis 'we'
can have very different references in different contexts, it can mean many things.
Linguists distinguish various 'we's based on their addressee and speaker exclusivity
or inclusivity. De Cillia et al. (1999:164) write that 'the first-person plural pronoun
"we" is the most complex among its type and can encompass all other personal
pronouns', suggesting a referential matrix of seven different types of 'we'. Based on
the suggestions of Wodak et al. (1999), de Cillia et al. (1999) Fairclough (2000), and
developed in my pilot study, I have chosen to distinguish between three different uses
of 'we' in my research.
• Exclusive newspaper 'we' - the speaker-inclusive, addressee-exclusive 'we',
where the 'we' designates the newspaper.
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• Inclusive Scottish 'we' - the speaker- and addressee-inclusive 'we', where the
'we' refers to the newspaper and its readers in Scotland, i.e. the 'we' is used
metonymically as a replacement for Scotland.
• All-inclusive British 'we' - this is similar to the previous one, but the 'we' refers
to the whole of Britain, i.e. the 'we' is used metonymically as a replacement for
Britain.
In the following section I will analyse these three uses of 'we' in my data corpus. I
will thereafter introduce the concept of wandering 'we'.
8.1.2.1. Exclusive newspaper 'we'
Not encompassing its readers, the newspaper 'we' is usually just informative, telling
the reader what the newspaper has done or believes in. It is difficult to claim that this
type of 'we' is (always) national. Indeed, as Brookes claims, 'it would be wrong to
suggest that whenever the words 'we' or 'us' are used in newspaper editorials it is the
nation that is being automatically denoted' (1999:255). Often the personal deixis 'we'
is quite explicitly reader or addressee-exclusive. Here are few examples of exclusive
newspaper 'we':
... in the course of the next three-and-a-half weeks we shall sum up our
various arguments for supporting the establishment of the Assembly. ... Today
we shall consider the Scotland Act as the first of many desirable, and overdue,
aspects of parliamentary and constitutional reform which Britain needs.
(SCOT050279)
The Herald is very clear about its editorial stance in the debate to come. We
will argue as vigorously and persuasively as we can for a double Yes vote. We
will do that because we believe the time is long overdue for Scotland to take a
decisively greater measure of responsibility for shaping its own future than it
has in the past. (HERA200897)
Today, we hope for a double Yes vote from an informed and involved nation.
Tomorrow, and in the days to come, we hope and expect your involvement and
participation in our pages to continue. (HERA110997)
In all above extracts, the newspaper is the actor, who believes, considers, sums up,
thinks and offers - the reader is a recipient at the other end, there to read and accept
the information. It would be difficult to claim that the 'we' in above extracts is
necessarily to be understood as 'national', and whether or not they should be
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understood as read in a national context is debatable. There is no obvious invitation to
partake in the imagining of 'us'; the 'we does not try to encompass Scottishness.
Indeed, in the second extract Scotland is described as 'it', and a distinction is drawn
between the newspaper and its (Scottish national) readership in the third extract.
8.1.2.2. Inclusive Scottish 'we'
To illustrate the inclusive Scottish 'we', consider the following extract from the
Scotsman'.
Let us take as a premise that it is desirable to sustain the unity of the United
Kingdom. Indeed, our close and cousinly links with the English, our affection
for them and respect for their culture, the degree of domestic, social and
economic intercourse between us - these facts make separatism ...
unthinkable. (SCOT23Q279)
This extract is interesting for several reasons. Firstly, it is clearly addressee-inclusive
and imagines its readers as Scottish - although not explicitly mentioning Scotland
itself. Here we have the 'implied consensus' between the newspaper and its readers,
as suggested by Fowler (1991) and most readers in Scotland would easily recognise
their national selves. Through a subtle use of the personal deixis 'we', the newspaper
creates a sense of we-ness between itself and its readers. Secondly, the Scotsman is
addressing its readers as Scottish, and is doing that in a clear Self/Other dialectic with
'our cousins, the English'. Thirdly, a family metaphor is used again, invoking an
image of a national extended family, where two cousins, England and Scotland, live
happily together. Whereas in this extract the family metaphor is used to argue for
devolution within the UK, then Reicher and Hopkins show how family metaphors are
used by politicians to do exactly the opposite, to argue against devolution. Their
Unionist interviewees 'frequently construed the relations between Scotland and
England as family-like: intimate and essentially harmonious' (2001:96). Family
metaphors are powerful exactly because they can be used to show animosity and
consensus, to argue both for and against something. Indeed, their interviewees
do not only use the metaphor to insist on the harmony in Scottish-English
relations, they also use it to recuperate apparent counter-evidence. Thus others
might point to fighting, squabbling and bickering; however if they think it
indicates real opposition they are sadly mistaken. It is precisely because, as
brother nations, the Scots and English get on so well and are so secure in their
relationship that they can afford the luxury of surface difference. (Reicher and
Hopkins 2001:96)
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The fourth interesting aspect about this particular extract, and the few paragraphs that
follow, is that this very same Scottish 'we' starts wandering. I will return to this
extract later.
The following extract from the Herald in 1997 is another example of how the reality
of a national 'us' is taken for granted, how the sense of national unity is presented as
something unproblematic and real:
No one doubts - from the stands at Murrayfield or Hampden to the pages of
Trainspotting, from the echoing footfalls of the legal fraternity in Parliament
House to the interactions of children and teachers in schools across the land,
from fishing boat to computer assembly line - that there is something we call
Scottish about what goes on here and a place called Scotland which gives
meaning to our lives. We are now being asked to choose how that sense of
identity should be nurtured in a new millennium. (HERA200897)
The extract is full of various national deixes ('the land', 'here', 'a place'), and
confidently claims that 'no one doubts' the existence of Scotland - begging the
question of who is this 'no one' (or actually not - the text assumes there is a
consensus among the readers about this 'no one', that it is self-evident to the readers).
Like most modern societies, 'Scotland is a country of enormous heterogeneity in
almost every significant social respect' (Cohen 1996:805). Nevertheless, this
heterogeneity is presented as homogeneity, and regardless of actual differences, 'the
nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship' (Anderson 1991:6-7).
By putting Murrayfield rugby and Hampden football fans, Trainspotting's drug
addicts, Edinburgh lawyers, children, teachers, fishermen etc. across Scotland all
together into one sentence, the extract suggests that Scotland is one big national
family, a thriving imagined community. Scotland is imagined as a unity, and it is
assumed that all those different groups of people agree on the single definition of
Scottishness. This is achieved by using the personal pronoun 'we' deictically and thus
'replacing differences in origin, confession, class and life-style' (de Cillia et al.
1999:164), which certainly are deep between the social groups listed in the extract.
The homogeneous ingroup, homo Scotus, is constructed discursively - whether it
exists in the 'real' world or not.
194
8.1.2.3. The all-inclusive British 'we'
In a study about the discursive construction of Austrian national identity the
researchers found that although 'we' can have 'very different referents according the
respective situation', in most cases the personal pronoun 'we' refers to "'the
Austrians" of today'. Even in cases where 'in a wider, EU context, "we" can also
apply to the group of "Europeans'", the 'prevailing implication, however, of "we"
remains the national collective of "the Austrians'" (de Cillia et al. 1999:163-164). This is
true in the Scottish media as well. Although usually the personal deixis 'we' is used to
mean 'us, the Scots', the Scottish newspapers do not always address their readers as
Scottish. Sometimes the 'we' is imagined as a much wider community, although still
limited in Anderson's (1991) sense, encompassing the whole of the UK.
The following extract is from a leader article less than a week before the 1979
referendum, and it is invoking a British 'we':
We have no written Constitution. As a nation we may have a temperamental
aversion to anything too rigid and restrictive. We also have a distaste for
systematic constitutional change, though we are perfectly capable of writing
constitutions for other people, sometimes, as in the case of West Germany,
with considerable success. Therefore we must take our opportunities of reform
as they arise, and thank our stars that our society is sufficiently mature and
stable to produce change without violence. (SCOT23Q279)
Although neither Scotland nor the UK have a written Constitution, the 'we' in
question is a British, not just Scottish one. Thus unless it is suggested that the Scots
wrote the West German constitution (note the intermittent use of deictic notions
nation and people - 'we' are a nation, 'they' are a people - possibly a hint of
superiority here?), the fourth 'we' and by implication the others too are at least a
British/UK 'we' (in the specific case of West Germany, it could even be imagined as
an 'Allied 'we"41). The above extract is also an example of the dispositional 'WE are
good, because it's our nature' bias. The language used in the example is very
essentialist, describing Britain as having 'temperamental aversion' and 'a distaste',
being 'sufficiently mature' and 'perfectly capable' - these are presented as inherent to
the non-mentioned British 'we'.
41 The 1949 German Constitution (the Basic Law or 'Grundgesetz') was drafted by the US, British and
French constitutional lawyers. The Germans themselves only had a consultative role in the making of
their new constitution.
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The British 'we' was especially common during the 1997 referendum campaign. Here
it is evoked in contrast to the European 'them':
The same could be said of Britain's future in Europe, and more particularly of
our attitude towards economic and monetary union. Mr Blair reckons that it is
our 'destiny', no less, to lead Europe. The continent 'needs us' and our
'vision'. So is our crusader yet able to make the 'hard choice'- Yes or No? -
over the European single currency? Um, not yet. (SCOT0T1097).
The sudden and unexpected death of Princess Diana during the referendum campaign
'widened' the 'we' from the Scottish to the British 'we'. Here is just one example:
It is reasonable to assume that the world will not end on Saturday as Diana,
Princess of Wales is interred but there must be many people who wonder, in
the light of the display of public emotion over her death, what has happened to
our country and where we go from here. This is a uniquely difficult question
to address. It is unlikely, as we said yesterday, that there has been a sea-change
in the nation from the sort of people who bear emotion stoically to those who
are able to display it publicly; from stiff upper lip to trembling lower lip.
[...]
Yet it is important that we recognise that in Britain we have a good and decent
system which has served us well. Governments come and go peacefully, our
democracy has an admirable 70% plus turnout at general elections and, yes,
we are capable of creative and fruitful change, as in the proposals for
devolution, if only we will have the courage and foresight to grasp them. We
have a unique combination of sensible stability and evolutionary reform which
serves us well. (HERA050997a)
There are three occurrences of the personal pronoun 'we' in the first paragraph.
Although Britain is not explicitly mentioned in the first paragraph, it is to be
understood as British - after all, Princess Diana was a British royal figure and is
evoked here as a symbol of national unity (Shone 2001:323). Thus the first two of
them are clearly evoking the British nation, or 'country', to be more precise - a
synonym for 'nation-state' (Kamusella 1999). The spatial reference 'here'- another
crucial small world - is also pointing to Britain in this context. In the light of these
British 'we's, the deixis 'nation' in the last sentence is also to be understood as
British, whereas the personal deixis 'we' (underlined) is exclusive, referring to the
newspaper itself. The second paragraph is saturated with deixis 'we', all of which can
be described as British again. In the first sentence, the Britishness of the 'we' is
actually flagged. The references to 'our' government and democracy are British, as
are the other elements of the discussion (general elections, political change, etc.)
Although the Britishness is flagged only in the first sentence of the paragraph, it is
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continuously invoked by using the personal pronoun 'we'. The first paragraph has
framed the article in British terms and that defines the whole article. It is here that
banal British nationalism is working exactly as Billig (1995) suggested.
8.1.2.4. The wandering 'we'
Echoing the ambiguity of national references in Scotland, as mentioned by Connell
(2003), the use of deixis 'we' in the Scottish broadsheets is much more complex. I
would therefore like to introduce a concept of a wandering 'we'. Riggins notes the
contradictory uses of 'we' that occasionally occur within phrases and sentences
(Riggins 1997:8). A wandering 'we' represents such a contradictory use of 'we'. It is
not a single type of 'we', but rather a particular type of usage that can be traced only
within a paragraph or the whole article.
I have previously shown that the personal deixis 'we' can have different referents.
One could expect that if an article is trying to appeal to its readers' Scottishness or
Britishness, or to put it crudely, if an article tries to make a Scottish point or a British
point, it would use the deixes consequently and consistently. But this appears not to
be the case. Often the deixis 'we' keeps wandering between the newspaper 'we',
Scottish 'we' and British 'we', that is, the deixis 'we' 'wanders' between addressee-
exclusive, addressee-inclusive and all-inclusive 'we'. This wandering of 'we's makes
the question Who are we? rather difficult to answer, and raises the question whether
the readers can really be expected to (unconsciously and easily) recognise their
national selves in the media then.
There are many ways a 'we' can wander. Sometimes a 'we' wanders between various
forms of inclusiveness - from exclusive newspaper 'we' to an inclusive Scottish 'we'
and/or to an all-inclusive British 'we' - or, indeed, vice versa. Sometimes the 'we'
wanders spatially - at one moment, the 'we' becomes 'them', or 'they' become 'us'.
Here is an example from the Herald, showing a case of the pronominal plural
wandering between 'we' and 'they':
Above all, we must give a clear message to the world today. That means that a
high turnout is vital. The Scottish question has dominated British politics for
the past five years and it would reflect poorly on the Scots if they failed to
respond to the challenge which the referendum represents. (HERAO10379)
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One of the possible explanations why the Herald wrote 'Scots ... they' and not 'it
would reflect poorly on the Scots if we failed to respond...', is that the pro-devolution
paper wanted to distance itself from those disappointing Scots who might vote 'No' at
the 1979 referendum. This would be a case of internal othering in a situation where
the (Glasgow) Herald supports Scottish devolution, and other right-minded and
relevant people (who are included in the 'we') can be expected to do the same. If they
do not, they are denied a membership of 'us', and they become the Other, although
internal to the imagined Scottish national community.
Another example in which the personal deixis shifts between 'us' and 'them' is from
the last devolution referendum campaign:
A day to seize opportunity
Carpe diem, says the old Latin tag. This morning we might prefer a sturdier,
native injunction. Perhaps it is time now to say that Scots should rise from
their backsides and prove that they have meant everything they have said. This
day, over all others, brings with it the opportunity to say what sort of nation
we mean to be. The alternative is clear, familiar and failed. It offers few hopes
of real progress. It offers nothing for our self-esteem. Though we are to
choose, it seems to this newspaper that there is no choice if Scotland is to
regain belief in itself. (SCOT110997)
Curiously, the Scottish 'we' in the second sentence becomes a Scottish 'they' in the
third sentence. The triple Scottish 'they' then becomes a Scottish 'we' again - which
goes through mild distancing again by the end, when Scotland becomes 'it' (as
opposed to 'if we are to regain belief in ourselves [as a nation]). Note also the use of
the demonstrative 'this' throughout the extract - 'this morning', 'this day, over all
others' assume that all the readers understand (and agree with) the importance of the
devolution referendum.
The following extract from the Scotsman was referred to earlier, and paragraphs 2 and
3 were partially reproduced already. It is a revealing case of how the story about the
small crucial words is much more complicated than some scholars imply. It is not just
we-politicians and we-the [national-equals-British] people story, as in the discourse of
New Labour studies by Fairclough (2000:35), it is we-politicians-and-all-different-
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kind-of-peoples story. I have numbered the paragraphs in the following extensive
extract for the ease of discussion.
[1] In the last few weeks we have set out some of the areas in which the
Assembly will be able to provide a new and much-missed dimension to
Scottish life. The Assembly is not expensive; it is cheap at the price. ...
[2] But the "good government" argument applies with some though not as
much force to the regions of England, and does not entirely explain why
Scotland needs the Assembly so badly. Let us take as a premise that it is
desirable to sustain the unity of the United Kingdom. Indeed, our close and
cousinly links with the English, our affection for them and respect for their
culture, the degree of domestic, social and economic intercourse between us -
these facts make separatism (a pejorative word for independence) unthinkable.
Now all the pressures which produced a surge of SNP political support are at
work again in our political system.
[3] We have no written Constitution. As a nation we may have a
temperamental aversion to anything too rigid and restrictive. We also have a
distaste for systematic constitutional change, though we are perfectly capable
of writing constitutions for other people, sometimes, as in the case of West
Germany, with considerable success. Therefore we must take our
opportunities of reform as they arise, and thank our stars that our society is
sufficiently mature and stable to produce change without violence.
[4] Thus the Assembly offers more democratic control and helps sustain unity
in diversity. It opens avenues to peaceful change. It begins the renewal of our
democratic institutions. But the final argument is psychological and perhaps
emotional. The lack of national democratic institutions has grievously sapped
Scottish self-belief. Standardising forces have eroded the external signs of our
nationhood, speech, custom and dress, and left us confused and adrift. The
deferential philosophy of dependence on English largesse attacks the qualities
of enterprise, invention and self-reliance in which we once took pride.
Dependence is in any case something of a myth, though a powerful one. There
is hardly an area of Scottish life that cannot be uplifted and quickened by an
Assembly.
[5] Of course, the institution will be neutral, in the sense that we can use it for
good or ill. Once we have won the Assembly, we have another fight on our
hands to ensure that we make the most of it. But the pessimism of the No camp
is really not justified. As a nation we have produced a long line of
administrators of the highest calibre. We have an experienced Civil Service.
We have a legal system rooted in a distinctive tradition. Our Labour
movement, so often portrayed as a sinister and threatening monster, is strongly
influenced by its Christian traditions. And our religious history, in which
presbyterianism imbued almost every area of life, has left us with an ingrained
belief in democratic principles. The Assembly is the first stage in the journey
towards a place for Scotland in the modern world, a small country living in
close intercourse with its cousin England; and it is a step from which we must
not shrink. (SCOT230279)
Within these five paragraphs from a rather lengthy leader article Why we must vote
Yes, the 'we' manages to be exclusive, inclusive and all-inclusive, or newspaper,
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Scottish and British. In the first paragraph, it is the newspaper 'we'. In paragraphs two
to five, it is a national 'we'. But which nation is being invoked in those extracts is
shifting and debatable. Paragraph Two is using Scotland as its referent - in a
Self/Other dialectic with the English, 'our close cousins', as discussed earlier. The last
'we' in that paragraph is ambiguous and can be understood both as Scottish or British.
The personal deixes 'we' in paragraphs Four and Five are also clearly Scottish. There
are references to 'our nationhood', 'our confused and adrift state', 'our former pride'
- themes regularly invoked in the Scottish media - in paragraph Four; and
Scottishness is explicitly flagged throughout the paragraph - 'Scottish self-belief,
'Scottish life'. In the last paragraph, there are twelve 'we's, all of which can be
described as Scottish again. Although the Scottishness of that 'we' is only emphasised
at the end of the paragraph, its Scottishness is unchallenged and undeniable. There is
an awkward wandering at the last sentence though, when Scotland is suddenly
described as 'it', followed by a Scottish 'we' at the end.
Sandwiched between all those Scottish 'we's in paragraphs Two, Four, and Five is
extract Three. There are references to the lack of a written constitution and being able
to write constitutions for other people - invoking a British, not Scottish reference, as
discussed earlier. Although Scotland does not have its own constitution, it is Britain
that the paragraph refers to, as can be understood from the mentioning of writing
constitutions to other people in following sentence. And even then, the last sentence
of that paragraph could be interpreted as the Scottish 'we', as it is only Scottish voters
who that have a say in the proposed reform. The wandering of 'we' makes the overall
picture quite confusing and complex.
8.1.3. Concluding remarks about the use of personal deixis 'we'
Billig suggests that newspapers engage in banal flagging of nationhood, and that the
readers subconsciously pick up the 'national' references hidden behind the small
words of 'we', 'here' etc. In the speeches of politicians and in the media, there is
usually no 'ambiguity about which nation/country this is' that the politician or article
refers to (Billig 1995:107). At least in case of Scotland, the situation is not as simple,
uncomplicated and clear. As we can see from looking at the use of the deixis 'we',
what comprises the national frame of reference in the Scottish media varies depending
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on the context and topic. Since the 'we' can have so many different referents in
Scotland, a concept of a singular national media 'we' that is easily recognised and
adopted seems misguided in this case. Far from just adopting the national 'we'
banally and unconsciously, readers may need to work on the different array of 'we's
that they confront in the newspaper, they must bring in some interpretative knowledge
in order to recognise their particular national 'we' invoked in the particular article.
And even more so, on many occasions the readers have to cope with a wandering 'we'
within the same article. Just like there is no single Other at any given time, but a
multitude of positive/negative/internal/external Others, there is no simple and banal
national 'we' in the media. Instead, the reader is offered a kaleidoscope of different
'we's - exclusive newspaper 'we's, inclusive (sub)national 'we's, all-inclusive
(supra)national 'we's, and wanderings of all sorts. The deictic pointing of the 'we' is
not so clearly pointed after all. Exploration of my data indicates that similar
contextual variations happen with other deictic notions in the Scottish media as well,
like 'nation', 'people', 'culture', etc.
It is possible that this wandering of 'we's can be expected under the circumstances,
that this is the very nature of nationalist and patriotic discourse in the media. Indeed,
as mentioned already, one of the rhetorical uses of the personal deixis 'we' is its very
lack of specificity. It can be used by politicians - and journalists - precisely when
they cannot be sure who their audiences are - or when they do not want their
audiences to be sure about the latter. It would not be unreasonable to suggest that this
obscurity and fluidity of deixis 'we' is the very reason it is employed in the media in
the first place. It is possible that the journalists do not want their readers to know what
does 'we' mean to start with. What is known though, is that the deixis 'we' is
extremely ambiguous and flexible. The 'we' can simultaneously represent one or
several different (national) categories to different readers. By doing so, the 'we' can
facilitate shifts between different national categories and create very different
Self/Other dialectics. What 'we' really means in any particular case remains open for
speculation and interpretation, and whether the 'we' always perform a nationalising
role is also questionable. Indeed, in order to know if and what kind of nationalising
role the deixis plays, it would be necessary to study how people actually do
understand and interpret such 'we's. There is plenty of scope for future research on
this theme.
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8.2. The use of other deictic notions
Apart from personal pronouns, other banal national referents or 'little crucial words'
are used in the media. Law notes that also 'indicators of time, "today", "now", "then",
of place, "here", "there", "away" and the demonstratives, "this", "that", denote where,
when and who forms the deictic centre of the nation' (2001). Kamusella (1999) lists a
number of national deixes, including 'people', 'community', 'language', 'history',
'people', 'culture', 'land', claiming that whenever these notions are used, it is
'national community', 'national history', 'national language' etc. that are meant. But
are these deictic notions always national? In the following section, I will look at the
use of various deixes in the Scottish media.
8.2.1. People
Cartoon 69. Published in the Scotsman on 11 September 1997
McCrone notes that while Margaret Thatcher might say 'We are the state, and we say
no (to Scottish parliament)', the convener of the Scottish Constitutional Convention,
Canon Kenyon Wright replied 'We are the people, and we say yes'. McCrone
suggests that the use of the term 'people' rather than 'nation' captures 'the breadth of
organisational representation in the convention; in other words, to draw upon civil
society as the root of political legitimacy' (2001a:46). Kamusella insists that
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'nowadays the term "people", in the meaning of "a people", one predominantly uses
as a synonym for a nation'. Indeed, the term 'a people'
creates a firm bond with the pre-national past of the state projecting onto it the
nationalist preconception that the present-day people (i.e. nation) populating
the state, has lived in it (or on its territory) since the times immemorial. Thus
the term falsifies history and contributes to inventing a 'national history'
congruent with the demands of a specific nationalism. (Kamusella 1999)
Also, the deictic notion of 'a people' 'evokes the strong mental construct of "one big
family" to which one belongs and which protects one' (ibid.).
In the Scottish media, 'people' is used in a number of ways. First of all, the term is
used as a synonym for 'nation', as suggested above. Secondly, the term acts in many
ways similarly to the personal deixis 'we' - there are instances of Scottish, British and
English 'people'. And thirdly, the 'people as electorate' is also common usage of the
term. Here are few examples of the 'Scottish people' usage:
The Scottish people today face a historic and complex decision. The verdict
which the nation passes on the Government's assembly plans will determine
the direction of political life in both Scotland and the rest of the United
Kingdom for years to come. For Scotland, today's vote is a uniquc occasion
for never since the union of the Scottish and English Parliaments in 1707 have
the Scottish people been asked to pass judgement on the political system
under which they live. [...] The question of turnout is made more important by
the 40% rule, for there is a very real danger of a damaging political row over
the interpretation of the wishes of the Scottish people. (HERAO10379)
If it all ends in tears two weeks hence, it will not be sufficient to blame the
apathy of the people of Scotland. (HERA280897)
It was probably inevitable that Dounreay, with its unrivalled capacity for
causing problems and alarming the people of Scotland, would haul itself to
the top of the political agenda in the days following Thursday's historic vote.
(HERA 150997)
The first extract above uses the history metaphor, and making a reference to the 1707
Act of Union. By emphasising that continuity (1707/today/years to come), the article
forges an historically expanded community (a construction strategy). It also
emphasises the importance of high turnout - it matters both in a symbolic level
(unanimous historic decision) and practical level (the Cunningham Amendment)42.
42 Labour MP George Cunningham introduced the controversial 40% rule in 1978.
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Cartoon 18. Published in The Scotsman on 27 February 1979
Similarly, there were explicit references to other 'national' people:
The people of Wales are next in line to face up to the responsibilities of
taking part in the constitutional improvement of the United Kingdom.
(HERA 160997)
Perhaps there was insufficient effort made to convince the Welsh people of
the benefits which might come from even a watery executive assembly of the
sort proposed. (HERA200997)
We should remember that hundreds of thousands of English people will
vote in the referendum and that many, we hope, will serve as Members of the
Scottish parliament. (HERA290897)
:
Icelanders, in many respects the nicest people in the northern hemisphere, are
desperately proud of their Norse blood. (HERA290897)
In all above extracts, the deictic notion 'people' is used as a synonym for 'nation'. But
whereas these examples specified the nationness of given 'people', it is far more
common to use 'the people' banally as a synonym for 'the nation'. Here are some
examples of implied Scottish nation behind the 'people':
Two years after the reform of the laws it is clear that longer opening hours
have not led to the abuse which many people had feared. (HERA060279)
The extract refers to the extended licensing laws that were introduced in Scotland in
1977 and thus the 'many people' are to be read as 'the many people in Scotland' that
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were concerned about the extended opening hours in Scottish drinking establishments.
The following examples are of the 'Scottish people/electorate':
So, understandably, people on both sides of the argument will go to the
ballot boxes on St David's Day to cast their vote with something less than
passionate conviction. (HERA 130279)
Yet should the Kirk seek to influence the verdict of the people on this issue
by having a statement which clearly favours devolution read from pulpits
throughout Scotland? (HERA230279)
The real question - whether we still believe in the power of government to
create an inclusive civic culture which can, with vision and determination,
enhance a small country's performance and improve the lives of its people -
goes on begging for an answer. (HERA200S97)
He has been typically mute on the first and crucial question of whether there
should be a Scottish parliament at all, arguing again that it is a political
decision for the people. [...] Sir Bruce emphasised yesterday that the first
question in the referendum was down to the will of the people.
(HERA220897)
If, as we believe, the Yes-Yes campaign has a good chance of winning the
day, it remains a fact that the devolution issue, of all issues, remains a
fiendishly difficult one to assess in terms of how people will vote on
Thursday. (HERA080997)
The notion of 'British people' was widespread, although the Britishness of 'the
people' is not explicitly flagged.
Since the debate has gone on for a decade already it is hardly possible that it
would have been resolved in another four weeks, although the Government
would then have been nearer the summer and the presumed breathing space of
the long recess which might have blunted people's memories of the
unpleasant winter of industrial strife. (HERA240379)
During the last devolution referendum, the concept of imagined communal 'we' Was
stretched from encompassing Scotland to encompassing the entire UK after the death
of the Princess of Wales. The same happens to the concept of 'people'. After the death
of Diana, the 'people' in question is definitely British, and not just Scottish.
But different people mourn in different ways. In that respect it is wrong and
potentially damaging to insist that people must mourn in a certain way, do
this, do not do that, and, more reprehensibly, feel things which they may not
necessarily feel. [...] It is important to be honest and to acknowledge that
there are many people in the country who, although saddened by the
needless death of a fellow human being, do not feel the need to mourn deeply.
(HERA030997)
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Perverse alchemists are at work, fashioning their spells in reverse and, while
we have known from the Middle Ages that base metal cannot be turned into
gold, it seems that in terms of the emotions of the nation the opposite is
entirely possible. This is not a comment on the genuine feelings of grief and
loss felt by large numbers of people throughout the nation at the death of
Diana, Princess of Wales. [...] Grappling with the display of emotion at the
death of the Princess, some have sought to render it down by portraying it as
some sort of sea-change in the behaviour of the people of Britain, a switch
in national habit from traditional reserve to the free expression of feelings
and emotions. [...] This is utter and demeaning rubbish. It is demeaning
because it denies the well-springs of decency and emotion which have always
existed in our nation... [...] People must be allowed to grieve for Princess
Diana however they want. It is wrong for them to be shunted into emotional
straitjackets by those who believe that they know best, who want to shut down
the entire country on Saturday for what they conceive of as a properly
reverential farewell. [...] The fund established for the purpose of honouring
the charitable interests of the Princess is another right and proper way for
people to contribute tangibly to causes which were dear to her heart.
(HERA040997)
It is reasonable to assume that the world will not end on Saturday as Diana,
Princess of Wales is interred but there must be many people who wonder, in
the light of the display of public emotion over her death, what has happened to
our country and where we go from here. This is a uniquely difficult question
to address. It is unlikely, as we said yesterday, that there has been a sea-change
in the nation from the sort of people who bear emotion stoically to those
who are able to display it publicly; from stiff upper lip to trembling lower lip.
[...] The people of Britain have always had a deep reservoir of emotion and
we need look no further than the dreadful event at Dunblane and the utterly
comprehensible displays of public mourning which followed it to see evidence
of this. Yet we must at least examine the possibility that a change of attitude
has taken place which may, or may not, continue to filter through the veins of
the nation in 10 or 20 years. Above all, we should ask what the events of
recent days tell us about ourselves as peoples of this land, and we say
'peoples' because there is no evidence that the response to the death of the
Princess is uniform across Britain. [...] Who can say how the royal family is
feeling? Why have they been driven to parade themselves for public
consumption when they clearly do not feel like it? Rest assured, there is
nothing worse than people forced to behave in a way which is alien to them.
(HERA050997a)
The above three extracts are all fascinating in terms of wandering national deixes. The
wandering 'we' was discussed earlier, but it would not be unreasonable to say here
that the national deixes are all over the place. While the previous weeks saw the
Herald talking about the Scottish 'we', Scottish 'nation' and 'people of Scotland',
suddenly the same deixes refer to the supranational entity of Britain. 'This land'
206
means the land of Britain and not Scotland. There is an interesting sentence in the last
extract though: 'Above all, we should ask what the events of recent days tell us about
ourselves as peoples of this land, and we say "peoples" because there is no evidence
that the response to the death of the Princess is uniform across Britain.' Thus Herald's
leader writer is aware of the various meanings of the term 'people', and seems to
distinguish between different peoples of Britain. But it is not sure whether these
different peoples are defined in terms of their nationness or just in terms of their style
of mourning. Nevertheless, the rest of the article is using the 'people' is evoking a
strong mental construct of 'one big family' to which all the people of Britain belong
and which protects these people in times of death and crisis.
8.2.2. History
'History' is another powerful national deixis. Whenever history is referred to, it is the
national history that is meant. Here is an extract from 1979:
In every country, except Scotland, it is taken for granted that national history
and literature should be well taught in the schools. An Assembly would be
able to remedy that neglect without turning our backs on the international
scene and contemporary problems, pace those who equate concern for Scottish
culture with parochialism. (SCQT080279)
Devine notes that, although the education had become a badge of identity in the
nineteenth century and was 'one of the ways in which a sense of nationhood was
preserved,' the Scottish education system 'did not play this role by promoting the
study of the native literature and the national history. On the contrary, the schools
were often criticised for their neglect of these aspects of Scottish heritage' (Devine
1999:389). The Scotsman echoes this issue above, using the language of tradition and
needs. The extract locates Scotland firmly as striving for an equal position in the
world of nation-states. The extract insists that 'in every country' of the world national
history is taught. Indeed, some campaigning bodies demand that the role of 'Gaelic,
Scots, and Scottish history in education' is increased (Hearn 2000:40).
Teaching national history and literature is presented in the extract as a taken-for-
granted norm, from which Scotland unfortunately diverges. Of course, in many
countries teaching national history and literature has been and remains an unattainable
dream towards which countries aim. For example, Estonia under Soviet occupation is
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just one example where national literature and history were taught with so-called
'white spots', i.e. the history and literature of the independent republic of 1918-1941
were not covered in schools. But, of course, 'in every country' is more convincing and
has stronger mobilising power than the somewhat more correct 'in many/most other
countries'. In any case - which national history would be taught in Scotland is up for
discussion. History is 'relative, based on more or less arbitrary choice of "facts" and
links between them which together form a historical narrative' (Kamusella 1999).
And history is always written by the victors - hence the history included in the school
curriculum written by SNP would probably differ considerably from one written by
the Tories and even the Labour Party. But the above extract overlooks these aspects,
(falsely) suggesting that there is a national history of Scotland that would be taught if
Scotland would regain control over what is taught in Scottish schools. There is a link
between (teaching of) national history and the Scottish nation-state. Kamusella (1999)
writes that Europe continues 'to be the land of histories whereas the other areas are
perceived to have no history(ies) until specific full-fledged nations/nation-states
emerge as its loci'. Consequently, until Scotland is again a nation(-state), its (national)
history cannot be taught as such. However, Scotland's national history is not extinct:
Well, we're no' feart now. Jim Sillars' verdict on our timid response to the
flawed constitutional challenge in 1979 might well have been right. But no-
one can now doubt our desire to embrace the biggest constitutional change in
nearly 300 years of our history. (HERA 130997)
It is our history, i.e. the history of Scotland that faces the big constitutional change.
References are made to 1707 and 1979, constructing an historical continuity between
'then' and 'now'. History and devolution are closely intertwined in the following
extracts from 1997, all discussing the potential venue for the new Scottish parliament:
In an ideal world the Scottish parliament would be sited in the royal burgh of
Stirling. The town itself is deeply historic; its location is the most convenient
in Scotland; it has excellent road and rail links; and it has excellent sites for
the parliament. (HERA230997)
The first extract establishes the historicity of Stirling, which is also referred to in the
second extract. Stirling is deeply historic in many ways - it is the site of decisive
battles, the Wallace monument, Stirling Castle. But none of that is mentioned in the
leader article, as readers are supposed to know all these details of Scottish 'national
history'. But all of them are constructing a historically expanded 'we', creating a link
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with the past, so necessary for the authenticity of the nation in (re)making. Wodak et
al. note that 'historical memory is an indispensable prerequisite for national identity'
and 'the further into the past the real or imaginary memories reach, the more securely
national identity is supported' (1999:25). The cartoon below goes back seven
centuries:
Cartoon 78. Published in Scotland on Sunday on 14 September 1997
The potential site of the new parliament lends to a number of further speculations on
the history topoi:
As to that, the capital should perhaps be reminded that home rule is for all of
Scotland, not just for one council with hard-to-let office space on its hands.
The parliament building, whether new or refurbished, should be chosen
with history and the nation as a whole in mind. It should not be a hotch¬
potch of architectural bits and pieces. Edinburgh - and Scotland - can do better
than this. (SCOT130897)
Of more pressing importance is the site. While there are still convincing
arguments for simply refurbishing the old Royal High School building on
Calton Hill - its elegant design and position, for example - it represents a
Scotland which has faded into history. True, its presence is a reminder of
the heady days of the Enlightenment when Scottish thinkers dominated the
European intellectual stage but at this critical juncture in our history
Scotland should be looking ahead and not into the past. (SCOT051097)
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This first extract emphasises the importance of the decision for the whole of Scotland.
The new Scottish parliament should be a parliament for 'the [Scottish] nation as a
whole'. The second extract emphasises the need to look forward - but even when
suggesting a need for a break from the past, it establishes continuity with that past (a
transformation strategy). This 'break with a past' slightly contradicts leader articles in
the same newspaper just a week or two earlier:
THREE possible sites have emerged from a list of several dozen, it seems, for
the new Scottish parliament. Of these a complex based around Edinburgh's
former Royal High School begins to look the most plausible, and is certainly
the choice of this newspaper. [...] The High School it must be. (SCOT230997)
it remains difficult to understand why an imaginative scheme for Edinburgh's
Calton Hill area, providing a new focusfor the life of the capital and a symbol
for all ofScotland, has been discarded. (SCOT300997)
The Scotsman has since decided that the new parliament should start anew, afresh,
and thus look further from the Royal High School building on Calton Hill. Note the
use of the renewal and life metaphors in the last extract. In any case, this is a Janus-
faced decision, a no-win situation. Although the new parliament has to look into the
future, it still has to look at the past. Despite many benefits, the other proposed venue
is inappropriate, as
although Leith is the port of Scotland's capital it does not share
Edinburgh's historical resonance. (SCQT051097)
Or to be more correct, Leith is a place with history, but it is not the right kind of
history, it is not a suitably national history:
IT is no disrespect to Leith, a proud place with a long history, to suggest that
it is not the ideal site for a Scottish parliament. (SCQT300997).
Despite the claims of Stirling for its deep historicity, and Leith having a proud history
as well, Edinburgh, and especially the city centre, is more historic, and thus more
suitable as the venue for the new Scottish parliament:
If Edinburgh is truly to be Scotland's political capital the parliament
must be at its heart. The building must be prominent, commanding, a sign
in stone of what home rule is supposed to mean. It must be knitted into the
historic fabric of the city, not deposited willy-nilly at the waterfront simply
because the Scottish Office has a piece of land handy. Leith is on the fringe
of Edinburgh and no worse, in any other circumstance, for that. To choose it
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as the site for the parliament sends out the wrong signals, however, and plants
the disturbing suspicion that our new democracy might be a prisoner of
bureaucracy. (SCOT300997)
By history and tradition Edinburgh has the greatest claim to be
Scotland's political capital. It is also the centre of the country's legal and
educational institutions and an international financial centre in its own right.
Even its most perfervid detractors cannot deny these facts. If Scotland wants
to be regarded as a nation, and perhaps even in the future as an
independent country, it is inconceivable that its parliament should not sit
in its capital city. (SCQT051097)
Nations do not only need myths of common origin and past, but can also 'thrive on
myths of the future' (Eriksen 2004:53). And although Scotland is looking into its past
to justify the need for devolution, it is also firmly looking into the bright future ahead
without Westminster dominance.
But it is fair to say that in most extracts above the term 'history' is used deictically to
note 'national history', and the media is actively discussing whether and which
'history' is suitably 'national'.
8.2.3. Nation
Nation is one of the most important deictic notions in the context of the discursive
construction of national identities. Nation 'depends on people defining a community
as such' (McCrone 2001 a:52), and it is illuminating to see how the media define the
concept. Again, the deictic reference of the 'nation' changes - sometimes 'nation'
means Scotland, sometimes Britain. And sometimes it wanders between these two, as
most other deictic notions I have looked at previously.
8.2.3.1. Scottish nation
As with previously discussed deictic notions, 'nation' usually means the Scottish
nation. The existence of such a nation is taken for granted:
So why vote yes, as the Economist very reluctantly would if it were on the
electoral register in Scotland? The main reason is that a bad scheme does not
destroy a good principle, which is that a nation - such as Scotland
undoubtedly is, with its own legal, educational, and other systems, not to
speak of a strong sense of national identity - has the right to govern its own
affairs. (HERA260279)
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Secondly, there is a difference between a nation and a principality. It is now
established beyond doubt that Scotland and Wales are different cases. The
point of home rule here was to enable Scotland as a nation to fit more easily
within the United Kingdom. (SCOT200997)
Even John Major did not attempt to deny what Mr Mandelson seems to deny -
that Scotland is a nation. (SCOT250997)
Both these extracts use qualifying statements to emphasise the depth and rootedness
of Scottish nationness. The first extract emphasises that Scotland is 'undoubtedly' a
nation with 'a strong sense of national identity'. The second draws a distinction
between a Scottish nation and Welsh principality. The third extract mentions that even
the archetypal anti-devolutionist John Major does not deny the nationness of Scotland.
Whereas several extracts use constructive strategies by building an historic continuity
between the Scottish people of 1707 and 1979/1997, the historic continuity does not
necessarily have to make links to the past. Although strategy of 'rooting' the nation is
popular in nationalist discourse, the future is just as important for nation-building,, as
already mentioned while discussing the role of deixis 'history':
... support for devolution depends not on calculation but on faith and hope in
the future of a small nation whose character has undergone a quickening
process of erosion. (SCOT030379)
We have already said that we believe that normal life should continue and that
it is entirely appropriate that this should happen while people mourn. We
believe that the devolution campaign should continue in a dignified manner
throughout this same period because it is of great and lasting importance for
the future of the nation, but we do not in any way include witless political
bile in a definition of normal life. (HERA040997)
In the scant days left before polling we all have a duty to weigh these matters,
and to vote with our eyes Firmly on the future of our nation.
(HERA080997)
The following extract uses the link with the past (1707) and the future together,
constructing a historically expanded nation again:
Saying Yes to the future
The need now, above all, is for that passion which turns the pages of history.
It is the passion which earned a small nation off on the northern fringes of
Europe its name in the world. It is the passion of poets, scientists, engineers,
entrepreneurs and statesmen. It is the thing that has kept Scotland's sense of
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itself intact for nigh on three centuries while other nations have been born,
flickered briefly, and have gone.
Now it requires only expression. The arguments are all but done. The
questions which remain are two-fold and they turn on Scotland's ability to
say Yes to the future. (SCQT080997)
And then there is the 'wandering nation'. The following extract uses the deixis
'nation' quite ambiguously:
Decisions have already been taken about how the nation will pay its respects:
close all the shops; play no spectator sports. From a particularly Scottish
perspective, should another one have been taken: tape up the ballot boxes?
[...]
Our political leaders have decided that there should be only quiet activity this
week, reviewed on a daily basis. At their best, they are astute at taking the
mood of the nation, and such has been the emotional response to the
Princess's death throughout the land that low-level campaigning was, it
seems, the only realistic option. (HERA020997)
The first paragraph begins by using the concept to mean the 'British nation'. It then
contrasts this to the Scottish nation by looking at the response to Princess Diana's
death 'from a particularly Scottish perspective', talking about 'another' decision. This
move can be interpreted both as contrasting 'Scotland' to 'nation/Britain', or as
nesting the 'Scottish nation' within the 'British nation'. The second paragraph is just
as ambiguous. 'Our political leaders' can mean both British and Scottish politicians.
'The mood of the nation' and 'throughout the land' can be understood both as Scottish
and British. The end of the paragraph, however, refers to Scotland, as it mentions the
'low-level campaigning'.
8.2.3.2. British nation
The concept of the British nation is evoked in three main instances in Scottish media.
Firstly, the British nation is evoked in the face of a (threatening) external Other.
Secondly, the British nation is used when talking about 'British national' issues.
Whereas Scottish newspapers seem to restrict the use of the word 'nation' to Scotland,
the word 'national' remains often British/the UK. Thirdly, the British nation is evoked
if something internal brings the 'nation' together.
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British nation versus the external Other
Eriksen writes that 'contrasting is also politically important in more immediate ways.
Polyethnic and class-divided Britain thus achieved a rare level of national cohesion
during the Falklands/Malvinas war in 1982' (Eriksen 2004:57). The situation does not
always need to be as extreme. Dealings with the European Union can also unify
Britain. The following extracts show the British nation as united against an external
Other - European Community:
The EEC is undoubtedly an object of popular hostility ... But the real
grievances about Europe are much more real. ... the truth is that Britain is
getting a raw deal in Europe, in terms both of her financial contribution and
some of her essential national interests. (SCOT 100379)
The single European currency is just one area where referendum dangers lie in
wait. If, as seems likely, the majority of European nations go ahead with
monetary union on time and if, as is possible, there are benefits for Britain in
joining them, the proposed referendum could be a nightmare. (E1ERA200997)
In these extracts, the nation is British, as opposed to the European Community and
'other people' in Europe.
Scottish nation, British national
The British nation is often used when discussing 'British national' issues. Whereas
Scottish newspapers seem to restrict the use of the word 'nation' to Scotland, the word
'national' remains often British.
This week the EEC summit is due to inaugurate the European Monetary
System, without the full participation of Britain. Many civil servants and
politicians hope for its collapse sooner or later because it threatens national
control of key economic instruments. (SCOT120379a)
Mrs Thatcher's broadcast last night was judiciously low key, echoing Mr
Callaghan's appeal to national unity but likewise replete with hints of
electoral battles to come. (SCOT240379)
The truth is perhaps not so startling. Our growth rate this year is expected to
be just under that of the world; but it is true, as she [Mrs Thatcher] implies,
that unless the country's wealth can grow at a rather faster rate then the
pressures for its redistribution will keep building up. Perhaps that is why
industrial conflict looms so large in our national consciousness (though the
economic cost of strikes is small). (SCOT260379)
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The political position and strength which he enjoys, and his subtle and
successful management of a moment of apparent national crisis, have
combined to place Mr Blair at a point of influence which has not been
paralleled since Mrs Thatcher was at her full and controversial height.
(HERA090997)
Dounreay may be a scientific mongrel, unloved by all outside the nuclear
family, but it is also a political hybrid of a peculiar sort. As a nuclear plant the
responsibility for ensuring that it does not blow up, and other sundry useful
tasks, falls to national government, in particularly the Department of Trade
and Industry. (HERA 150997)
Something had to give, and it did when council leader Robert Gould made his
off-the-cuff remarks about votes for trips. With hindsight, it is now clear that
he unwittingly provided Labour's national leadership with the excuse, if not
the evidence, to take its crusade for probity into its heartland. (HERA250997)
Princess Diana effect
Again, the death of Princess Diana stretches the meaning of 'nation'. Almost
overnight, all notions of Scottish nation have been replaced with the talks about
British nation.
The reaction of each one is different and the reaction of one individual is as
important and valid as the reaction of any other. Because of this it is wrong,
we believe, for the imposition of a particular state of mourning on the nation.
(HERA030997)43
Emotions of a nation: Perverse alchemists at work
[...] Perverse alchemists are at work, fashioning their spells in reverse and,
while we have known from the Middle Ages that base metal cannot be turned
into gold, it seems that in terms of the emotions of the nation the opposite is
entirely possible. This is not a comment on the genuine feelings of grief and
loss felt by large numbers of people throughout the nation at the death of
Diana, Princess of Wales. [...] Grappling with the display of emotion at the
death of the Princess, some have sought to render it down by portraying it as
some sort of sea-change in the behaviour of the people of Britain, a switch in
national habit from traditional reserve to the free expression of feelings and
emotions. Responsible for it, of course, is the poor, dead Princess herself
through her willingness to talk openly and publicly about her many problems.
This is utter and demeaning rubbish. It is demeaning because it denies the
well-springs of decency and emotion which have always existed in our
nation and it is rubbish because it suggests that a very controversial, if
431 recently came across a poem published in the Black Dwarf in London on Wednesday 2 December
1818 'On hearing of the death of Her Majesty'. Note the assumption that there is a certain 'particular
state of mourning' (hat is expected from the nation:
Ah Me! What news is this I hear? / Alas? The say the Queen is dead! / Bless me! The onions will be
dear, / For tears offashion must be shed!
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fascinating, figure had powers which would make Svengali blanch.
(HERA040997)
It is reasonable to assume that the world will not end on Saturday as Diana,
Princess of Wales is interred but there must be many people who wonder, in
the light of the display of public emotion over her death, what has happened to
our country and where we go from here. This is a uniquely difficult question to
address. It is unlikely, as we said yesterday, that there has been a sea-change in
the nation from the sort of people who bear emotion stoically to those who
are able to display it publicly; from stiff upper lip to trembling lower lip. [...]
Yet we must at least examine the possibility that a change of attitude has taken
place which may, or may not, continue to filter through the veins of the
nation in 10 or 20 years. [...] There is nothing wrong with change and, heaven
knows, the nation longed for political change in May. (HERA050997a)
Just as with 'we' and 'people', the death of Princess Diana widens the scope of the
deixis 'nation'.
8.2.4. Country
Lastly, 'country' is another national deixis, aiming to build and/or fortify a nation-
state (Kamusella 1999). The word is ambiguous. It can function as a synonym for
'nation', or it can function as a synonym for 'rural' (Rosie et al. 2004:443). The use of
the deixis 'country' in the Scottish media is again very varied, but usually it is used to
mean 'nation'. The deixis 'country' can again refer to Scotland or Britain. Here are
few examples of the Scottish 'country' - curiously, mostly from the Herald:
Those Scots who wish for an end to those advantages, for a complete
separation of their country from England, should certainly vote "Yes."
(HERA260279)
The real question - whether we still believe in the power of government to
create an inclusive civic culture which can, with vision and determination,
enhance a small country's performance and improve the lives of its people -
goes on begging for an answer. (HERA200897)
The polling organisations have a hard task on their hands when they try to
make sense of the various currents of opinion swirling around the country
and one of the few certainties is that any poll conducted by telephone is
unlikely to be even remotely accurate. (HERA270897)
With his long arms and legs Mr Dewar is the very mould of a one-man band,
able to pull strings, bang drums, and tweak cymbals simultaneously and he has
done this to excellent political effect around the country. (HERA280897)
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By the end of this week Scotland will have faced the challenge of creative
constitutional change; of grasping the opportunity to take control of our own
domestic affairs within the framework of a united kingdom. By all sensible
measures of opinion it seems likely that the country will embrace the
opportunity to have a devolved parliament with law-making powers over those
aspects of day-to-day life which affect everyone. (HERA080997)
There has been a debate, and what a debate! It has been lively, informed,
passionate, sometimes downright abusive but never boring. It has poured in
from every corner of the country, and from abroad through readers of the
electronic Herald on the Internet. (HERA 110997)
Every region in Scotland voted for the devolved parliament, although Orkney
and Dumfries and Galloway were nervous about tax-varying powers.
Despite that, the vote in Scotland showed a heartening level of agreement right
across the country. (HERA 160997)
Note how the last three extract emphasise the unanimity of the (projected) referendum
decision. Here are some examples of the British 'country':
The assembly is bound to mean a step into the unknown; and constitutional
change, particularly in a country with no written constitution, is bound to be
messy. (HERA 130279)
It is easy to see how the position arose. The parties are the normal vehicle for
the expression of political opinion and broadcasting time is allocated to them
more or less automatically on a formula related to their voting strength in the
country. (HERA 170279)
Mrs Thatcher is gathering her skirts about her, ready for the fray. In a speech
on Saturday she gave us some inkling of the line she will be pursuing in an
election campaign. Such is the stagnation of the economy that she does not
have to try too hard to paint a picture of a country gripped in Socialist-
induced lethargy. But the grammar of adversary politics demand that she
express this in more dramatic terms. Therefore Britain is bound for the scrap
heap. [...] The truth is perhaps not so startling. Our growth rate this year is
expected to be just under that of the world; but it is true, as she implies, that
unless the country's wealth can grow at a rather faster rate then the pressures
for its redistribution will keep building up. (SCOT260379)
Their jockeying for power has had its entertaining moments, but generally it
has had the effect of reassuring the country that one or the other has been in
charge and making decisions - with one glaring exception. (HERA 190897)
Again, one can trace so-called 'Princess Diana effect' in the media - the death of
Princess of Wales expands the notion of the 'country':
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Nevertheless there is a balance to be struck and we return to our original point
about the suspension of reality. We are not mourning the death of someone
close to us in the same way a member of our families would be close. It is
important to be honest and to acknowledge that there are many people in the
country who, although saddened by the needless death of a fellow human
being, do not feel the need to mourn deeply. (HERA030997)
If the alchemists are bad the commissars of grief are every bit as troubling.
People must be allowed to grieve for Princess Diana however they want. It is
wrong for them to be shunted into emotional straitjackets by those who believe
that they know best, who want to shut down the entire country on Saturday
for what they conceive of as a properly reverential farewell. (HERA040997)
If devolution is a very Scottish affair (with consequences for the whole of UK
though), then after Diana's death all these concepts - nation, country - were stretched,
to encompass the whole of Britain into one 'we' in this moment of commemoration
and sadness.
8.3. Concluding remarks
Considering the complexity of identifications in Scotland, it would be wrong to say
that deictic notions like 'we', 'nation(al)', 'country', 'people' etc. in the media
automatically mean 'British', as could be expected from the 'mission statements' (i.e.
leader articles) of Scottish national newspapers (i.e. The Scotsman and The (Glasgow)
Herald) in the context of a major national event (i.e. devolution referenda), if one
takes Billig's banal nationalism as the starting point. But it would be equally wrong to
assume that the media always addresses its readers as Scottish. The use of deictic
notions in the Scottish media is much more complex and depends heavily on the
context. But so is the issue of identity in Scotland in general. According to various
public opinion polls, the majority of Scots prioritise being Scottish (Bond and Rosie
2002). But although Scottishness is highlighted over Britishness, there is an element
of Britishness present, as 'to Scots ... national and state identities are distinct, and in
that order, but not antithetical to one another' (McCrone 2002:304). One could say,
that this is reflected in the media. Or - maybe it is the other way around? We are back
to the chicken and egg question of the media sociologist and discourse analysts - is
the (media) discourse constitutive of society, or does it constitute society?
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9. Scottishness in political cartoons
Chapter Five explained the approach to analysing visual materials, and chapter 6 the
role of political cartoons and political humour in general. This chapter discusses the
presentation of Scottish devolution and identity in political cartoons, and analyses
political cartoons as an arena for the discursive construction of Scottish national
identity. A sample of cartoons was drawn from the same two time frames as the
textual data corpus. The corpus includes 86 political cartoons from a wide range of
Scottish and British newspapers, both broadsheets and tabloids, providing an
opportunity to compare the coverage of Scottish devolution between, crudely put, left-
and right-wing newspapers, between various media organisations and across different
formats.
I have not, thus far, come across any other studies of political cartoons and
devolution, or Scottish politics, so this research is mainly exploratory. Indeed, I did
not set out to look at political cartoons when I began my research and data collection.
But while I was analysing leader articles, it became increasingly clear that comment
and opinion was contained as much in cartoons as in leader articles, and therefore it
made sense to look at the political cartoons, as well as consider the links between the
visual and textual comment. While the leader articles present the anonymous
corporate view of the newspaper (Seymour-Ure 1997:586), the editorial cartoon is
often somewhat less the representation of the newspaper's point of view than the
cartoonists. One of my interviewees at the Guardian explained that newspaper's
cartoonist, Steve Bell
comes up to the office to draw cartoons and he attends the Party conferences.
He's a good example of the freedom that The Guardian has. He draws actually
outrageous cartoons that are going to offend people and the Editor will look at
them and he'll shiver but he lets them go through. (Interview 10)
The extract implies that cartoonists have relatively free hands in their choice of topics
for daily cartoons. However, Brinkman suggested that it is in the interest of the editor
to 'control' the cartoonist, as cartoons and editorials presented together are more
effective in bringing about opinion change than either one of them alone. They are
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especially powerful if they propose similar arguments (Brinkman 1968). This suggests
that the majority of the cartoons in my data corpus would be related to the same topic
as the leader article on that day; and probably also put forward the same main
argument.
Secondly, the literature on political cartoons suggests several 'typical' thematic
sources for editorial cartoons. Cartoons often have 'their targets are in the field of
political or public affairs, but they may be social customs, fashions, or sports events or
personalities' (Low and Williams 2000). Personification 'of one kind or another,
notably the personification of the nations in the shape of John Bull and Uncle Sam
and the Russian Bear, forms the very alphabet of political caricature of the present
day' (Maurice and Cooper 2000). I expect that many cartoons will be 'personalised'
in the sense that they focus on personalities involved in the Scottish devolution
referenda.
Thirdly, McCrone et al. discuss the 'tartanisation' of Scottish culture, and find that
there is 'no shortage of Scottish iconography; if anything, it is too overwhelming. It
appears in films, novels, poems, paintings, photographs, as well as on shortbread tins'
(1999:49). In its pursuit of difference from England, Scotland has preferred 'a Celtic
and Gaelic definition' and this has lead to 'the extraordinary efflorescence of
Highland and Gaelic imagery in the self-presentation and assumed genealogy of
modern Scotland' (Chapman 1978:92; cited in McCrone et al. 1999:57). While
Wigston, who analysed the representation of Aids in South African political cartoons,
had to look for indexical and symbolic signs alone instead of iconic signs, as there
was no readily available iconic sign to represent the disease (Wigston 2002), I
expected to find a wide variety of 'tartanised iconography of Scotland' in my data. As
an example of a widely tartanised cartoon, consider the following cartoon published in
the Times on the day of the 1997 devolution referendum:
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Cartoon 67. Published in The Times on 11 September 1997
Simple iconographic reading of the cartoon reveals the supposedly Scottish icons of
the Highland Cow, thistle, and the Highland mountains. More thorough reading
suggests that the Highland cow, blinded by its hairy coat, is about to run over the cliff.
The implied message here is that the Scots are about to fall as well. Indeed, Magnus
Linklater, a well-known columnist and the former editor of the Scotsman, wrote in an
article adjacent to the cartoon that
Scotland will vote today in a spirit of optimism and adventure rather than
pessimism and caution. It has listened to the stark warnings about its great
constitutional experiment, and if the polls are anything to go by - has decided
to risk it anyway. (TIME110998)
Although Linklater's comments are quite kind and optimistic, combined with the
cartoon, the message is that the Scots are somewhat reckless and experimental,
ignoring the 'stark warnings' (possibly in the form of the stormy clouds on the
cartoon). The following cartoon from the Daily Express on the day of the 1997
devolution referendum is also using a wide array of supposedly Scottish iconography:
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Cartoon 70. Caption: "Ave, Hamish, Maggie warned of an English backlash!" Published in The
Express on 11 September 1997
This time we have an image of the Hadrian's Wall (depicting, falsely, the
geographical border between Scotland and England), sheep, the Highlands, and the
Scottish shepherds in kilt. On the other side, across the dividing wall, we can see the
Union Jack.
9.1. Analysis of cartoons
Brinkman (1968) suggested that cartoons can be influential and bring about greater
opinion change, if presented together with the editorials. And vice versa - the leader
articles accompanied by a cartoon result in greater opinion change, especially when if
the cartoon presents similar arguments as the editorial. I compared all cartoons with
the leader article/major opinion article on the given day and found that the cartoon
almost always illustrates - and thus reflects - the topic of the main editorial comment,
although not necessarily the leader article itself. Not all cartoons were on the same
topic as the leader article, nor were they always published next to the leader article.
Often the editorial cartoon appeared on the front page, usually next to a major opinion
piece, whereas the leader article is usually inside the paper. On a few occasions, there
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was more than one cartoon in the same newspaper on any given day, reflecting
different main articles. Thus, the potential of the cartoons under the study to be
socially constitutive and bring about opinion change is quite considerable - provided
that the audience understands the cartoons in the way the cartoonist and editorial
intended.
The analysis of political cartoons in this thesis is informed by the grounded approach.
Based on the initial reading of the cartoons, it focuses on the topics covered, persons
depicted, and the use of Scottish iconography in the editorial cartoons. In the
following I will be looking at various icons and themes depicted in political cartoons.
The categories under study were based on the following criteria: if the same image
was used in two or more cartoons in the cartoon data corpus, a separate category was
created for that image. 18 images were coded more than once, resulting in a separate
category. There is definitely no shortage of Scottish iconography - the whole Scottish
iconography was used in the cartoons: tartan, Nessie, thistle, kilts, heather, haggis,
Highland cattle, Saltire, Highlands, whisky, lion. The stereotypical Scottish icons are
widely used in the available population of cartoons (i.e. cartoons from all newspapers
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As we can see, about one third of cartoons are 'tartanised', and 17 per cent of
cartoonists have literally 'put the kilt on' their cartoon. The Highlands and the Saltire
were other widely used images. In 1979 the Glasgow Herald's cartoonist Turnbull
popularised a Rampant Lion to represent the people of Scotland. The non-Scottish
papers published cartoons using a much wider variety of 'Scottish iconography',
including the Scottish terrier, grouse, thistle, sheep, Edinburgh
Castle etc.
2.LM
I will look at some of the sources of the imagery used in cartoons below, as this will
help us understand the popularity and (intended) meaning of these images.
The Highlands
A lot of the 'Scottish icons' in cartoons - the mountains and glens, the sheep, the
Nessie, the kilt, tartan, thistle, etc. - can grouped under the common denominator -
the Highlands. Although today Scotland has symbolically appropriated the Highlands,
this is a recent development. When
the Highlands did become part of the vocabulary in the medieval period, it was
in response to a need to isolate and distinguish a part of Scotland that differed
in cultural and social terms from the rest. A crucial difference was linguistic
for, as Gaelic retreated from the Lowlands, the 'Highlands' became more
culturally distinctive and linguistically separate from other parts of the
kingdom. (Devine 1999:231)
Using a classic Gellnerian term, the Highlanders were the Ruritarians of Scotland at
the time (Gellner 1983). The Highlanders and their culture were seen by the Lowland
Scots as inferior and dangerous, and therefore 'had to be assimilated to the social and
cultural norms that prevailed in the rest of Scotland' (Devine 1999:232). The popular
attitudes towards the Highlanders were far from positive and friendly:
There was a long tradition of anti-Highland satire in both Lowland poetry and
song which can be traced back into the Middle Ages. ... caricatured the Gael
as stupid, violent, comic, feckless and filthy. ... The Highlander also inhabited
a physical world of desolation, barrenness and ugliness; and to the Lowland
mind, before the revolution in aesthetic taste of the later eighteenth century,
the north of Scotland was both inhospitable and threatening' (Devine
1999:232)
Thus for a long time the Highlanders were the negative Other for the 'mainstream'
Lowland and Central Belt Scots. This began to change in the middle of eighteenth
century. Chapman describes in The Gaelic Vision of Scottish Culture how the
Highlanders and their culture, previously considered inferior, became gradually
appropriated by Lowland Scots44. While until the middle of the eighteenth century 'the
Highlands had been invested with the symbolism or the exotic, the foreign,' by the
end of that century 'all of Scotland was being colonised by that sign' (McCrone
44 The Gaelic appropriation and the invention of the Highland tradition are extensively covered
elsewhere (Chapman 1978; Trevor-Roper 1983; Womack 1989; McCrone 1992, 2001a; Devine 1999).
225
2001a:40). Today the Highlands are considered emblematic for 'real Scotland' and
are used symbolically as 'metaphors of the nation' (Eriksen 1992:64). There 'is the
added irony that the Highlands provide many of the images and meanings for
Scotland as a whole in the late twentieth century. In cultural terms, its imagery
dominates' (McCrone 200la:67). As Chapman wrote,
We are faced with the problem that a language not understood by 98% of the
Scottish people, with a modern literary tradition that only begins to assume
importance in the late 18th century and is still very small ... and spoken by a
people who have been regarded for centuries by their southern neighbours as
barbarians should now be regarded as the quintessence of Scottish culture.
(1978:12)
Consider the following cartoon:
Cartoon 88. Published in the Daily Telesravh in August 1994
Peter Womack conceded in his Improvement and Romance: Constructing the Myth of
the Highlands, that 'the Highlands acquired the role of representing Scotland for the
English' (1989:148). This is clearly obvious in the above cartoon from an 'English'
newspaper. The Scottish iconography is used to the full: a dour and unsmiling
Scotsman in a kilt, the national 'flower' the thistle, the Highlands, the stag
(reminiscent of the Monarch of the Glen painting by Sir Edwin Landseer). Although
Highland imagery is often used in Scottish cartoons, they are even more common in
cartoons published south of the Border. Indeed, the Highlands have become to
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represent Scotland for the English (Womack 1989). Again, consider the following,
more recent political cartoon from a British tabloid:
Daily M*M, Thursday, Ally 1,20C4
Bo off with ye! My wife and I will not have unnatural acts performed in oor hoose!'
Cartoon 234. Published in the Daily Mail on 1 July 2994,
The cartoon illustrates the news story about a Highland guesthouse owner Mr Forrest
who refused a gay couple a double room, labelling them 'sexual deviants'. The
cartoon uses the Highland imagery of the glens and mountains, thistle, sheep and the
man in kilt. Again, the cartoon is quite outrageous, and the message would be
unacceptable if spelled out in words. The above cartoon is from a London-based
tabloid The Daily Mail, hence the cartoon can be said to represent Scotland for the
English readership through the Highland imagery. Interestingly though, the very same
cartoon was published in the Scottish edition of Daily Mail. One could hence argue
that the cartoon depicts the Highlands alone, and is not an example of the Scottish
appropriation of the Highlands. The way the cartoonist has chosen to depict
guesthouse owners gives the cartoon a very anti-Highlands feel and could thus be seen
as an example of negative othering of the Highlands (internal Other). In this case it
seems that the anti-Highland satire mentioned by Devine is not extinct yet.
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Flags
Flags are one of the important icons expressing nationness and they have been used
for centuries as markers of identity (see Billig 1995; McCrone 1998:41; Dunkerley et
al. 2002:53). 'States increasingly began to use flags in the medieval period,' and 'the
flag of Denmark, the Dannebrog ('Danish Cloth') is the oldest national flag in
continuous usage' (Dunkerley et al. 2002:53)45. Flags are widely used in political
cartoons, as they are handy markers of identity. In the cartoon below, the Queen wears
a hat and a handbag with the Union Jack, symbolising 'a strong sense of British
national and imperial identity' (McCrone 2001a: 113). The Prime Minister, though,
flashes a Saltire under his kilt:
Cartoon 123. Published in The Express on Sunday on 27 July 1997
Flashing the Saltire under the kilt was depicted on at least three cartoons in July 1997. The Labour
Party's announcement about plans for devolution referendum is in this way pictured as something
shocking, unexpected, surprising, possibly even unacceptable.
The Saltire, national flag of Scotland, depicts the cross of St Andrew, Scotland's saint.
The meaning of the Saltire for its users can vary. 'To Scottish Nationalists, flying the
Saltire ... may signify a counter-nationalism to that of the British state, whereas to
Unionists it implies that being Scottish and being British are complementary not
45
Dannebrog dates back to the thirteenth century when it allegedly fell from the Heavens during the
1219 battle of Lindanise (former name ofmy hometown Tallinn) between 'Danes' and 'Estonians'.
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competing identities' (McCrone 1998:41). In the cartoons, it often symbolises
Scotland:
Cartoon 117. Published in Daily Teleeravh on 25 July 1997 (left). Cartoon 24. Published in the
Scotsman on 1 March 1979 (right)
Of course, just as the meaning of the Saltire for its users can vary, the Union Jack can
have very different connotations:
Cartoon 71. Published in the Guardian on 11 September 1997
If on cartoon 123 (previous page) the Union Jack could be interpreted as representing
a more or less 'neutral' British identity, then on this cartoon it represents Britain in a
negative sense. Margaret Thatcher, the epitome of the No No camp, brandishing
Union Jack on her face, is depicted as a scary figure, the negative Other.
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Buildings
Various buildings can be used metonymically in cartoons. The new parliament
building was described as 'a symbol for all of Scotland' (SCOT300997), 'a national
symbol' (SCOT230997) in a number of leader articles. Here the symbolic building is
the Royal High School:
"JTj mjk» TCiif- wind up litn*, laUtJ"
Cartoon 21. Published in the Glasgow Herald on 28 February 1979
Again, the above cartoon is pregnant with Scottish iconography. Apart from the
metonymic use of Assembly building, the cartoon also depicts the indecisive lion,
singing Nessie and Haggis, all in the foreground of the Highland mountains.
Personifications
As said above, there are 'typical' topics for editorial cartoons, and various
personifications are one of them. The table below shows the politicians that appeared





Callaghan, James 15 - 15
Blair, Tony - 13 13
Dewar, Donald - 11 11
Thatcher, Margaret - 6 6
Foot, Michael 6 - 6
Dalyell, Tarn 3 3 6
Hague, William - 3 3
Macdonald, Margo 3 - 3
Healey, Dennis 3 - 3
Wilson, Harold 2 - 2
Prescott, John - 2 2
Depictions of politicians are rather colourful. For example, on cartoons below,
Callaghan is depicted as a bagpipe, Thatcher as a monument:
Cartoon 23.Cartoon by Michael Cummings. Published in Daily Express on 28 February 1979 (left).
Cartoon 63. Caption 'Minority sect hold bizarre eve of poll ceremony'. Published in the Herald on 10
September 1997 (right)
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Note that Prime Ministers appear frequently on cartoons in both data sets. A
prominent Scottish politician Donald Dewar is also present in 1997, followed by
Home Secretary Michael Foot in 1979 and former MP Thatcher in 1997. And whereas
Margaret Thatcher does play an important role in the period leading up to and
following the 1979 devolution referendum, she is curiously absent from the first data
set (however, she appears often in cartoons preceding the 1979 devolution
referendum). The only politician to span the two time frames on cartoons is Tarn
Dalyell.
Cartoon 49. Published in the Scotsman on 28 August 1997
Copying 'high art'
Although cartoons in general do not aim at being high art (Wigston 2002:76), the
cartoonists happily use 'history and cultural comparisons are another common source
of imagery' (Seymour-Ure 1998a:3). Although popular, so-called 'copycat cartoons'
should be drawn with care by cartoonists. Maurice & Cooper warn that
the best type of caricature should not require a high degree of intelligence.
Many clever cartoonists overreach themselves by an excess of cleverness,
appealing at best to a limited audience. Of this type are the cartoons whose
point lies in parodying some famous painting or a masterpiece of literature,
which, as a result, necessarily remains caviar to the general [audience]. (2000)
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Wigston, who analysed the representation of AIDS in South African cartoons, agrees
that unless the reader has a knowledge of a particular painting parodied in the cartoon,
'the whole argument put forward in the cartoon is missed' (Wigston 2002:92). There
were a number of cartoons in my data corpus that are parodying some famous
paintings or a masterpiece of film, and thus can remain 'a caviar to the general'.
Consider the following cartoon from The Independent:
Cartoon 47. Published in The Independent on 21 August 1997 (left)
Sir Henry Raeburn (1784) The Reverend Robert Walker Skating on Duddinnston Loch. Oil on canvas.
National Gallery of Scotland. Edinburgh (right)
The cartoon depicts Donald Dewar skating on a lake. On the first instance the cartoon
does not say much - we can see that Mr Dewar is supporting the Yes-Yes campaign,
that there is 'Paisley'46 written over the hat, swept off by the wind, and that Dewar is
just about to skate onto a thin broken ice. The cartoon is based on a famous picture by
Sir Henry Raeburn (1756-1823). This is a particularly Scottish image, e.g. also the
symbol of the National Gallery of Scotland. Dewar looks rather sour, and thus reflects
the bleak landscape behind him. As the CartoonHub comments,
What should have been a triumphant demonstration of cross-party unity with
Donald Dewar, Liberal Democrat Menzies Campbell and Scottish Nationalist,
Alex Salmond at a meeting on the forthcoming referendum on devolution
46 See the footnote in section 6.3.4. on Paisley crisis.
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resulted in questions from the floor which were persistently about the death by
suicide of the Labour MP for Paisley, Gordon McMaster. (CartoonHub,
PC2436)
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The same cartoonist, Dave Brown, is the author of another art-inspired cartoon,
above. This time the source of inspiration is a movie poster for The Seven Year Itch by
Billy Wilder (20th Century Fox, 1955).
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Cartoon 118. Published in The Independent on 25 July 1997 (left)
The cartoon depicts Donald Dewar, while looking like Marilyn Monroe, in the role of
Richard Sherman, the itchy protagonist, whose imagination gets the better of him at
the end of the movie. Although one can make sense of the cartoon looking at the
image and reading the caption alone, it gets a different meaning if one is familiar with
the movie.
Apathy
In 1979, the topos of apathy was very common in leader articles, and apathy was an
inspiration for a number of political cartoons. Here is an oversized lady who, despite
leaning on the polling booth, cannot be bothered to cast her vote. It is also warning the
readers that no-vote equals to No-vote at the referendum because of the 40%
requirement.
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Cartoon 3. Published in the Scotsman on 13 February 1979
Following the apathy theme, Turnbull drew a series of cartoons with the indecisive
and confused lion for the Glasgow Herald in 1979. The next two cartoons depict the
apathy among the Scots. In both cases the lion, symbolising the people of Scotland,
cannot make up its mind:
Cartoon 13. Published in the Glasgow Herald on 24 February 1979
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On the cartoon above the lion looks unable to make up his mind as he is burdened by
the Apathy's ball and chain and the wounded pride from the failed World Cup
football campaign in Argentina. The same topos of indecisiveness is depicted in the
next cartoon. No amount of dancing, singing and bagpipe playing on behalf of
Callaghan can induce the Lion to choose and make up his mind:
!
Cartoon 19. Published in the Glasgow Herald on 27 February 1979
The lion is still confused, despite all Callaghan's efforts (latter wearing a kilt and
covered in campaign slogans). The cartoon on the front page of the Glasgow Herald
on the 1979 devolution referendum day is full of optimism:
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Het«
Cartoon 24. Published in the Glasgow Herald on 1 March 1979
The Lion, this time dressed in full kilt, is proudly stepping over the No-field of the
ballot paper, heading towards the polling station. The cartoon is full of optimism and
hope. But devolution was not to happen in 1979:
Cartoon 30. Published in the Glassow Herald on 3 March 1979
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The last cartoon shows the post-referendum mood. The Lion's head does not know
what his heart is doing, as well as the rest of the body. Such personification metaphors
are quite popular among cartoonists, as it allows to depict a non-human (lion) with
human characteristics (indecisiveness, bravery), resulting in anthropomorphisation of
the Lion (see Wodak et al. 1999:44). However, the Lion was absent from political
cartoons in 1997. One possible explanation is that the lion was re-appropriated by the
English in 1990s - think of the Three Lions and 1996 Football World Cup.
Renewal, rebirth and change
Chapter 7 mentioned that many headlines contained evolutionary metaphors: The
rebirth of a nation (SCOT 110997), and The first day of a new life (SCOT130997).
Especially the second one gives a lot of promise of a bright future ahead - the use of
'first' and 'new' indicate a change from the (Westminster-dominated) past. Compare
these birth-metaphors with Bill McArthur's cartoon on the referendum day in The
Herald. The cartoon shows three men - one is wearing a kilt, symbolising his
Scottishness, and Tony Blair and Donald Dewar as midwives. The Scottish man in a
kilt is seemingly about to give birth:
Cartoon 68. Published in the Herald on 11 September 1997
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Ironically, the iconographic reading of the cartoon raises more doubts about the birth
of a new Scottish nation than promises. The fact that the person in labour is a man
obviously means that anatomically, there can be no baby at all. Donald Dewar and his
bowl of soapy water can mean that the baby might be thrown out with the bath water
- and possibly hinting to the oft-heard accusation that the whole devolution is in the
interests of Labour politicians and not the Scottish nation. Finally, considering that the
mother-to-be is actually a man with a hairy beard, wobbly knees and slightly drunken
expression, one is triggered to think of Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, of a monster
giving birth - or a man depicted giving birth to a monster. And it can always be a
stillbirth. Under the humorous caricature, several doubts and questions are lurking. It
is also interesting to note how the cartoonist implies that the devolution would be
necessary for the birth of the Scottish nation, as if it did not exist before. Although
Anderson writes that nations 'have no clearly identifiable births, and their deaths, if
they ever happen, are never natural' (Anderson 1991:205), the cartoonist is tentatively
trying to record the exact time and place of the birth of the Scottish nation. This issue
of 'biological' birth takes us back to the 1995 Warwick debates between Anthony D.
Smith and Ernest Gellner and to latter's question whether nations have navels or not.
Another sub-theme is using the strategy of transformation. A number of cartoons
depicted the proposed changes (to the better) that the devolution would bring. The
cartoon below uses the Superman image:
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Cartoon 6. Published in the Scotsman on 19 February 1979.
Accompanying an article on women's rights, the cartoon shows how a hard-working
housewife suddenly turns into a Superwoman. As if all the mundane troubles of
Scotland would disappear with devolution (note the image of the Assembly building
on the Superwoman's outfit).
Maps and break-up of Britain?
Nations are not places as such, but metaphorical places and maps that provide
'everyday abstract image of the nation' (Eriksen 2004:59). This makes maps a
powerful medium of banal nationalism, and they are popular in cartoons. This is not
surprising:
Benedict Anderson has pointed out that in the modem world we have grown
very used to recognising the geographical silhouette of the country to which
we belong. Indeed, it comes in the shape of badges, on national stamps, sports
emblems and so on. The everydayness and implicitness of the emblem
reinforces our identity with it, and we learn to recognise it from atlases,
weather maps, etc. (McCrone 1998:41)
240
A number of cartoons use maps, especially broken maps to imply that devolution may
result in the possible break-up of Britain. Here is one cartoon from pre- referenda era:
Cartoon 177. Published in the Spectator (date unknown)
The cartoon shows Scotland being cut off from the rest of the United Kingdom with
scissors -implying a possible break-up of Britain. The next cartoon is from the British
tabloid on the day of the 1979 devolution referendum. It shows the map of Britain as a
rump of meat hanging at a butchers, and Michael Foot as a butcher offering a piece of
it to a Welsh and Scottish lady, dressed in respective 'national' costumes:
WHO WANTS A CUT OFF THE JOINT ?"
DEVOLUTION BUTCHER
Cartoon 27. Published in the Sun on 1 March 1979
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... SollTS WjjAH B4p
TO THAT 'SORT OfNom&B
RIGHT AWff...
Cartoon 57. Published in the Times on 8 September 1997
Making a reference to the death of Princess Diana ('the past week has seen a truly
heartfelt uniting of the whole kingdom' - for a discussion on the effect of Princess
Diana's death on widening the scope of the deictic nation see Chapter 8), Cartoon 57
shows Scotland as a chunk of land separated from the rest of British Isles.
Cartoon 80. Published in the Sunday Telesraph on 14 September 1997
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Cartoon 80 depicts Tony Blair with a victorious grin after the 1997 devolution
referendum. In addition to the gap between Scotland and the rest of UK, both cartoons
also depict Tony Blair, indicating his role in the potential separation. These images
are quite powerful in the sense of showing the potential outcome. Note that both
cartoons are from right of centre British newspapers. Scottish newspapers are not
resorting to such 'visual scaremongering'. Or as a popular Scottish tabloid, Daily
Record wrote:
it is evil to accuse all those who are going to vote "YES" of trying to Tear
Britain Apart. There is no sinister plot to put steel shutters across the A74 at
Gretna Green and to warn the English not to cross their Metal Bridge!
(DREC080279)
9.2. Concluding remarks
Looking at the cartoons has proved quite illuminating. The wide range of icons used
in the cartoons, the hidden - and often politically incorrect - messages,
personifications and topics used in cartoons all provide an interesting focus for
analysis. Looking at these aspects across time and across newspapers
(English/Scottish, broadsheet/popular, etc.) gives the researcher an insight into
popular culture and distils the various identity presentations of the time. The chapter
has shown that cartoons are a valid and worthy data on their own right. As almost all
cartoons in my data corpus reflect the main feature article on a given newspaper, then,
following Brinkman (1968), it is highly likely that they are capable of influencing
readers. Cartoons are definitely an interesting and useful area for the study of
discursive analysis of visual national identity construction.
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10. Conclusion
This thesis has analysed the discursive construction of national identities in the media,
focusing on the dialectic between the national Self and Other. I chose Scotland as my
case study. More specifically, I looked at two key discourse moments in the last
century - the devolution referenda of 1979 and 1997. Campaigns for constitutional
change at the last quarter of the twentieth century forced Scots to engage in serious
national navel-gazing. 'Who are we?' 'Where do we come from?' 'Where are we
going to?' 'Why do we need devolution?' - all those questions were asked, and
tentatively answered, in the various campaigns surrounding devolution in Scotland.
Reicher & Hopkins argue that 'such a context of division is bound to lead to a focus
on difference and hence a need to identify exactly what it is that renders any one
nation different from others' (2001 :viii). Those key discourse moments were therefore
ideal for gaining an insight into how Scottishness is constructed discursively in a
Self/Other dialectic.
There are a number of underlying assumptions and three main strands of analysis to
the thesis. Firstly, national identity is understood from a social constructionist
perspective. That is to say, that although I believe that nations need 'navels' - Ernest
Gellner (1996) himself has strongly made the case that they do not - I admit that these
can be imagined, invented and forged. Secondly, the identity construction is always
conducted in Self/Other dialectic. In order to know who one is, one needs to know
who one is not, and who the Other is. Although nationalism studies are full of
literature focusing on the threat of the Other, I argue that the Other need not be only
negative, but can also be positive. Thirdly, the media are one important arena where
such identity construction and maintenance takes place, and therefore provide a useful
focus of analysis. The media, of course, are not the only possible field of analysis -
large-scale surveys, in-depth interviews, analyses of literature, school curricula, and
political speeches and leaflets etc. can all provide an insight into how national
identities are constructed. But in today's media-saturated society, the media do matter.
Fourthly, following the recent trend of 'getting microscopic', I decided against large-
scale quantitative content analysis. As I am more interested in the way identities are
constructed discursively, the analysis is mostly qualitative. The theoretical chapters on
identity and the media, and more practical chapters on the data corpus and
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methodology prepare the way for the analysis of the media discourse in Scotland in
Chapters 7-9.
The three main strands of analysis in these three chapters focused on the Self/Other
dialectic, national deixes and visual constructions of Scottishness in two main Scottish
national broadsheets. In many ways, Scottish media provide a textbook case study, as
all the typical rhetorical strategies relevant to the discursive construction of national
identities, are used while discursively constructing Scottishness and otherness. The
differentiation, construction and transformation strategies, and attributional bias are
all common, and I look at them in more detail in my thesis.
Firstly, the Self/Other dialectic is common in the Scottish media, as Chapter 2
suggests. The most prominent negative Other is Westminster, being metonymically
used to represent the United Kingdom and its unsatisfactory system of government.
Conservative politicians, whether in Scotland or elsewhere in the UK, are also
represented by the media as alien to Scotland. England, the stereotypical 'arch-enemy'
of Scotland, features in the media, although not always in an explicitly negative light.
However, when England is praised, it is in relation to Scotland and, in accordance
with attributional bias, the positivity of the English Other is usually situational and not
dispositional. While the English and England are a prominent Other in the Scottish
media, they remain an outsider. The English in Scotland, who form the largest
foreign-born community north of the Border, are mentioned in only two leader articles
in the whole data corpus.
Wales and Northern Ireland, the other two devolved parts of the United Kingdom, are
discussed much less in the media. Indeed, I introduce a notion of the Welsh non-Other
in Chapter 7. As both Wales and Scotland held their devolution referenda in 1979 and
1997, I expected much more comparisons between two nations. But my data do not
support this expectation. When Wales is mentioned, it is usually in order to show
Scotland in a considerably better light than Wales. Instead of healthy sibling rivalry,
there is criticism and downplaying ofWales, to the extent of doubting the existence of
a Welsh nation. Effectively, these media take a de facto position that Northern Ireland
is another country altogether, and that Wales can hardly be described as a nation. This
implies that the only constituent nations of the United Kingdom are Scotland and
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England. Consequently, Scottish newspapers paint an image of the United Kingdom
as a bi- and not a multinational state.
Interestingly, there are many other non-Others in the Scottish media - or Others that
are not there. According to nationalism literature, immigrants are usually considered a
negative internal Other by many nations. But not in Scotland. Migrant communities
are not topoi that are discussed in relation to devolution in Scotland. Whether that is a
sign of the claimed civic nature of Scottish national self-description (and hence the
ethnic background of potential Scottish citizen does not matter) or the small (and
hence insignificant?) size of the migrant population in Scotland, is hard to tell. So
while depicting the UK as a bi-national state, Scotland is described as very
homogeneous and the multicultural dimension is missing. This is another form of
construction strategy, building a homogenous and united nation.
There is another Other that is not there. Having read Greenfeld (1992) and Colley
(1996), who both identify France as a key Other in the Britishing of Scotland - it was
surprising that France and the French were a non-Other in the Scottish media, despite
the Auld Alliance and Mary, Queen of Scots. Although I came across some extremely
stereotypical descriptions of French politicians while compiling my data corpus,
leader articles that discuss devolution do not make any references to France or the
French.
Although the Other is usually depicted in the media in a negative light, this is not
always the case. The othering can be much more subtle and often the Other is used as
a 'neutral' foil to show Scotland in better light. I also discuss the role of positive
Others in nation building and preserving in Chapter 2. My earlier research on Estonia
(Petersoo 2000) shows that the role of positive Others is very important for the
forging of national identity. In the Scottish media, Europe, especially Scandinavian
countries, figure as positive reference points. The latter are small, successful and
independent nation-states, and the media use them as an example of a possible future
model for Scotland. And 'the modern world' discourse is very strong in the media.
According to this normalising perspective, Scotland needs to re-enter the world of
nation-states as an equal player. This is necessary in order for Scotland to regain its
sapped self-confidence, self-respect, entrepreneurial spirit, dignity, sense of
246
responsibility, creativity, etc. - all essential for a strong and thriving nation. And, of
course, attributional bias is evident here as well - in 'normal' circumstances, Scotland
would have all these praiseworthy traits, and the current lack of these is situational,
not dispositional.
Secondly, deictic language in the media is very complex. Looking at the use of deixes
in the media is revealing, and Billig's concept of banal nationalism proved very
useful. I analyse the use of some of the smallest words in nationalism vocabulary -
the personal pronoun 'we'/'us'/'our', as well as other national deixes - 'nation',
'country', 'people' and 'history'. Billig suggests that the national deixes in the media
is rather uncontroversial and always designates the nation. He shows in Banal
Nationalism how newspaper headlines and articles use deictic notions 'we', 'nation'
etc. to refer regularly to Britain. And Brookes insists that even when the media do not
make explicit references to the nation, they are to be understood in national contexts.
But what does that mean in the Scottish media environment? Where is the 'nation' in
Scotland? Where is the deictic centre of the Scottish national media? The situation is
much more complicated in Scotland and this is reflected in deictic wandering. Even
within the same leader article - and indeed, within a single paragraph - the deixis can
refer to the newspaper, or Scotland, or Britain, or the abstract notion of 'the people of
the world'. It is in this sense that the deixis 'wanders'. Of course, as it is possible for
people to identify themselves both as Scots and as Britons, then it is not surprising
that these are occasionally used interchangeably in the media, either explicitly or
implicitly. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see how Scottish and British references are
used within the same leader article. Although one could expect there to be more
clarity in the use of deictic notions in the Scottish media (after all, it is often claimed
that the Scots can easily distinguish between what is Scottish and what is British; as
opposed to their allegedly terminally confused neighbours south of the Border), this is
not always the case. Still, the vast majority of leader articles use both the personal
deixis 'we' and other deictic notions to refer to Scotland. Although the occasional (yet
common) wandering of deictic notions is perhaps unsurprising in this context of
Scottish nation in British nation/state, it certainly undermines Billig's discussions of
the British national media and the simple recognition of deictic media language. The
newspaper reader in Scotland has to put a lot of (un- and subconscious) work into
interpreting the various deixes that they are confronted with when they conduct their
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daily newspaper reading ritual and (un- and subconsciously) recognise their national
selves. Hence identifying with their respective imagined national communities is not
as uncomplicated as Billig suggests. One should talk about the flexibility of meaning
rather than taken-for-grantedness of deictic notions.
And last, but not least, the thesis examines political cartoons. Although this proved to
be one of the more entertaining parts of the analysis and writing of the thesis, it was
probably the most difficult one. As visual sociology is a comparatively new area of
research, there are no clear guidelines how 'to do' visual sociology, no previous
studies to learn from. Therefore, I had to start from scratch and the conducted research
is only a preliminary attempt to understand the data. However, some tentative
suggestions can be made. First of all, the cartoons are there to illustrate the main
commentary and/or leader article. As the old proverb says, a picture is worth a
thousand words and should make a greater and more lasting impression on the reader.
What is derived from a cartoon many depend on the interpretation that the reader
brings to it. What is not in dispute is that cartoons do help readers to remember the
topic of the (leader) article better and are therefore worth paying attention to.
Secondly, cartoons are rich in (Scottish) iconography and looking at them across time
can inform us about popular culture and iconic figures, nicely distilling various
identity presentations of the time. And thirdly, cartoons are full of hidden messages
that would be unacceptable if spelled out in words in the era of political correctness.
Consequently, cartoons are an interesting area for the study of discursive analysis of
national identity construction visually.
There are several avenues for future research that came out of the thesis. Evidently, a
comparative study of Scottish and British media would be interesting. While it is
claimed that British media are national media, the constitutional change that has taken
place contests this very nationness. Scottish media are the national media for the
Scots, and this fits somewhat uneasily with the British national newspaper scheme. As
political developments have rendered the category 'British national media'
problematic both theoretically and analytically (Maclnnes et al. 2005), one needs to
reassess the research done so far on the topic. This, again, opens up possibilities for
useful comparative research on Scottish national and British national media - or
Welsh, English and Northern Irish media. Comparative analysis of various media
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would also allow one to research the Self/Other dialectic in more detail. Social
identity theories emphasise the importance of being recognised by the Other. Billig
suggests that sometimes the national 'we' will be - and needs to be - 'reassured to
have confirmed "ourselves" as the Other of "our" Other' (1995:12). My research
confirms that England is a strong Other for Scotland and hence important for the
discursive construction of Scottishness. If one would analyse the discursive
construction of Englishness in the newspapers south of the Border, would Scotland
recognise itself as the Other in the eyes of its own Other, i.e. England? Is the
relationship between the Self and Other the same in both directions? The analysis of
such an issue would considerably further our understanding of the processes involved
in national identity formation and maintenance. I have tried to show the usefulness of
my positive/negative and internal/external typology of the Others for national identity
construction, as outlined in Chapter 2 and discussed further in Chapter 7. In case of
Scotland, however, I did not follow the internal/external dyad as meticulously as I did
in case of Estonia. Nevertheless, the negative/positive dyad works well in case of
Scotland, and hence shows a way for a more thorough future research on the role of
positive Others in national identity formation and maintenance.
Another important issue for further research is the role of the media in general, and
newspapers in particular, in national identity construction. The specific and particular
nature of media language has possibly a very important role to play in identification
processes and has thus far received only scant attention from scholars. What are the
implications for debates about the moral nature of nationalism? Do the media have the
ability to fuel/tame phenomena like xenophobia and discrimination? All these issues
need to be researched further.
The thesis started out from two main directions - national identity studies and media
studies. It examined the relationship between mass media and national identity, and
the discursive construction of Self/Other dialectic in the media. National identity
formation and maintenance is a very multi-faceted process. While I started out by
looking at the Self/Other dialectic in the media, I became more detailed and
'microscopic' as my research progressed and was also looking at the deictic nature of
the media language and various linguistic means of identity construction. Moreover,
the discursive construction of national identity proved to be not only textual - that is
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why the thesis also looked at visual identity constructions in the form of political
cartoons.
I would like to believe that my thesis has made a certain contribution to various areas
of sociology, such as media, national identity, Scotland, discourse, visual sociology,
the use of deixis, and the concept of the Other. Much more needs to be done if we are
to understand the complexities of 'othering' in Scotland and in the wider world. I am
looking forward to exploring these during my post-doctoral fellowship.
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11. Appendices
11.1. Leader article data corpus
Leader article headlines -1979 devolution referendum (1 Feb - 31 Mar)





Feb 5 Scotland's choice
Feb 6 Very good afternoon
Feb 7 Agenda for the Assembly: Family law
Feb 8 Agenda for the Assembly: Educational stimulus
Feb 9 Agenda for the Assembly: The public purse
Feb 10
Feb 11
Feb 12 Agenda for the Assembly: Renovating the law The gap narrows
Feb 13 Agenda for the Assembly: Healthy discussion An act of faith - for Scotland
Feb 14 Agenda for the Assembly: Questions about
housing
Feb 15 Agenda for the Assembly: Tourist policies
Feb 16 Agenda for the Assembly: Prison affairs
Feb 17 Referendum debate Fair play ruling
Feb 18
Feb 19
Feb 20 Under examination
Feb 21 Not generous
Feb 22 The case against No
Feb 23 Why we must vote Yes Out of bounds
Feb 24
Feb 25
Feb 26 What the papers say
Feb 27 Scotland's exports
Feb 28
Mar 1 Moment of decision Scotland must give a decisive answer today
Mar 2
Mar 3 Callaghan's duty Does this have to be our last word?
Mar 4




Mar 9 Tactical options
Mar 10 Electoral ploys Government off the hook
Mar 11
Mar 12 - First steps








Mar 20 Market for votes
Mar 21
Mar 22
Mar 23 At bay
Mar 24 Tory options In the balance
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Mar 25
Mar 26 Here we go again
Mar 27
Mar 28
Mar 29 Rites of spring
Mar 30
Mar 31
Leader article headlines -1997 devolution referendum (11 Aug-10 Oct)
Date Scotsman (40) Herald (30)
Aug 11 A home rule peace process Why we need Tarn
Aug 12 Speaking up to honest Tarn Plight of the innocents
Aug 13 Edinburgh's blueprint
Aug 14 Dilemma over Dounreay
Aug 15
Aug 16 Devolution omens
Aug 17 Voter apathy looms
Aug 18 The wealth of the nation
Aug 19 Dewar must stop the rot Labour's damaging dither
Aug 20 The real decision we face
Aug 21 New faces for a new parliament Beauty tackles the beast
Aug 22 A view from the Mound Scottish tax-varying powers
Aug 23
Aug 24 Labour leaves two hostages to fortune
Aug 25 New role of Scottish Secretary The theory of devolution
Aug 26 Time to raise the home rule game
Aug 27 Refighting a losing battle Blair must offer leadership
Aug 28 Campaign stutters on
Aug 29 Industry must find a voice Racism in Scotland: Attacks on English a disgrace
Aug 30 Museums and the national interest
Aug 31 Raise the tone of devolution debate
Sep 1
Sep 2 A harmful hiatus
Sep 3 Decency and devolution Life must go on: Why we will foster devolution debate
Sep 4 Emotions of a nation: Perverse alchemists at work
Sep 5 Shadow boxing for Scottish business - Well-served by the system
- The Tory dilemma: Time to grasp the Home Rule
thistle
Sep 6 A monarch and her country
Sep 7 A glittering prize for Scotland
Sep 8 Raise the voice of a nation Challenge of change: An end to the democratic deficit
Sep 9 A helping hand for home rule Challenge facing Blair: Momentum of change must be
maintained
Sep 10 No hopers mar 'No' campaign
Sep 11 The rebirth of a nation A worthy and lively debate: All worries of apathy
have been dispelled
Sep 12 A triumph of the settled will
Sep 13 The first day of a new life Now let's celebrate: We wish you a happy new era
Sep 14 Considered view of Scotland the sober
Sep 15 The opposition Scotland needs Responsibility for Dounreay: Scottish Office must act
decisively
Sep 16 A leader rushing to judgement The Welsh split
Sep 17 Lessons for the leader: Hague should be given time to
settle
Sep 18 Time for public to have a say
Sep 19




Sep 23 Pondering the parliament Parliament's location: Leith out in front despite
problems
Sep 24 Honest choices and the SNP


















Agreeing not to differ (much)
Dewar on wrong course to port
Sermons and sound-bites
Pride of place for a Scottish parliament
Is Scotland in Europe or not?
The silence of the shamed
Scottish Tory realism: Home Rule best chance to revive
fortunes




Sundays are highlighted in grey to facilitate better reading of the table.
Devolution dates are highlighted in bold.
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11.2. Political cartoons data corpus
Cartoons in the 1979 and 1997 data corpus:
Cartoon ID Paper ID Cartoonist Source
1 SCOT030279 Bob Dewar Scanned
2 SCOT060279 Bob Dewar Scanned
3 SCOT 130279 Bob Dewar Scanned
4 SCOT 160279 Bob Dewar Scanned
5 SCOT170279 Bob Dewar Scanned
6 SCOT 190279 Bob Dewar Scanned
7 SUN 190279 Stanley Franklin 31690
8 SCOT200279 Bob Dewar Scanned
9 HERA200279 Turnbull Scanned
10 MAIL210279 Mac (Stan McMurtry) 31695
11 HERA220279 Turnbull Scanned
12 SCOT240279 Bob Dewar Scanned
13 HERA240279 Turnbull Scanned
14 TELS250279 John Jensen JJ0539
15 SUN270279 Stanley Franklin 31716
16 TELE270279 Nicholas Garland NG1871
17 SCOT270279 Bob Dewar Scanned
18 SCOT270279 Bob Dewar Scanned
19 HERA270279 Turnbull Scanned
20 EVES270279 Jak (Raymond Jackson) 31717
21 HERA280279 Turnbull Scanned
22 SCOT280279 Bob Dewar Scanned
23 DEXP280279 Michael Cummings 31718
24 SCOTO10379 Bob Dewar Scanned
25 HERAO 10379 Turnbull Scanned
26 DEXP010379 Carl Giles 32750
27 SUN010379 Stanley Franklin 32749
28 MAIL010379 Jon (John Philpin Jones) 32751
29 MAIL020379 Mac (Stan McMurtry) MA0079
30 HERA030379 Turnbull Scanned
31 DEXP030379 Jak (Raymond Jackson) 32755
32 SUN050379 Stanley Franklin 32758
33 TELE090379 Nicholas Garland NG1874
34 HERA010379 Turnbull Scanned
35 TELE160379 Nicholas Garland NG1877
36 TELE220379 Nicholas Garland 32814
37 HERA230379 Turnbull Scanned
38 TELE250379 John Jensen JJ0542
39 TELE270379 Nicholas Garland NG1878
40 SCOT 150897 High Scanned
41 HERA160897 Bill McArthur PC2639
42 SCOT 190897 High Scanned
43 HERA 190897 Bill McArthur PC2558
44 GUAR210897 Felix Bennett PC2437
45 HERA210897 Bill McArthur PC2562
46 SCOT210897 High Scanned
47 INDE210897 Dave Brown PC2436
49 SCOT280897 High Scanned
50 GUAR290897 Steve Fricker PC2451
51 HERA290897 Bill McArthur PC2804
52 SCOT030997 High Scanned
53 HERA040997 Bill McArthur PC2800
54 GUAR040997 Steve Bell PC2476
55 HERA080997 Bill McArthur PC2796
56 HERA080997 Bill McArthur PC2797
57 TIME080997 Peter Brookes PC2480
58 GUAR090997 Steve Bell PC2489
59 SCOT090997 High Scanned
60 HERA090997 Bill McArthur PC2785
61 INDE090997 Peter Schrank PC2484
62 HERA 100997 Bill McArthur PC2793
63 HERA 100997 Bill McArthur PC2649
64 SCOT100997 High Scanned
65 HERA 100997 Bill McArthur PC2648
66 TELE 100997 Nicholas Garland PC2513
67 TIME110997 Peter Brookes PC2486
68 HERA 110997 Bill McArthur PC2794
69 SCOT 110997 High Scanned
70 EXPR110997 Bernard Cookson PC2498
71 GUAR110997 Steve Bell PC2496
72 INDE110997 Peter Schrank PC2497
73 HERA 120997 Bill McArthur PC2792
74 HERA 130997 Bill McArthur PC2791
75 TIME 130997 Peter Brookes PC2502
76 TELE 130997 Nicholas Garland PC2511
77 SCOT130997 High Scanned
78 SOS 140997 Steve Cam.. Scanned
79 INDS140997 Peter Schrank PC2503
80 TELS140997 Trog (Wally Fawkes) PC2572
81 OBSE140997 Chris Riddell PC2504
82 GUAR150997 Martin Rowson PC2507
83 INDE 180997 Priestly PC2525
84 SCOT190997 Bill Scanned
85 OBSE210997 Chris Riddell PC2530
86 HERA..0997 Bill McArthur PC2647
87 HERA..0997 Bill McArthur PC2644
Total: 86
Other cartoons used in the thesis:
Cartoon ID Paper ID Cartoonist Source
88 TELE..0894 Nicholas Garland NG5563
98 TIME010397 Michael Cummings PC0978
115 TIME230797 Peter Brookes PC2278
117 TELE250797 Nicholas Garland PC2302
118 INDE250797 Dave Brown PC2303
123 EXPS270797 Martyn Turner PC2352
134 MIRR10056 Stanley Franklin 13398
145 SUN271175 Stanley Franklin 28773
177 SPECTATOR Nicholas Garland NG4696
192 TELS151198 Trog (Wally Fawkes) PC4954
228 GUAR200302 Steve Bell Scanned
234 DMAIL010704 Mac Scanned
Notes:
• The number in the first column indicates the cartoon ID in my cartoon database.
• The last column shows the ID of the cartoon in the CartoonHub database at
http://library.kent.ac.uk/cartoons. 'Scanned' indicates that the cartoon was scanned into my database
either from a microfilm printout or directly from the newspaper.
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11.3. Interview data corpus
Interviewee
number
Newspaper title Position Date Place IW
1 Independent Columnist 2002 London PP
2 Scotsman Columnist 2001 London MR
3 Scottish Daily Mail Scottish political 2002 Edinburgh MR
reporter
4 Scottish News of the Editor 2004 Glasgow PP
World
5 Scottish Daily Mail Staff reporter 2002 Glasgow MR
6 Scottish Daily Express Staff reporter 2003 Glasgow MR
7 Observer Columnist 2002 London MR
8 Observer Scotland 2002 Edinburgh MR
correspondent PP
9 Freelance Columnist 2002 Glasgow PP
10 Guardian Foreign Affairs Editor 2002 London PP
11 Times Scottish editor 2003 London JM
12 Scotland on Sunday Assistant editor 2002 Edinburgh MR
13 Scottish Daily Mail Sports reporter 2002 Glasgow, MR
14 Daily Telegraph Political 2002 Edinburgh PP
correspondent
15 Observer Former editor 2002 London PP
16 Western Mail 2003 London JM
17 Daily Telegraph Political 2002 London PP
correspondent
18 Record Features Editor 2003 Glasgow MR
Total: 18
Notes:
• Interviewers: John Maclnnes (JM), Pille Petersoo (PP), Michael Rosie (MR)
• All interviews have been transcribed verbatim.
11.4. Chronology of history
Year Month Event
843 Scots and Picts unified in the Kingdom of Alba
1034 Britons and Angles politically incorporated into Kingdom of Alba
1286-1371 Wars of Independence between Scotland and England
1314 Battle of Bannockburn, led by Robert the Bruce
1320 Declaration of Arbroath
1400-1600 The approximate period of the custom bonding
1560 'First' Reformation
1567 'Second' Reformation
1581 The Negative Confession (religious bond of James VI's household)
1587 James VI becomes King
1591-1662 Periodic witch-hunting panics
1603 England and Scotland share the monarch, i.e. the Union of Crowns
1609 The Band and Statute of Incolmkill (Iona)
1625 Charles I becomes King
1638 National Covenant
1643 Solemn League and Covenant
1649 Charles I beheaded
1650-1660 Cromwellian Interregnum
1666 Covenanting Uprising ('Pentland Rising')
1679 Covenanting Uprising ('Bothwell Bridge')
1689 First Claim of Right
1698 Scottish colony established at Darien (Panama), only to fail
1707 May 1 The Acts of Union between the parliaments of England and Scotland
Scotland's last parliament adjourned/dissolved
1712 Patronage Act •
1715 Jacobite uprising
1719 Jacobite uprising
1733 First church secession establishes the Associate Presbytery
1742 Centenary of the Solemn League and Covenant observed by Associate
Presbytery
1745 Jacobite uprising
1746 Defeat of Jacobites at battle of Culloden
1761 Second church secession established the Relief Church
1790-1830 Main period of Highland Clearances
1792 Friends of the People Society established (Radical organisation)
1793 United Scotsmen established (Radical organisation)
1801 Ireland added to the British state
1820 The'Radical War'
1832 First Reform Act
1842 Second Claim of Right
1843 Kirk splits in the 'Great Disruption'
1868 Second Reform Act
1880-1914 Approximate period of the 'Kailyard' literature
1882 Highland Land League formed
1884 Third Reform Act
1885 Secretary for Scotland established
1885 Crofter's Party established
1886 Scottish Home Rule Association established
Crofter's Holding Act
1886 The Scottish Office established giving 'a territorial, political and administrative
dimension' to 'the national institutional matrix' (Schlesinger 1998:61)
1888 Scottish Labour Party established
1893 Independent Labour Party established
1906 Labour Party in Scotland established



























Scottish Home Rule Association re-established
Peak of Red Clydeside labour unrest
Communist Party of Great Britain established
Scots National League established
John MacLean campaigns as a Scottish Worker's Republican candidate
Labour home rule bill put before parliament
Labour home rule bill put before parliament
National Party of Scotland established
Scottish Self-Government Party established
Scottish National Party founded out of earlier national parties
Communist Party adopts popular front, rapprochement with home rule
movement
Beveridge Report signals growth of Britain welfare state
Split in SNP over party versus movement strategies
Robert Maclntyre wins Motherwell by-election for SNP
Scottish National Assembly formed by John MacCormick
National Covenant Created
New Towns established
The Stone of Destiny briefly brought to Scotland from Westminster Abbey
The Commonwealth Immigration Act
Winnie Ewing wins Hamilton by-election for SNP
The Immigration Act
Assembly in Northern Ireland abolished
Scottish Local Government reorganisation; COSLA established
October Report of Royal Commission on the Constitution
February General Election. Labour Government elected (H. Wilson, PM). W. Ross
becomes Secretary of State for Scotland. SNP sends 11 MPs to Westminster.
June Privy Council Paper "Devolution within the United Kingdom: some alternatives
for discussion"
September Government White Paper "Democracy and Devolution: proposals for Scotland
and Wales" (Cmnd 5732)
October General Election. Labour Government returned (H. Wilson, PM). W. Ross
continues as Secretary of State for Scotland
November Government White Paper "Our Changing Democracy" (Cmnd 6348)
December Scottish Labour Party (SLP) formed
January SLP launched
April H. Wilson resigns and J. Callaghan appointed PM. B. Millan, Secretary of State
for Scotland; M. Foot, Lord President
May Keep Britain United (KBU) launched
August Government White Paper "Devolution to Scotland and Wales: supplementary
statement" (Cmnd 6585)
September Scotland is British (SIB) formed
November 23 SIB launched
November 29 Scotland and Wales Bill published
Nov/Dec Union Flag group formed
December 8 Shadow Cabinet decision to oppose Second Reading of Scotland and Wales Bill.
Resignation of shadow Secretary of State for Scotland A. Buchanan-Smith and
shadow Scottish Office spokesman Malcolm Rifkind. T. Taylor appointed
shadow Secretary of State for Scotland
December 16 Government announces intention of holding referenda in Scotland and Wales
before implementation of the Bill
February Guillotine (timetable) motion defeated.
Scotland and Wales Bill dropped.
March 21 Alliance for a Scottish Assembly formed
March 24 Government reaches agreement with Liberal Party (Lib.-Lab. Pact)
April J. Smith takes over responsibility for devolution
July Government announces intention of introducing separate Bills for Scotland and
Wales
November 4 Scotland Bill published
November 27 Labour Party (Scottish Executive) decides to go it alone in campaigning for a
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Yes vote in the Referendum
1978 Scottish Government Yearbook established
January 25 Cunningham amendment (40 per cent rule) passed
January 26 Yes for Scotland (YFS) launched
March Labour Party (Scottish Council) Conference endorses Scottish Executive line on
Referendum campaigning
July 31 Scotland Bill receives Royal Assent as The Scotland Act 1978
November 1 Date of Referendum announced
November 11 J. Smith appointed Minister of Trade
November 13 Labour Party Scottish Secretary rules out cross-party cooperation in Yes
campaign
November 14 First leaflet published by Labour Vote No (LVN)
November 26 Liberal Leader warns against proliferation of Yes groups
November 27 Alliance for an Assembly (AFA) launched
LVN launched
November 30 Scotland Says No (SSN) launched
Labour Movement Yes (LMY) campaign plans announced
December 20 Referendum Order (No. 1912) published
1979 '79 Group formed (within SNP)
February 12 LMY campaign launched by Prime Minister Callaghan
March 1 Referendum Day
March 2 Results announced. 63.8% turnout, 51.6% for parliament (but only 32.9% of the
total electorate).
March 28 Government defeated on No Confidence motion in House of Commons
May General Election. Conservative Government elected (Ms M. Thatcher, PM). G.
Younger, Secretary of State for Scotland
June 20 Repeal of The Scotland Act 1978
Campaign for a Scottish Assembly (later Parliament) established
First version of Siol Nan Gaidheal formed
The Nationality Act
General Election
Duration of magazine Radical Scotland
Greater London Council abolished
General election
Third Claim of Right
Scottish Labour Action formed (within Labour)
Second version of Siol Nan Gaidheal formed
March First meeting of the Scottish Constitutional Convention
'Poll Tax' introduced in Scotland
A Claim ofRightfor Scotland
Democratic Left formed out of Communist Party
April 9 General Election.
Tories returned in only 11 of the 72 Scottish seats.
Tommy Sheridan gets 20% of vote running for Westminster while serving
sentence for non-payment of Poll Tax.
Common cause established in run-up to general election
Democracy for Scotland formed in wake of general election ('The Vigil')
Scotland United formed in wake of general election
December 12 Democracy Declaration presented at the Scotland Demands Democracy Rally,
on the occasion of the European Summit
1993 Scottish Watch and Settler Watch begin appearing in the news
Coalition for Scottish Democracy formed
November 27 Rally to Recall Scotland's Parliament out of Adjournement
Campaign for a Scottish Parliament conducts mini-referendum in Falkirk
Scottish Affairs replaces the Scottish Government Yearbook
1994 Labour Party Scotland changes name to Scottish Labour Party
Consultative Conference on the establishment of a Scottish Senate (later the
Scottish Civic Forum)
Death of John Smith, Labour Party leader

























Scotland's Parliament, Scotland's Right published by Scottish Constitutional
Convention
Tory government returns Stone of Destiny to Edinburgh
General Election. Tories failed to return a single Scottish MP to Westminster.
Labour landslide victory.
Scotland FORward formed
The Government published its devolution White Paper, Scotland's Parliament
Devolution Referendum in Scotland. 60.4% turnout, 74.3% for Parliament,
63.5% for tax-varying powers.
Scotland Bill put before Westminster Parliament
First Elections to the Scottish Parliament
D-Day: Official opening of the Parliament
Second Elections to the Scottish Parliament
MSPs start moving into the new Holyrood Parliament Building
Notes:
• The sources vary, but I found Bochel et al. 1981 :xiii-xiv; Schlesinger 1998; and Hearn 2000
especially useful.
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11.5. Newspaper circulation in Scotland and the United Kingdom
1 Newspaper 1979 1997 July 2004
UK SCOT UK SCOT UK SCOT
Daily Record 700,000 465,885 437,269
The Sun 3,446,000 4,080,000 3,161,477 340,909
Daily Mail 1,726,000 1,788,000 2,285,106 125,933
Daily Star - 738,000 778,740 89,189
Daily Express 2,822,000 1,279,000 879,812 81,598
The Herald 115,000 76,548 76,130
The Scotsman 90,000 65,055 63,346
Daily Mirror 3,968,000 2,518,000 1,661,290 58,758
The Times 319,000 647,000 609,621 27,234
Daily Telegraph 1,331,000 1,060,000 856,938 23,517
The Guardian 319,000 400,000 324,405 14,382
The Independent - 294,000 226,054 12,439
Financial Times 181,000 294,000 127,614 6,348
Notes:
• The table only covers daily newspapers
• The titles are sorted according to their current sales figures in Scotland.
• Data for 2003 is from the website of the Audit Bureau of Circulations (www.abc.org.uk)
• Data for 1979 not available. The numbers are for 1975 as reported in Tunstall (1996:41,47,54)
• Data for 1997 not available. The numbers are for 1995 as reported in Tunstall (1996:41,47,54)
• Data for Scottish newspapers for 1979 is from Brown (1979)
• The Audit Bureau of Circulation categorises 'national titles' as following:
o Popular papers: Daily Mirror, Daily Record, Daily Star, The Sun
o Mid-market papers: Daily Express, The Daily Mail
o Quality papers: Financial Times, The Daily Telegraph, The Guardian, The Herald,
The Independent, The Scotsman, The Times
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